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A number of recent papers using a linear specification have indicated that private property 
institutions are a fundamental determinant of growth. In my first paper, I use a semi-nonparametric 
partially linear model to provide evidence against a linear specification and to support nonlinearities in 
the relationship. The findings indicate that the exogenous component of private property institutions 
contributes positively to economic growth for countries in the lower and middle stages of private property 
institutions and have a negative relationship with economic growth of countries having the highest level 
of private property institutions. These results are confirmed when using an appropriate parametric 
specification and estimation by GMM. When using different measures of private property institutions as 
the ‘rule of law’ and ‘political freedom’, the results are consistent. 
 
The second paper documents a nonlinear relationship between financial development and income 
inequality across developing and developed countries, and uncovers the empirical root of this 
phenomenon. The source is in two parts: there is a close relationship between the level of economic 
development and the level of financial development across countries; and the impact of financial 
development on income inequality is contingent on the level of economic development. 
 
 The 1990s saw considerable economic turbulence due to varying degrees of financial crisis in 
many countries in Asia and Latin America. In the third paper, I document that a combination of external 
shocks, weak institutional background and excessive bank lending contributed to the differential 
responses by countries to financial crisis. Using a version of the models of Bernanke and Gertler (1990) 
and Jensen and Meckling (1976), the paper builds a theoretical model to show that institutional problems, 
coupled with external shocks, can affect the capital structure of firms and lead to a choice of projects 
having low net present value, which carries implications for aggregate investment and growth.. In the 
empirical counterpart, the study shows that proxies for weak institutions of corporate finance, excessive 
bank lending and terms of trade shocks played a central role in determining the magnitude of growth and 
investment collapse as observed in these regions. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
My dissertation focuses on recent issues in the economic growth and development literature. 
The questions addressed identify potential growth determinants by exploring heterogeneity 
in growth, and by examining the relative success of alternate factors in explaining cross-
country growth experiences. In recent years, there has been a breakthrough in econometric 
estimation techniques and availability of new datasets, enabling enhanced searches for 
answers to fundamental questions in this area of research. For example, well-known 
concerns expressed by pioneer economists Harberger (1987) and Solow (1994) and many 
others regarding the assumption of a common linear model for a set of widely different 
countries can now be addressed by more general models that allow for heterogeneity. In the 
first two chapters, I use parametric and recently advanced semi-parametric estimators to 
uncover potential nonlinearities so that the marginal effect of a particular variable can differ 
across countries and over time. In the third chapter, with the help of recently available data 
on institutional and financial infrastructure across countries, I examine a specific episode, 
the financial crises witnessed in the 1990s decade, to investigate why certain countries have 
the ability to recuperate from external shocks relatively quickly, while others are 
overwhelmed. The following paragraphs give a description of my dissertation. 
 
The first chapter explores the relationship between institutions and growth. A 
number of papers (Hall and Jones, 1999, Acemoglu et al. 2002, Rodrik et al. 2004) use linear 
growth models to document that institutions are a fundamental determinant of economic 
growth. Motivated by Douglass North (1990), I explore whether private property institutions 
have a differential relationship with economic growth when countries are in different 
thresholds of their level of institutions. The investigation uses a combination of parametric 
and semi-nonparametric methods that allow for more flexible model specifications. The 
nonlinear parametric specification is estimated using a combination of instrumental variable 
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and generalized method of moments methods. The semi-nonparametric model is estimated 
using the sieve minimum distance estimator. Results obtained using both methodologies 
indicate a nonlinear relationship in which the development of property rights institutions is 
associated with enhanced growth at low and intermediate levels of institutions but with 
depressed growth when economies have attained a high level of institutional development. 
Using the index ‘constraint on executive’ as a proxy for private property institutions, the 
results indicate that institutions have a positive relationship with growth only when its level 
is below 6. After this level, the relationship is found to be negative. The results are 
confirmed using different measures of institutions such as ‘rule of law’ and ‘democracy’. 
 
In the second chapter, I explore the relationship between financial development and 
income inequality. A wide literature (King and Levine, 1993, Levine and Zervos, 1998) 
documents that financial intermediary development is beneficial for economic growth. 
However, its relationship with income distribution is not widely established. Evidence from 
theoretical studies suggests alternative predictions, and due to unavailability of reliable data 
on these variables until recently, empirical evidence has been lacking. This paper is an 
attempt to shed light on this empirical relationship. I address this question using two 
methodologies; GMM estimation of a parametric specification and sieve minimum distance 
estimation of a semi-nonparametric specification. The benchmark model is a nonlinear 
specification that includes control variables common to the cross-country literature on 
growth and financial intermediation.  The GMM panel estimator and the semi-nonparametric 
estimator produce consistent findings. The results indicate that income inequality tends to 
decrease as countries initially develop their financial infrastructure; beyond a certain 
threshold, the relationship is non-negative. When using the indicator ‘private credit’, I find 
that the inflexion point is approximately at the level of 55 percent of GDP. The finding is in 
accordance with the theoretical predictions by Galor and Maov (2000). The results are robust 
to modification in the conditioning information set, alternations in the sample in accordance 
with levels of per capita income and using alternate measures of financial development.  
 
In the third chapter, I explore potential growth determinants by examining whether 
varying institutions of corporate governance and excessive bank lending contributed to the 
differential response of countries to financial crisis witnessed in 1997. To investigate these 
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factors, I build a simple model to show that the quantity of investment spending is sensitive 
to the share of borrowers’ net worth in the project, the quality of institutions protecting 
investors, and the possibility of a negative shock. Based on comparative statics exercises, I 
find that large external shocks, coupled with relatively low levels of corporate governance, 
have detrimental effects on aggregate output and investment. Moreover, rapid increases in 
external lending in prior years induce greater risk of output/ investment collapse. In the 
empirical analysis, I find that for a set of countries including and excluding crisis countries, 
these three factors were important in explaining the growth and investment collapse during 
five years immediately after the crisis in 1997. The results are robust when controlling for 
simultaneity and for additional determinants as advanced in literature. 
 
The results have some policy implications. From the first paper, the analysis reveals 
that for countries enjoying low and intermediate level of institutions, growth is enhanced 
when accountability groups have more power to regulate the state machinery from 
expropriation. However, for economies having the highest level of institutions, increasing 
the level of “checks and balances” in the decision making process can stifle the growth 
process by introducing more regulation within the existing system of institutions. From the 
second paper, the analysis reveals that financial development for developing economies 
corresponds with reduced income disparity and poverty among various sections of the 
society. This is also witnessed from the success enjoyed by micro-credit institutions across 
the world in improving living standards of the poorest sectors of the economy. For more 
developed economies, the findings indicate that financial development is not an important 
factor when designing policies aimed at decreasing income inequality. From the third paper, 
the findings indicate that with greater integration of global financial markets, strong 
corporate governance, vigilant supervision, and heightened screening of potential investment 
projects by banks and other financial intermediaries during economic boom periods are 
important components to stabilize emerging economies who are recipients of large 
investments.  
  
The chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 documents the relationship 
between private property institutions and economic growth. Chapter 3 examines the 
relationship between income inequality and financial development and documents a 
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nonlinear relationship. Chapter 4 examines the Asian financial crisis and documents the 
effect of weak corporate governance institutions, financial fragility, and external terms of 
trade shocks on growth and investment declines witnessed during this episode.  
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2.0  PRIVATE PROPERTY INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: AN 
EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF NONLINEARITIES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the recent cross-country growth literature, the role of institutions is widely recognized as 
having a positive relationship with economic growth. A number of papers have shown that 
private property institutions are an important determinant of economic growth, trumping 
other variables measuring macroeconomic policies (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 
2003; Rodrik et al., 2004). This study attempts to contribute to this area by investigating the 
relationship between private property institutions and economic growth of countries at 
different thresholds of their level of institutions. While most recent papers have assumed a 
linear relationship between institutional development and growth, the study shows that the 
relationship is more complex and nonlinear. The findings indicate that the development of 
property rights institutions is positively associated with growth at low and intermediate 
levels of property right development, but negatively associated when a high level of 
development has been attained.  Also, the positive relationship is relatively weak for 
countries having the lowest level of institutions, but is more pronounced as countries 
develop their institutions over time.  
 
The role of institutions in enhancing the growth and development of economies was 
explored by Douglass North (1990), drawing from writings by Coase (1937) and Williamson 
(1985). North delineated the role of formal and informal institutions in shaping incentives of 
economic agents and in creating opportunities for production and enterprise. His theory 
extended the role of institutions to the development of laws protecting private property, their 
enforcement, and regulation. In particular, the theory linked the transformation of resources 
to productive units, the costs of transactions in exchange of goods, and the costs of 
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enforcement, to the quality of institutions existing in a society. Recent literature (Acemoglu 
2005), drawing from North’s theory, define private property institutions as rules and 
regulations protecting the citizens against the power of government and elites. In this sense 
the concept of private property institutions is closely linked to the distribution of political 
power in the society and in regulating the relationship between ordinary citizens, politicians, 
and elites who have access to political power. In accordance, measures of private property 
institutions depict the extent of checks and balances between various parts of the decision-
making process of the economies. 
 
The beneficial impact of having good private property institutions is widely 
suggested in various studies in growth. For countries having moderate levels of institutional 
development, growth is enhanced when accountability groups have more power to regulate 
the state machinery from expropriation by the ruling executive. As a result, transaction costs 
and other rent-seeking costs in production are reduced. Hence investors feel more secure and 
the market mechanism works efficiently, resulting in growth. In an environment wherein the 
enforcement of property rights is reliable, firms tend to increase investment in fixed capital, 
use capital intensive technology, and have long-term horizons.  
 
The differential impact of institutions on growth can be discerned when examining 
conflict-ridden countries having no real institutions that protect private property. In countries 
having the lowest level of institutions as measured by independent research organizations, 
political “accountability groups” such as legislatures or councils of nobles have no control 
over the actions of the ruling regime or chief executive. Many of these countries (for 
example, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda and Zaire in the sample of countries 
considered in this paper) have the lowest value in the index of private property institution, 
“constraint on executive”1. These economies also have some of the lowest per capita 
incomes in the world. The political scenario in these countries can be collectively described 
by examining the case of Ghana. In Ghana, the Convention People’s Party (CPP) ruled over 
the nation since its independence in 1957 under the leader Kwame Nkrumah. By 1960, the 
leader took many actions to suppress the opposition and alter the Constitution to strengthen 
                                                     
1 This index is popularly used in empirical literature as a measure of the extent of institutions 
supporting private property. The index is described in detail in section 3.  
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his political power. The bad economic policies adopted under this regime were analyzed by 
Bates (1981) and discussed in Acemoglu et al (2003). Bates showed that the government 
used the state Cocoa marketing board and exchange rate policy to systematically expropriate 
the cocoa farmers who dominated the economy and exports. In later years the distortionary 
policies continued as these economies could not develop a system of checks and balances. 
The political scenarios in Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda and Zaire were similar to Ghana, with 
totalitarian leaders using the state machinery to expropriate resources over this period.  
 
When totalitarian regimes improve their system of checks and balances, the process 
is usually conflict ridden, and improvements can have a turbulent impact on the real 
economy. In the sample of countries under our study, Algeria, Ethiopia, Togo, and Morocco 
have seen the value of private property institutions in the index of ‘constraint of executive’ 
rise from 1 to 2 over the period 1970 to 1990. An implication of the move from 1 to 2 for 
this index is that from a state of complete control over its actions, the executive faces some 
real but limited constraints in the exercise of its power. The transition is usually not smooth. 
For example, in Algeria, the main political transition which laid more power in the hands of 
“accountability groups” occurred following the political uprising in 1989. Elections were 
held in 1992, but political instability over the period 1986-1991 lead to economic instability, 
with economic growth falling to an annual average of 0.4 percent in 1990s from 3.09 percent 
in the 1970s.  In Togo, President Eyadema ruled the nation from 1969 onwards after ousting 
President Grunitzky in a bloodless military coup. Since then till the mid 1980s, political 
parties were banned and all constitutional processes suspended. The president ran 
uncontested elections in 1979 and 1986. However, in 1989-90 there was some movement 
toward developing a real opposition party. Thus the political transition happened in late 
1980s till a new Constitution was adapted in 1992 which gave some authority to the 
Opposition party. The change in political structure resulted in an increase in level of 
institutions from 1 in 1970 and 1980 to 2 in 1990. During this period, the annual average 
growth rate dropped from 0.16 percent in 1970s to -0.51 percent in 1990s.  
 
Similarly, Morocco moved from a level of 1 in the index of ‘constraint on executive’ 
to 2 over 1970 to 1990. Its growth rate averaged at 2.7 percent over the decade of 1970s, 1.6 
percent in 1980s and 0.4 percent in the decade of 1990s. From these examples, I infer that 
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while countries are under a totalitarian system in which there is no system of checks and 
balances in the powers of the decision making body, resources are expropriated and rents 
transferred to agents supporting the ruling body. But when the political system changes to 
bring some accountability, the resulting power struggle has an adverse impact on the real 
economy. As a result, economic growth declines during this period. The decline may be 
caused by even worse expropriation and redistribution or it may be a result of the unstable 
political scenario affecting the investment climate with investors having a bleak view of the 
safety of their assets. The above situation is summarized in North (1990) as follows:  
The costs of transacting depend on the cost of measurement and the costs of 
enforcement.  Enforcement is the critical obstacle to increasing specialization and 
division of labor. Enforcement poses no problem when it is in the interests of the 
other party to live up to agreements. But without institutional constraints, self 
interested behavior will foreclose complex exchange, because of the uncertainty that 
the other party will find it in his or her interest to live up to the agreement. The 
transaction cost will reflect the uncertainty by including a risk premium, the 
magnitude of which will turn on the deflection by the other party and consequent 
cost to the first party. Throughout history the size of this premium has largely 
foreclosed complex exchange and therefore limited the possibilities of economic 
growth. [p. 32 ] 
 
The paper also explores the possibility that for countries having the highest level of 
private property institutions, a further extension in private property institutions may have an 
adverse impact on economic growth.  In the case of these economies, increasing the existing 
level of institutions implies increasing the level of “checks and balances” in the decision 
making process, sometimes in terms of more regulation within existing system of 
institutions. An example is the chronic ‘cabinet instability’ that is witnessed in multiparty 
democracies as in India, Pakistan, South Africa as in the sample of countries considered. 
These countries have the highest value in the index of ‘constraint on executive’ in 1990. The 
implication is that the accountability groups for these countries have more power than the 
ruling executive, and in many instances important legislation are stalled as a result of multi 
party politics which ultimately effects growth adversely.  
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Another instance wherein higher levels of regulation may have an adverse impact on 
growth by increasing transaction, transformation, and enforcement costs can be seen in cases 
of corporate reform laws like the Sarbanes –Oxley Act.  This law was passed by the US 
Congress in the year 2002 after accounting scandals hit multinational companies as Enron, 
WorldCom, and others. The act mandated rigorous accounting standards and inspection by a 
specialized team of independent experts of the company accounts. Fallout of the reform act 
is that it has severely affected the overall costs of big businesses as the new compliance 
regulations involve huge costs in auditing and insurance. A survey by Korn/Ferry 
International found that the law cost Fortune 1000 companies an average of $5.1 million in 
compliance expenses in 2004. This has resulted in many cases of small U.S. and big foreign 
firms deregistering from the U.S. stock exchanges. The incidence has been a blow to the US 
capital markets and to the smaller companies that depend on these capital markets for 
financing. There is a widespread belief that the Act will make capital more expensive and 
lower the rate of growth in the US. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is an example of how 
“accountability groups” can impose regulations on existing practices of business and 
legislation which in the end affect economic growth negatively.  
North (1990) asserts:  
Even with the relatively secure property rights that exist in high income countries, it 
is possible and indeed frequently the case that a technical combination that involves 
costly monitoring may be less efficient than a technique that has a lower physical 
output but less variance in the product or lower costs of monitoring workers.[p. 110] 
 
Thus in countries with relatively high per capita incomes, transactions costs such as 
legal fees, title insurance, credit rating searches – and also costs in terms of time that must be 
devoted to gathering all the information – results in the consumption of resources that could 
have been allocated to more productive means.  
 
In this paper, I explore potential nonlinearities in the relationship between private 
property institutions and economic growth, based on an otherwise standard reduced-form 
model used in cross-country growth studies. In the 1990s, the growth literature focused on 
the effectiveness of macroeconomic policies in promoting cross-country growth. But since 
the late 1990s, studies have conclusively shown the supremacy of institutions over 
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macroeconomic policies (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2002; Hall and Jones, 1999; 
Parente and Prescott, 1999).  More recently, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen 
(2003) used a linear framework to investigate causal relationships between institutions and 
macroeconomic policies on economic growth, crises, and volatility, and provided evidence 
that countries that inherited ‘weak’ institutions from their colonial past were more likely to 
experience high volatility and economic crises. In this study, apart from assuming a 
nonlinear specification for the variable measuring institutions, I use the same framework as 
in the above quoted paper. Thus in the empirical exercise, the benchmark model is a linear 
specification having the same variables as in Acemoglu et al. (2003). The nonlinear 
specification is estimated separately using parametric and semiparametric techniques. The 
semiparametric estimation method allows for the derivation of consistent estimates without 
any assumption regarding the functional form for the nonlinear component. The 
semiparametric model is a partially linear model that allows the nonlinear components to 
enter additively. The approach focuses on estimating and then graphically presenting 
evidence on the nature of these nonlinearities. The graphical representation, as also seen in 
recent studies of the non-linear components (Banerjee and Duflo 2003; Liu and Stengos, 
1999, Kalaitzidakis et al, 2001) provides direct evidence of the presence of nonlinearities in 
the relationship between property rights institutions and economic growth. As a further 
check for the robustness of these results, I estimate separate regressions using a parametric 
square and cubic specification of the measure of private property institutions and arrive at 
similar results showing evidence of nonlinearities in the relationship. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature 
investigating the effect of institutions on growth. Section 3 provides the details on the data 
used, the empirical strategy, the benchmark linear and semiparametric estimation results, and 
the evidence of nonlinearities in the relationship between private property institutions and 
growth. Section 4 provides robustness checks by testing the data for outliers, observations 
with large influence, and gives the results from these tests. Next, the section gives a glimpse 
of contingencies in the relationship between initial income and the measure of private 
property institutions by splitting the entire sample according to poor, middle and rich 
economies under income standards of classification as defined by the World Bank. Also the 
section offers further evidence using other measures of private property institutions as the 
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‘rule of law’ (Kauffman, 2002) and ‘political rights’ (Freedom House, 1997). Section 5 
concludes. 
2.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
INSTITUTIONS AND GROWTH: A SURVEY OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Over the past decade there has been resurgence in studies investigating the 
relationship between growth and institutions. The upshot of this strand of literature is that 
political and economic institutions are viewed as a major determinant of economic 
outcomes. The pioneering papers by Jones (1981), North and Thomas (1981), North (1981) 
and Olson (1981) inspired a generation of economists to look for alternative explanations of 
the broad and persistent differences observed in economic performance among nations. In 
early work examining the influence of institutions on growth, Kormendi and Meguire (1985) 
and Scully (1988) used cross-sectional growth regressions and Gastil’s indexes of civil and 
political rights. These papers suffered from endogeneity problems because the indexes of 
civil and political rights are measured contemporaneously with growth and their results were 
inconclusive. Mauro (1995) found that efficient bureaucracy indexes are a significant 
determinant of investment. Knack and Keefer (1995) used two institutional indexes in 
growth regressions capturing the security of contract and property rights, the ICRG index 
and BERI index. They reported that institutional indexes were significant in the investment 
regression, confirming indirect effect on growth through factor accumulation. Barro (1996), 
in a panel study over the sample period 1960-90, used ICRG and BERI indexes of property 
rights to measure their impact on growth. The ‘rule of law’ index was found to have a 
positive and significant impact on growth, but the BERI index was only marginally 
significant, which was attributed to the reduced sample size due to unavailability of data. 
Hall and Jones (1999), following Knack and Keefer (1995), used a weighted average 
measure of institutions from the ICRG indexes, and showed that differences in social 
infrastructure across countries caused large differences in capital accumulation, educational 
attainment, and productivity, and hence accounted for cross-country income differences. 
Rodrik et al. (2002), using the index of ‘rule of law’ as proxy for institutions by Kaufman et 
al (2002), estimated the contributions of institutions, geography, and trade in determining 
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income levels of countries, and found significant evidence that the measure of institutions 
had strong effects, and that the other variables had insignificant effects once the measure of 
institutions is controlled for.  
 
The study by Acemoglu et al. (2006) is the nearest to the concept and measure of 
institutions followed in this paper. They proxied for private property institutions with the 
index ‘constraint on executive’ by Polity IV, and showed that private property institutions 
were a major influence on long-run growth, investment and financial development, while 
contracting institutions measured with legal formalism by Djankov et al. (2002) had weak 
effects on growth and investment. The next section gives the empirical methodology and 
linear estimation results. 
2.3 THE ESTIMATION METHOD: DATA, PARAMETRIC AND SEMI-
PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION 
2.3.1 Data details 
The empirical analysis is based on data for 58 countries2. The estimation procedure 
is based on pooled cross-country data averaged over the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, so that 
there are three observations per country (1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000). The dependent 
variable is the growth rate of per capita gross domestic product (GDP). The variables used as 
regressors can be classified as stock and flow variables3. The stock variables are measured at 
the beginning of the decade, and consists of initial income, which is logged per capita real 
(chain weighted) GDP measured in 1970, 1980 and 19904; secondary school enrolment 
rates, defined as gross enrolment ratio for secondary school education from the Barro and 
Lee data set for the year 1970, 1980, 1990; and also the preferred measure of private 
                                                     
2 The list of countries are given in the Appendix A1. The countries are chosen as per the sample of 
countries used by authors Acemoglu et al (2002). Though the Acemoglu et al (2003) database 
includes 64 countries, the restrictions on availability of data for controls limit the sample to 58 
countries. 
3 Appendix A3 gives a summary statistics of the data used. 
4 Source is Penn world tables 6.1. 
  12
property institutions, ‘constraint on executive’ for the year 1970, 1980, 1990 from the Polity 
IV dataset. The flow variables are a set of macroeconomic policies measured as averages 
over the decades following Acemoglu et al (2003). They are: average government 
consumption as a percent of GDP, defined as average of real government consumption to 
real GDP (Source: Barro and Lee dataset); the log of average inflation as a percent of GDP 
for each decade, defined as log of annual inflation in the consumer price index (Source: 
World Development Indicators 2005); and the log of an average measure of overvaluation of 
exchange rates for each decade, defined as an index of real overvaluation of the official 
exchange rate (Source: Easterly and Levine, 2002). The other controls are time dummies for 
decades 1980 and 1990.  
The benchmark OLS estimation model specification is: 
itititititit yZIQY εθγβα +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅= −1'' ln  ,            (2.1) 
where Yit is the average growth rate of the decades 1970, 1980, 1990; Qit is the vector of 
macroeconomic policies; Iit is the measure of institutions, Zit is the vector of controls, ln yit  is 
the log of initial GDP per capita income and εit  is the random error term.  
 
Since the property rights institutions are the focus of the study, the preferred 
measure ‘constraint on executive’ is briefly described in this paragraph. The index is from 
the Polity IV database based on the work of Robert Gurr. The measure corresponds to 
procedural rules constraining state action, and highlights the close relationship between 
private property institutions and political institutions.  It measures the extent of constitutional 
limits on the exercise of arbitrary power by the executive. Theoretically, a society wherein 
elites and politicians are effectively constrained is expected to experience less infighting 
between various groups to take control of the state, and to pursue more sustainable policies. 
The polity dataset reports a qualitative score between 1 and 7 for every independent country. 
This measure is used extensively in the recent empirical literature on institutions and growth; 
for example Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006) showed that this measure is correlated with other 
measures of institutional quality and economic development. Another important 
consideration is that this is the only measure of institutions available from 1950 onwards for 
most countries, including the sample of countries chosen. The next paragraph discusses the 
implications of having a qualitative score of 1 to 7 so as to better understand the implications 
of nonlinearities of this variable in economic growth.  
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 This paragraph aims to provide an interpretation of situations that prompt 
movements from a particular level to another level in this index. The index refers to the 
extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of the chief executive, 
whether they are individuals or collectives5. The ‘constraints’ are usually imposed by 
accountability groups such as legislatures in democracies, to the ruling party in a one-party 
state, or councils of nobles in a monarchy. When a country has a score of 1 in the index, it 
implies that there is no regular limitation (apart from removal of executive through 
assassinations or coups) on the power of the executive. Examples of this situation are when 
Constitutions are frequently revised or suspended at the executive’s initiative; when 
Constitutional restrictions are ignored; when the executive appoints the members of 
accountability groups and removes them at will; when rules by decree are repeatedly used; 
when the legislature cannot initiate legislation, or veto or suspend actions of the executive. 
The score of 2 is an intermediate category. The score of 3 implies that there is some real but 
limited constraints on the actions of the executive. An examples is when there is evidence 
that the legislature initiates some categories of legislation; when the legislature blocks 
implementation of executives acts and decrees; when ruling parties take legislative actions 
independently of the executive; when there is an independent judiciary; when the legislature 
approves of some appointments made by executive; when attempts by executive to change 
some constitutional restrictions are not adopted and finally when there is a civilian executive 
but policy decisions reflect military demands. The score of 4 is an intermediate category. 
The score of 5 indicates that the executive has more authority than any accountability group 
but is subject to substantial constraints by them. An examples is when there is evidence of 
the legislature often modifying executive proposals for legislation; when the legislature 
refuse funds to the executive; when the legislature make important appointment in 
administrative posts; when the legislature refuse the executive permission to leave the 
country. The score of 6 is an intermediate category. The score of 7 is when accountability 
groups have power equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. For 
example, when there is evidence that a legislature initiates most of legislation; when the 
executive is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on their support for 
                                                     
5 The source of information in this paragraph from the Polity IV Project: Dataset User’s Manual, pp 
23-24. 
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remaining in office; and when there is chronic ‘cabinet instability’ in multi-party 
democracies. The next paragraph gives a description of the method to tackle endogeneity 
issues in the estimation process. 
 
OLS estimates are inconsistent due to endogeneity and measurement error problems. 
This is because both institutions and macroeconomic policy variables are endogenous, so 
estimation by OLS may be capturing reverse causality, or the effect of some omitted 
characteristics (geography) on both policy (or institutions) and the economic outcome. Also, 
the variables may be measured with error, so OLS estimates can have a downward 
attenuation bias. To address these problems, the two-stage least squares estimation procedure 
is employed using the variable settler mortality as a distinct instrument for institutions. 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) developed this instrument based on studies by Curtin (1989, 1998) 
and Gutierrez (1986), and showed that differences in mortality rates serve as an exogenous 
source of variation in the historical development of institutions among former colonies, and 
hence satisfy the exclusion criteria that the instrument should be correlated with the 
endogenous regressor and should be orthogonal to any omitted characteristics and other 
regressors. The interpretation given is as follows: in the colonial era of 17th and 18th century, 
European settlements developed in areas when disease environments were favorable to 
health. In these locations, Europeans migrated in large numbers and developed political and 
economic institutions similar to, or even better than, contemporary institutions in Europe. In 
such settler colonies as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, colonialists 
rapidly developed and maintained good institutions, with tight constraints on politicians and 
elites, and secure property rights. In contrast, in places in which the Europeans did not settle, 
because they faced high mortality rates (for example in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and 
Central America), relatively extractive institutions is established, with power concentrated in 
the hands of small elite. These countries typically ended up with weaker  institutions at the 
beginning of the postwar era.  
 
The identification strategy for the 2SLS estimation is to use the settler mortality 
measure as an instrument for institutions.  In all regressions I instrument for institutions 
using log settler mortality. The first-stage regression specification is as follows: 
iiiit uXsmI +⋅+⋅+= ϕφλ  ,               (2.2) 
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where smi refers to log settler mortality, Xi are the control variables and ui is the random 
error term. The exclusion restriction is that in the population Cov(εi, smi ) = 0, that is, settler 
mortality is not correlated with any unobserved determinant of growth (after controlling for 
covariates). Panel B in Table 2.1 gives first-stage estimates for settler mortality. The 
estimates are negative (-0.74, s.e 0.21) and significant at the 1 percent level, and similar to 
the estimates reported in Acemoglu et al. (2003). They report a value of -0.91 (with t-
statistics of 5.68) using original ex-colonies sample of 64 countries from AJR (2001) for the 
period 1970-97. 
 
To explore for nonlinearities parametrically, I estimate the above specification with 
the index of ‘constraint on executive’ entering at first as a quadratic and then as a cubic 
form. These estimations are undertaken using GMM estimation techniques using square and 
cubic terms of settler mortality as instruments for the variable for private property 
institutions when they are entered as a quadratic or as a cubic form. The population moment 





⎛ ′−′ βiii XYZE  where ( )′′′= 21 , ZZZ  and Z1 indicates the matrix of instruments for 
institutions and Z2  is the matrix of instruments for other variables.  
 
To test the validity of the moment conditions, I use the test of over-identifying 
restrictions developed by Hansen (1982) and Newey and West (1987). The null hypothesis 
of Hansen’s test is that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, that is the instrumental 
variables are not correlated with the error term. The test statistic is simply the sample size 
times the value attained by the objective function at the GMM estimate (the J-statistic). 
Hansen’s test is distributed as χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of moment 
conditions minus the number of parameters to be estimated. These statistics are reported in 
the tables. 
2.3.2 Parametric Estimation Results 
Panel A in Table 2.1 gives the OLS, 2SLS and GMM coefficient estimates from the 
linear model. The first and third columns have all explanatory variables in the linear 
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specification of equation (2.1). The first column reports the OLS coefficient estimates of the 
baseline model, while the third reports the 2SLS estimates after controlling for endogeneity. 
The second and fourth columns report the estimates of a quadratic specification of constraint 
on executive in the attempt to capture the potential nonlinearities in the relationship between 
private property institutions and growth. The fifth column reports estimates obtained when 
constraint on executive enters as a cubic function in the regression specification. 
 
Table 2.1.  Private Property Institutions, Macroeconomic Policies and Growth 
Explanatory variable OLS (I) OLS(II) 2SLS  (III) GMM  (IV) GMM  (V) 
Panel A: Dependent variable is Growth rate of GDP per capita 
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R2 0.24 0.248    
Hansen’s J    [0.92] [0.93] 
Panel B. First Stage estimates for measure of Private property institutions 




Notes: The figures in parentheses are the standard errors. The figures in brackets are p-values. Panel 
A is a pooled cross section regression with 3 observations per country. In all there are 58 countries 
based on the sample of 64 countries by Acemoglu (2002). In Panel A the dependent variable is the 
growth rate over the decades 1970-80, 1980-90 and 1990-00. Details of sources of data are given in 
Appendix A.  ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
In column 1, I present the OLS estimates of the baseline specification.  The 
coefficient estimate of ‘constraint on executive’ is found to be positive (0.002, s.e. 0.10) but 
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insignificant at conventional levels. In column 2, the coefficient estimate of the linear term 
of ‘constraint on executive’ is positive (0.75. s.e. 0.41) and quadratic term is negative (0.096, 
s.e. of 0.51), both significant at the 10 percent level.  
 
The relationship between private property institutions and growth when controlling 
for endogeneity (2SLS and GMM estimates) are given in columns 3, 4 and 5. In these 
estimates, the institutions variable is instrumented using settler mortality. From the 2SLS 
estimates in column 3, I find the historically determined component of private property 
institutions to be a good predictor of growth rates, being positive (0.82, s.e 0.26) and 
significant at the 1 percent level. The estimates of the controls are as follows. The coefficient 
on log GDP per capita is negative (-0.88, s.e 0.44) and significant at the 5 percent level and 
confirm the conditional convergence that has been reported in various studies. The value of 
annualized rates of conditional convergence or divergence if negative, λ implied by the 
coefficient estimates associated with initial income value θ  solves 
)exp( t⋅−= λθ  ,               (2.3) 
where t is the time distance between current and lagged income. The 2SLS estimate of initial 
income of -0.88 implies a convergence estimate of 0.426%. To compare with other studies, 
Barro and Salai-Martin (2004, Table 12.3, p.522), using cross-sectional OLS, obtain a 
convergence estimate of 2.48% using a broader set of explanatory variables than I consider, 
and with a sample of 86 countries.  The estimated coefficient on secondary schooling 
enrolment is positive (2.57, s.e. 1.09) as confirmed by numerous studies and significant at 
the 5 percent level. The estimate implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in enrolment 
(0.26 in the decade of 90s) is associated with an increase in growth rate by 0.67. Among the 
policy variables, the estimated coefficient of government consumption ratio is negative        
(-0.07, s.e. 0.03) and significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient value compares with 
that found by Barro and Salai-Martin (2004 table 12.3 p522) at 0.062 (s.e. 0.023). This 
estimate implies that reduction in the ratio by 0.25 (which is the standard deviation in the 
1990s) is associated with an increase in growth by 0.0175. The coefficient estimate of 
inflation is positive (0.56, s.e 0.16) and significant at the 5 percent level. The estimate for 
average value of exchange rate overvaluation is positive (0.064, s.e. 0.48) and not 
significant. From these estimates, I conclude that inflation is an important variable among 
the policy variables as a factor influencing growth rate for this sample. However, when 
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compared to the estimate of constraint on executive, this factor has a smaller influence. In 
some ways the results confirm those in studies by Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Rodrik et al. 
(2002). 
 
The regressions include an overall constant term and separate time dummies for the 
two decade periods, 1980-90 and 1990-2000. These two time dummies are negative (-1.61, 
s.e. 0.43) and (-2.02, s.e. 0.48) respectively and significant at the 1 percent level. This 
compares with the negative estimates found by Barro and Salai-Martin (2004, table 12.3 
p522). The interpretation is that the sample’s rate of economic growth seems to have 
declined from 1970 to 2000.  
 
In the fourth column, I add a square of the private property institutions variable 
‘constraint on executive’ to allow for a nonlinear effect on economic growth. This system is 
now estimated using the generalized method of moments. The instrument list includes settler 
mortality and its square. The results indicate that the linear and the squared term in the 
variable are each statistically significant with coefficient estimates at 6.69 (s.e. 3.43) and      
-0.76 (s.e. 0.41) respectively. These estimates imply that starting from a system with no 
rights on private property, increases in ‘constraint on executive’ tend to stimulate growth. 
However, the positive influence attenuates as the indicator takes on a midrange value of 6, 
and further increases tend to retard growth. Therefore, increases in institutions promoting 
property rights tend to enhance growth for countries that have low and moderate levels, but 
to retard growth for countries that have the highest levels as measured in the index. These 
results are confirmed in the sample which has been treated of outliers and observations of 
undue influence, these estimates are presented in Table A4  in the Appendix A. 
 
In the fifth column, I add a cubic term in the specification of ‘constraint on 
executive’ to explore further evidence on the existence of nonlinearities in the relationship 
between income and the measure of private property institutions. The GMM results indicate 
that private property institutions have nonlinear effects on growth: the linear term with a 
positive coefficient of 1.54 (s.e. 2.75), and the squared and cubic term in constraint on 
executive is 1.44 (s.e. 0.82) and -0.22 (s.e. 0.07), respectively. The estimates imply that 
starting from a system in which there are no constraints in the power of the executive, 
  19
increases in constraints in power tend to have at first weak positive relationship with growth. 
Therefore installing more checks and balances on the power of the executive seems to have a 
weak impact on growth when countries are at a low level in their index of ‘constraint on 
executive’. A possible reason can be that for countries having the weakest level of 
institutions, the macroeconomic outlook is also bleak. Thus the marginal impact on 
increasing the level of institutions is not as significant as improving the economic 
infrastructure. Further increases in the level of constraint in powers of the executive are 
associated with significant beneficial effects on growth. The results also indicate that after a 
certain level in the index (at the value of 6); growth is negatively associated with an increase 
in the level of private property institutions. This nonlinear result is shown by Figure 1c and 
1d. Figure 1c represents the full sample, whereas in Figure 1d estimation is done after 
outliers are removed from the sample6. The solid lines indicate fitted values implied by the 
linear, square and cubic terms in ‘constraint on executive’.  The findings imply that growth 
would likely be increased by further checks and balances in the political system in countries 
such as Tunisia and Malaysia, which exhibit intermediate levels of private property 
institutions. Moreover future growth may be retarded by an increase in checks and balances 
in the existing political system in countries as India, USA, and Chile, which have the highest 
levels of institutions protecting property. For countries with the lowest level of institutions 
(e.g. Sudan, Zambia), unless the reforms to improve the level of institutions are done rapidly,  
the impact on growth maybe positive but negligible.  
 
Next, I investigate whether the impact of the variable ‘constraint on executive’ on 
growth differs among the different categories of the variable. The method used is to do so is 
by dividing the index in its components parts and analyzing the impact of its component 
parts on growth. This method is helpful in measuring the marginal impact of different levels 
of the variable on growth.  Column 1 in Table 2.2 shows the result when the private property 
institutions index is replaced by two dummy variables. The first dummy equals 1 if the index 
is 1 and 2, and equals zero otherwise. The second dummy equals 1 if the index is 3, 4, and 5 
and equals zero otherwise. If the index exceeds 5 (has values 6 and 7), then both dummies 
are equal to zero.  
                                                     
6 The details of the test for the presence of outliers and influence observations are in section 4. The 
results of the 2SLS and nonlinear GMM estimates are given in Table 5 in Appendix A4. 
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Table 2.2. Impact of Private property institutions on Growth: by Category 
Explanatory variable Coefficient (I) Coefficient (II) 




Dummy 345 0.99 
(0.45)** 
 
Dummy 34  0.78 
(0.53) 
Dummy 56  0.88 
(0.55)* 




























R2 0.34 0.33 
F 8.66 [0.00] 7.5 [0.00] 
 
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are standard errors and in brackets are p values. The sample size is 
164; the sample is with no outliers or observations of undue influence. ***, **, * indicates 
significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
The estimated coefficients with their standard errors are positive (0.92, s.e. 0.46) for 
the first dummy and positive (0.98, s.e. 0.45) for the second dummy; both estimates are 
significant at the 5 percent level. These results indicate that the hypothesis of linearity, 
requiring the coefficient of the first dummy to be roughly double that of the second, is 
strongly rejected. Also, the middle level of ‘constraint on executive’ is most favorable to 
growth, the lowest level comes second, and the highest level comes third. In column 2, I 
undertake a similar exercise. Here, the first dummy equals 1 if the index is 1 and 2, and 
equals zero otherwise; the second dummy equals 1 if the index is 3 and 4, and equals zero 
otherwise. The third dummy equals 1 if the index is 5 and 6, and zero otherwise. If the index 
is 7, then all dummies equal zero. The estimated coefficients are 0.87 (s.e. 0.51) for the first 
dummy, 0.78 (s.e. 0.53) for the second dummy and 0.88 (s.e. 0.55) for the third dummy. The 
results are similar to that estimated in the first column. 
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 In Table 2.3, column 1, I have a dummy variable for six of the seven values in the 
index of ‘constraint on executive’. The value of 7 in the index serves as the benchmark 
category. The estimated coefficients indicate a positive impact of the institutions variable on 
growth for countries having lower and middle levels of institutions. The impact on growth 
falls for countries having the highest level of institutions. The results confirm this in Table 
2.3.  For countries that have a low level of institutions, the relation is positive 0.88 (s.e. 0.55) 
and significant at the 10 percent level for Dummy 1; the estimate is slightly bigger at 0.94 
(s.e.0.64) and significant at the 14 percent level for Dummy 2. The countries in the middle 
range have a positive association with growth, for example, the estimates of Dummy 3 is 
0.89 (s.e. 0.54) and significant at the 10 percent level. The estimate on Dummy 4 is negative 
(- 0.16, s.e. 1.24); its insignificance is possibly due to the extremely small number of 
observations (a total of 4) in that category. The coefficient estimate for Dummy 5 is bigger at 
1.34 (s.e. 0.63) and significant at the 5 percent level. Lastly, for countries having a high level 
of institutions (the value of 6 and above) the correlation with growth is marginal. The 
coefficient estimate for the Dummy 6 is positive and marginal at 0.075 (0.75). In the second 
column, these conclusions are further reiterated when only including the dummy for 
category 7, the best level of the measure. The estimate is negative (-0.85, s.e.0.4) and 
significant at the 5 percent level. The estimate implies that compared to the baseline levels of 
institutions (categories 1 to 6 in case of estimation in column 2), growth for countries having 
the highest level is relatively low. 
 
From the 2SLS estimation results, for given values of per capita GDP and human 
capital, growth depends positively and significantly on private property institutions rather 
than policy variables. The 2SLS estimates provide the benchmark linear framework. From 
the GMM estimates and the analysis using dummy variables, I find evidence of 
nonlinearities in the effect of the index of private property institutions on growth. Figure 
2.1c and 2.1d shows the nature of the nonlinearities. An inverse u- shape can be discerned. 
The next section provides the semi-parametric estimates and further evidence of the effect of 
private property institutions on economic growth. 
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 Table 2.3 The Relationship between Private Property Institutions and Growth : By Category 
Variable Estimate (1) Estimate (2) 
Dummy 1 0.88 
(0.55)* 
 
Dummy 2 0.94 
(0.64) 
 
Dummy 3 0.89 
(0.54)* 
 
Dummy 4 -0.16 
(1.24) 
 
Dummy 5 1.34 
(0.63)** 
 













































Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate over the decades 1970-80, 1980-90 and 1990-00. The 
figures in parenthesis are standard errors and in brackets are p values. The sample size is 164; the 
sample is with no outliers or observations of undue influence. ***, **, * indicates significance 
levels at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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2.4 SEMI-PARAMETRIC PARTIALLY ADDITIVE MODEL ESTIMATION: 
METHODOLOGY AND ESTIMATES 
A semi-parametric framework is one in which part of the regression specification assumes a 
functional form and part of it is estimated without any assumptions about the specific 
functional form beyond some degree of smoothness. Many different estimators have been 
used to evaluate the pertinent growth equations, and there are certain rules associated with 
the choice of each estimator. I will briefly discuss these estimators in order to motivate the 
approach of estimation that I adopt. Next, I will give a brief description of the methodology I 
use to explore for potential nonlinearities in the relationship between private property 
institutions and growth. 
 
The semi-parametric partially linear specification (PLR) of the model can be written 
as:  
                  (2.4) Y X h Z ui i
T
i i= + +β ( )
where Xi  is a variable of dimension q,  β is a q x 1  vector of unknown parameters, Zi  is a 
continuous variable of dimension p, h(.) is an unknown function and ( ) .0,| =iii ZXuE  In 
the semi-parametric literature, Robinson (1988) provided a method of obtaining a n1/2 
consistent estimator of the parameter vector β by concentrating out the influence of nonlinear 
variables, the Zs. This is accomplished by conditioning on them through kernel methods and 
estimating the conditional expectations ( )ii ZYE |  and ( )ii ZXE | . In the second stage of 
the two-step estimation procedure, the kernel estimates of ( )i ( )ii ZXE |i ZYE |  and  are 
used to estimate β.  The estimate of β is given by: 
              (2.5) ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]yxxxxxxx mymxmxmx ˆˆˆˆˆ 1 −−⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ′−−= ∑∑
−β
Where and  )|(ˆ ZXEmxx = )|(ˆ ZYEmyx =  are kernel based estimators. Once  is found, 
h(Zi) can be estimated from (2.4)  as   This estimator has been used 
in growth studies to find evidence of nonlinearities in income and human capital and 
economic growth (Liu and Stengos, 1999, Mamuneas et al. 2004). 
βˆ
.ˆˆˆ 'βxxiyxi mm −=)(ˆ iZh
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When the nonparametric part is endogenous, the above estimator cannot be used to 
estimate the unknown nonlinear function as the resulting estimator is inconsistent. In recent 
semi-parametric literature, a number of papers have tried to resolve this by using the sieve 
minimum distance (SMD) estimator (Ai and Chen 2003, Newey and Powell, 2003). Both 
papers provide a method for obtaining n1/2 consistent estimator of β0 and h(.)  using the SMD 
estimator. I closely follow Ai and Chen (2003) and give a description of this estimator. In a 
general formulation, equation (2.4) can be can be written in terms of the conditional moment 
restriction,  
                 
                          ( )[ ] 0|,, 00 =XhVE i θρ                           (2.6) 
where ( )', zXYV ′=′ , Xz is a subset of X, ( ).ρ  is a vector of known (residual) functions, and 
( )[ XhVi |,, 00 ]E θρ  is the conditional expectation of ( )00 ,, hVi θρ   given X. The 
parameters of interest α0 = (θ0, h0) contain a vector of finite dimensional unknown 
parameters of interest θ0 and a infinite dimensional unknown functions h0(.) = (h01(.),…., 
h0q(.)). The model is semi-parametric in the sense it contains unknown functions h0.  
The partially linear regression model studied by Robinson (1988) as specified in 
equation (2.4) have the conditional moment restriction as follows: 
 
( ) ( )iiii ZhXYV 00110, −′−= θαρ   ,                                    (2.7)  
with ( )[ ] 0,|, 210 =iii XXVE αρ , where α0 = (θ0 , h0),  V = (Y, X′1)′, , and  
 Under the assumption that the above model is identified, Ai and Chen (2003) 
provide a method for obtaining n1/2 consistent estimator of α0  when the nonparametric part 
appears endogenously in the model using a sieve minimum distance estimator (SMD) 
( )′′′= 21 , XXX
( ) .,1 ′′′ ZY=Y
( )nn hˆ,θˆ=nαˆ
n
.  The SMD estimator is analogous to the GMM or a two- stage nonlinear least 
squares (2SNLS). The authors have shown that under a set of sufficient conditions, 
αˆ converging to α0 and θ0  is both n1/2  consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. 
The following paragraph outlines the method of SMD estimator7.  
                                                     
7 The next paragraph is heavily derived from Ai and Chen (2003). Please refer to this paper for more 
details on the efficiency and consistency of estimator and derivation of variance-covariance matrix. 
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Suppose that the observations {(Y, X) : i = 1, 2, …n} are drawn independently from 
the distribution of (Y, X) with support ℵ×Υ  where  Y is a subset of  and ℵ is a 
compact subset of  . Suppose that the unknown distribution of (Y, X) satisfies the 
conditional moment restriction given by (2.7), where   is a known 





( ) Η×Θ≡Α∈≡ 00 ,h0 θα . I assume that 
 is compact with nonempty interior and that  is a space of 
continuous functions. I further  assume that  V
θdℜ⊆Θ qΗ××Η≡Η ......1
zℵ×Υ≡Ω∈( )zXY ′′′,≡  and . ℵ⊆zℵ
 
 Let FY|X be the functional form of the conditional distribution of Y given X. If FY|X 
were known, then the functional form of the conditional mean function 
 would be known. The minimum distance estimator 
of α0  would then minimize: 
( ) ( ) )((.),,,, | ydFhxyxm xXYz =∫= θρα
                         ( ) [ ] ( ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ Σ )′ −Η×Θ∈= ααθα ,)(,inf 1),( XmXXmEh ,                          (2.8) 
where  is a positive definite matrix for any given X. The true value of α0 could then 
be estimated by minimizing the sample analog of (2.8). Following the sieve literature, Ai and 
Chen (2003), replace the H with the sieve space , which is computable 
and often finite-dimensional compact parameter space that becomes dense in H as n 
increases. The SMD estimator of α0 minimizes the sample analog of a nonparametric version 
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where  is a consistent estimator of )(ˆ XΣ )(XΣ . To compute the consistent estimator of 
m(X, α) the linear sieve estimator is used. Let ( ){ },......2,1,0 =jXjp  denote a sequence of 
known basis functions (as in splines, Fourier series, power series etc.), the linear sieve 
estimator is given by  












where  ( ) ( )( )′= nknkn XpXpP ,.....,1 .  
The integer kn is the smoothing parameter which is required to grow with n so that 
the approximation error decreases to zero. The above sieve estimator can be interpreted as 
GMM. With   = I, the SMD estimator )(ˆ XΣ nαˆ  is the solution to 



























XpZPPIXpZ αραρθα  ,        (2.10) 
where  ⊗  denotes the Kronekar product and I the dρ  × dρ  identity matrix. 
 
Following Ai and Chen (2003), I assume that the nonparametric part of the 
estimating equation assumes a Fourier series form with, [ ] ,21,1,1 10 11 >−Λ=Η∈ γγcjjh    
for j = 1….q.  For identification I assume that Z contains a constant with dim (Z) > 1, and  
hoj (0) = 0 for j = 1, …, q. I consider the Fourier series sieves for j = 1, …, q: 









































where ( 1,2/1 )γ∈p  is a constant arbitrary close to 1γ . I apply the SMD procedure 
described above with ,  given in (2.6) and k1n = q(2Jn + 1). The 
SMD procedure with the identity weighing is a 2SLS estimation applied to  
q
nnn Η××Η≡Η ......1 jnH
( ) 1'11 iiii uZhXY ++= β ,   with   pkn(Xi)  as instruments. 
 
For the nonlinear component, to determine the individual impact of private property 
institutions, I model the unknown function h(Zi) as a function of the measure of private 
property institutions. The results of the estimates are presented in Table 2.4. The first column 
reports the results from estimation of the full sample. The second column gives the results of 
estimates when outliers and other observations of undue influence are removed. The 
semiparametric coefficient estimates of the control variables and nonparametric h(Zi) are 
presented in the table. 
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Table 2.4. Institutions, Macroeconomic policies and Growth: Semiparametric estimates 
Explanatory variable Coefficient Estimates 
I (Full sample) 
Coefficient Estimates 
II (sample without Outliers)  












































N 174 164 
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are the standard errors. The dependent variable is growth rate of 
GDP per capita averaged over the decades 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. There are three observations per 
country. 
 
In column I, the semiparametric estimate of the policy variables average of log of 
inflation is significant with estimate of -0.75 (s.e. 0.28), average of government consumption 
and exchange rate overvaluation are negative and insignificant at conventional levels. These 
results are somewhat similar to the 2SLS results. The estimated results for human capital and 
initial per capita income also are slightly different. The estimates for human capital increase 
to 3.21 (s.e. 2.14) while initial income is 0.094 (s.e. 0.13). A possible explanation for the 
insignificant estimates of initial income can be that the historically determined component of 
institutions is a good predictor for initial income, making our institutions variable and initial 
income collinear. Also, the estimate of initial per capita income implies a rate of divergence 
of 7.8%. The estimates of the nonparametric function h(Zi) are positive and significant. The 
fitted values of the coefficients a0 ,  a1, and a2  are represented in Figures 2.1a for the full 
sample. The estimates show that function is highly nonlinear and similar to the fitted values 
of GMM estimates represented in the previous section. In column II, the estimates of the 
policy variables are similar; the only difference is the estimates of human capital become 
smaller (1.48, s.e. 0.55) and significant at the 5 percent level. The estimate of initial income 
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increases to 0.35 (s.e. 0.5), remains insignificant and implies a divergence rate of 3.5 %. The 
coefficients of the nonparametric h(Zi) are positive and significant. 
 
The estimates of the nonlinear components for private property institutions are 
presented graphically in Figure 2.1 alongside 95 percent confidence intervals. In the figure, 
‘institutions’ is the only variable which enters as a non-linear determinant of economic 
growth; this is done to examine the relationship between private property institutions and 
growth without considering the possible non-linear effects of other variables. The Figure 2.1 
has four parts. Figures 2.1a and 2.1b denote the semi-parametric estimates of the measure 
‘constraint on executive’ using the full sample and the sample without the presence of 
outliers and observations having a large influence . The horizontal axis shows the exogenous 
component of constraint on executive while the vertical axis shows the value of h(Zi) in the 
standardized form. The Figures 2.1c and 2.1d show the parametric estimations from the 
fitted value implied by the linear, squared, and cubic terms in ‘constraint on executive’ from 
the estimates presented in column 4 in Table 2.1. The parametric estimates are included to 
show similar effects of the measure when estimating parametrically instead of semi-
parametrically. To highlight the difference between the nonlinear GMM and linear estimates, 
I have plotted the linear benchmark. In situations in which the benchmark lies outside the 
confidence bounds, there is evidence of a nonlinear structure not captured by the simple 
linear model.   
 
In Figures 2.1a and 2.1b, two different regions can be discerned based on the level 
of institutions. The diagrammatic effect is similar when examining the fitted values of linear, 
square, and cubic terms of the exogenous component of parametric estimates of ‘constraint 
on executive’. (The linear benchmark lies inside the confidence bands of the semi-parametric 
fit for the sample without outliers only in the ranges 1.3 to 6 on the measure ‘constraint on 
executive’ and lies outside the band for the other levels of the measure). The figure suggests 
that the beneficial effects of this measure of private property institutions are limited to 
countries enjoying low to middle levels of private property institutions, while for high- 
private-property-institutions countries the relationship is negative. Moreover, this result is 
repeated with fitted parametric estimates as seen in Figure 2.1d, indicating there is some 
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adverse impact of private property institutions on growth for countries enjoying higher levels 
of constraint on executive. 
 
1a. Semiparametric Estimates of Full Sample 
 
1b.Semiparametric estimates with no outliers 
1c. Parametric Estimates of Full Sample 1d. Parametric Estimates with no outlier 
  
Figure 2.1. Private property institutions and Economic Growth: Parametric and 
Semiparametric estimations 
 
Notes: In figures a, b, the circled points gives the non-parametric estimate of h(Zi), the dotted lines are 
confidence intervals at the 95% level. In figures c and d, the circled line gives the fitted value implied 
by the linear, square and cubic terms of constraint on executive from the 2SLS estimates; the solid line 
gives the linear benchmark 
 
The implication is that at low and middle ranges of private property institutions 
(below 6), growth is increasing with increases in the measure of institutions. Also as seen in 
the figures, the impact is more pronounced for estimates in the middle ranges, rather than in 
the lower ranges of the index. In the context of the sample of countries in the study, Sudan, 
for example, has a value of 1 in the index of private property institutions, and its growth 
would rise by 0.043 percent on average per year if this country moved to 2 (the value 
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Algeria and Gambia in the sample) in the index over a decade . The result reflects the 
marginal beneficial impact of improving property rights by creating economic opportunities 
that have growth enhancing incentives. A possible explanation is that economies with weak 
institutions have lower constraints in the expropriatory power of the ruling executive. As a 
result, when these economies experience some political change which results in increasing 
constraints in powers of the executive to some extent (or developing institutions which 
makes executive more accountable), they may witness a marginal positive impact on growth 
because the investment environment become less fragile and the efficiency of investment is 
enhanced as the enforcement of property rights is more reliable even in times of 
uncertainties in the power struggle.   
 
At the middle levels of institutions, for example, Tunisia has a value of 3 in the 
property rights index and, its growth would rise on average by 0.063 percent per year if its 
index rises to 4 (as enjoyed by Malaysia in the sample) over the decade. Thus the 
relationship is stronger after a certain threshold, as institutions in these levels have more 
power to check the predatory actions of executive. This results in higher growth by 
increasing the volume of investment, by for example, eliminating red tape and rent seeking 
costs. Higher growth can also result from the increase in the efficiency of investment, and by 
enforcing well-defined property rights.   
 
At higher levels of institutions (above 5.5 as measured by the constraint on 
executive), the relationship between private property institutions with growth becomes 
negative. This could be because in economies enjoying a high level of private property 
institutions, there is already an effective system of checks and balances in the power of the 
executive. Any reform to increase the existing level of regulation on powers of the executive 
corresponds with higher transaction and transformation costs as more rules and regulations 
are involved in the measurement of tangible and intangible assets. Again, costs of 
enforcement can be increasing in terms of, for example, legal fees, credit rating searches, 
realtor fees etc. In terms of the coefficient estimate, for example, Brazil and Indonesia 
having a index value of 6 would be predicted to incur a fall in the average growth rate of 
0.07 percent per year if either increased its current level of institutions to a value of  7 (as 
enjoyed by United States and Canada in the sample) over a decade. Thus the findings 
  31
indicate that the measure of private property institutions has nonlinear relationship with 
economic growth. In the next section, I provide robustness checks. 
2.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
2.5.1 Impact of Outliers, and influence statistics 
Table A4 in the Appendix A  reports parametric estimates obtained given the elimination of 
potential outlier observations. The results provide evidence of whether the results reported 
above are driven by certain influential observations. In the full sample, seven observations 
(Congo in decade 1970s, Congo, Uruguay, Zaire in the decade 1980s, and Honduras, Haiti, 
and Zaire in the decade 1990s) were singled out using a combination of two test statistics to 
flag observations which act as outliers.  The first test statistics is advocated by Belsley, Kuh 
and Welch (1980) which involves use of DFITS statistic to flag observations associated with 
high combination of residual and leverage statistics . The second test statistic, the Cook’s D 
statistic, is used as a measure of the aggregate impact of each observation on a group of 
regression coefficients and their covariances. Usually values larger than 4/n are considered 
to be highly influential. I also use a test for checking observations that have a large influence 
and as a result I drop three observations: Australia, New Zealand in the 1990s and Nigeria in 
the 1980s. The leverage values measure how far an observation is far from the others in 
terms of the levels of the independent variables (not the dependent variable). Observations 
with values larger than 2(k +1)/n are considered to be highly influential, where k is the 
number of predictors and n is the sample size.  
 
From the results in Table A4, the 2SLS estimate (column 2) of private property 
institution is positive (0.56, s.e. 0.22) and significant at the 5 percent level.  Estimates of 
coefficient for enrolment is higher, positive (2.86, s.e. 1.11) and significant at the 5 percent 
level. The estimates of inflation and government consumption are similar to estimates 
presented for full sample; however the estimate for exchange rate overvaluation is higher, 
negative (-0.56, s.e.0.45), though still insignificant at conventional levels. The estimate for 
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initial income is negative (-0.75, s.e. 0.31) and significant at the 5 percent level.  In column 
3, I report GMM estimates with the linear and quadratic terms of the measure ‘constraint on 
executive’. The coefficient estimate on the linear term is positive (4.9, s.e. 2.9) and 
significant at the 10 percent level, whereas that on the squared term is negative (-0.53, 0.35) 
and significant at the 12 percent level. The coefficient estimate on government consumption 
is negative (-0.093, s.e. 0.04) and significant at the 5 percent level whereas, the coefficient 
estimate on exchange rate overvaluation is negative (-1.35, s.e. 0.85) and significant at the 
10 percent level. The real differences are in the estimates of initial income and enrolment; 
the former becomes insignificant at conventional levels, while for the latter, the estimate is 
smaller, positive (0.97, se 1.8) and no longer significant. Thus the results from the 
estimations of sample without outliers underscore the relationship between institutions on 
growth, as well as some macroeconomic policy variables on growth. 
2.5.2 Income – Private property institutions contingencies 
In this section, I examine the relationship between initial income and measure of private 
property institutions. Using the preferred measure ‘constraint on executive’, I find the 
correlation coefficient between the two variables for the whole sample is 0.59. Contrary to 
the general belief that countries with good private property institutions usually belong to the 
income category representing high levels of per capita income, I find that many countries 
(such as India, Jamaica, Chile, Trinidad and Tobago in our sample of countries) with lower 
levels of per capita income tend to enjoy higher values in the measures of private property 
institutions in 1990. Again, this reaffirms that these measures represent the availability of 
checks and balances in the powers of the executive, and apparently this criteria does 
notguarantee high levels of per capita income.  
 
To examine income – private property institutions contingencies I split the sample of 
countries to sub-samples, including lower-income, middle-income, and rich countries, and 
estimate separate linear specifications for each. The criteria for the three income levels are as 
follows: the sample of poor countries includes those with per capita incomes less than 
$2,650, the middle-income sample includes countries with incomes between $2,650 and 
$5499; and the upper-income sample includes countries with incomes above $5499. These 
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thresholds are as defined in the World Bank’s income measures corresponding to measures 
from the Penn World Tables. Usually rich income levels are those with per capita incomes 
higher than $11,500, but due to data constraints, I club the richer countries with the sample 
of upper-middle-income countries when examining the income-institutions contingencies in 
the linear specification.  Table A5 in Appendix A reports estimates of the impact of 
institutions on growth in a linear specification for these split samples. 
For the poor-income sample, the impact of private property institutions on growth is 
positive (0.70, s.e. 0.37 ) and significant at the 10 percent level. When estimating without the 
presence of outliers, the estimate is smaller, positive (0.51, s.e. 0.29) and significant at the 8 
percent level. For the middle-income sample, the coefficient is larger, positive (2.21, s.e. 
0.81) and significant at the 1 percent level.  This corresponds to the documented evidence of 
large impact of private property institutions on economic growth. For the richer income 
group, however the coefficient estimate becomes smaller (0.48, s.e. 0.35) and statistically 
insignificant. When estimated without the presence of outliers, the estimate is larger, positive 
(0.86, s.e. 0.72) but still insignificant. These results reinforce the evidence that for countries 
with higher income levels, the relationship between private property institutions and 
economic growth is marginal.  
I will briefly discuss the coefficient estimates obtained for the additional explanatory 
variables. The ratio of government consumption to GDP is consistently negative for all 
income samples, but factors more for middle-income countries (-0.12, s.e. 0.06) and is 
significant at the 5%. For richer and lower-income countries, the estimates are smaller and 
insignificant. Estimated coefficients for secondary school enrolment are positive and 
significant for all three income levels, but factor more importantly for the middle-income 
countries (5.75, s.e. 2.33). From the estimated coefficient of initial income, I find that similar 
to results by DeJong and Ripoll (2006), ‘club convergence’ is more rapid for richer income 
countries than middle-income countries. From the estimates of initial income for rich 
economies, convergence is at the rate of 3.10 percent per annum. For middle-income 
economies the rate is 2.29 percent. The estimates of initial income for the poor countries 
sample indicate divergence at the rate of 7.9 percent per year. Finally, inflation is an 
important variable that has a strong, negative correlation with growth for middle-income 
(0.87, s.e. 0.14) and high-income economies (0.53, s.e. 0.22); but its estimate is negative 
(0.12, s.e. 0.26) and insignificant for poor countries. In contrast, exchange rate overvaluation 
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is negatively correlated with growth for lower-income economies (1.53, s.e. 0.59) and is 
statistically significant. However, the correlation with growth is positive for richer (1.39, s.e. 
1.36), and middle-income countries (0.91, s.e. 0.81) but insignificant at conventional levels.   
2.5.3 Other Measures of Private Property Institutions 
In this section I provide additional evidence of the nonlinear relation of private property 
institutions with economic growth using other measures widely used in literature: the ‘rule of 
law’ and ‘political rights’. The ‘rule of law’ measure is obtained from Kaufman et al (2002) 
and is for the year 1997-98 and has been used in studies by Rodrik et al. (2002). This is a 
composite indicator of a number of elements that capture the protection afforded to property 
rights as well as the strength of the rule of law. This is a standardized measure that varies 
between – 2.5 (weakest institution) and 2.5 (strongest institution). Figure 2.2 gives results 
obtained using a fitted value implied by the linear, square and cubic terms of rule of law. The 
estimations are obtained after testing the data for outliers and observations having undue 
large influence. Semi-parametric estimates could not be obtained due to small sample size of 
the data. The figure reiterates the evidence in Figure 2.1 that private property institutions 
relate positively with growth for countries having low and middle levels of the measure. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Rule of Law and Economic Growth 
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Moreover there is some evidence of an adverse effect on economic growth for 
countries enjoying the best level of private property institutions as per this measure.  The 
estimates of the 2SLS and GMM regression are given in the Appendix A, Table A6. The 
2SLS estimates show a strong, significant, and positive relationship (3.63, s.e.1.48) between 
the measure of private property institutions ‘rule of law’ and economic growth. The 
coefficient estimates of initial income show the presence of economic convergence, at the 
rate of 3.5 percent per year.  As seen in Figure 2.2, for levels of index below 0.5, increasing 
the levels of institutions protecting private property is beneficial. For levels of index in the 
range above 0.5, the impact on growth is marginal, and at higher levels there is a suggestion 
of a negative impact on economic growth.  
 
Next, I use Gastil’s measures of political freedom and civil liberties which have 
been used in a number of studies examining the effect of variables describing qualitative 
political and civil liberties on cross country growth and investment (Kormendi and Mequire, 
1985; Scully, 1988; Sachs and Warner, 1997; and Barro, 1996). This measure is a seven 
point index, with higher values of this variable indicating fewer freedoms or greater political 
violence and thus bad conditions for investment. The logic of using this index is that leaders 
whose tenures are insecure are more likely to expropriate because they expect to bear fewer 
of future costs of their current expropriatory actions (Knack and Keefer, 1995). Also in 
periods of political instability triggered by unconstitutional events, mechanisms for 
protecting property and contractual rights become fragile. The result is that investors reduce 
and/or reallocates their investments to avoid risk. However, this measure has several 
drawbacks in capturing the effects of property rights. The most common reason cited (Knack 
and Keefer, 1995) is that countries may exhibit a stable political environment and still may 
have insecure property rights. For instance, dictators who are more effective in the 
repression of dissent may be most successful in avoiding coups, revolutions and 
assassinations, but offer the worst political rights. Figure 2.3 demonstrates non-linearities 
between the measure of democracy and economic growth. 
As the measure is increasing in insecure political freedom, Figure 2.3 can be 
interpreted as follows. At low levels of democracy (from the range 7 to 5.5) increasing levels 
of democracy is beneficial to growth. At middle levels of democracy (the turning point is 5.5 
and the upper limit is 3), increasing political freedom has a marginal correspondance with 
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growth. At higher levels of democracy (range 3 and below), increasing political freedom still 
further corresponds with deteriorations  in rate of growth.  These are similar to those found 
by Barro (1996). The intuition is that where a moderate amount of political rights already 
has been extended, a further increase could diminish growth, perhaps due to pressures for 
income redistribution. Table A7 in Appendix A reports 2SLS and the GMM estimates. In 
accordance with previous 2SLS results, democracy has a negative (-0.59, s.e. 0.22) and 
significant impact on growth. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Democracy and Economic Growth 
Notes: The above diagram plots the fitted values of the linear and quadratic terms the of 
GMM estimation.  The solid line gives the fitted estimates, the dotted lines gives the 95 % 
confidence intervals. 
 
The results from the two alternate measures of private property institutions reiterate 
the findings of the previous section. The GMM estimates show the presence of 
nonlinearities. When comparing these variables in terms of their economic impact, I find 
‘rule of law’ has a greater explanatory power than ‘political rights’ variable. 
2.5.4 Private Property Institutions and Malaria Index 
Settler mortality rates, which measure mortality of early colonial settlers in the 16th 
century, may become a weak instrument in specifications that  introduce a variable denoting 
disease environment such as the Malaria Index. In order to examine the strength of the 
results, in this section I introduce the Malaria Index in the regression equation and use an 
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additional instrument for institutions. Table 2.5 presents the results when using the Malaria 
Index. The Malaria Index measures the proportion of each country’s population that lives 
with the risk of malaria transmission and is derived from Gallup and Sachs (1998). It is 
defined as the product of fraction of population living in areas of high malaria risk times that 
fraction of malaria cases in 1990 that are due to P. falciparnum. The additional instrument is 
is the ‘fraction of population speaking English’. This variable has been previously used as an 
instrument for institutions by Hall and Jones (1999). The instrument is meant to capture the 
exogenous variation in Western European influence around the world which contributed to 
the existence of differing institutions. Intuitively, Western Europe discovered the ideas of 
Adam Smith, the importance of property rights, and the system of checks and balances in 
government. The countries that were strongly influenced by Western Europe were likely to 
adopt favorable infrastructure and institutions. The extent of Western European influence is 
proxied by the extent to which the languages of Western Europe are spoken as a mother 
tongue. The instrument is positively correlated with the measure of institutions and is 
presented in Table 2.5.  
Column 1 and 2 report the OLS estimates of the linear and quadratic specification of 
institutions and includes Malaria Index in the regression equation. The coefficient estimates 
of ‘constraint on executive’ are similar to that reported in the baseline estimates presented in 
Table 2.1. The coefficient estimate of the Malaria index is negative (-1.47, s.e. of 0.60) and 
significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient estimate implies that a one-standard-
deviation increase in the index (0.45 in the 1990s) is associated with a growth decline of 
0.66. Column 3 reports the instrumental variable estimates using ‘log settler mortality’ and 
‘fraction of population speaking English’ as instruments. In column 3, the coefficient 
estimate for ‘constraint on executive’ is positive (0.68, s.e. of 0.38) and significant at the 10 
percent level. The estimate for malaria index is negative (-1.65, s.e. 0.69) and significant at 
the 5 percent level. The first-stage estimate for ‘fraction of population speaking English’ is 
positive (2.94, s.e. 0.56) and significant at the 1 percent level. The first-stage estimate for 
‘log settler mortality’ is positive (0.31, s.e. 0.15) and significant at the 5 percent level.  
 Column 4 reports the GMM estimates of the quadratic specification of institutions. 
The coefficient estimates of linear and quadratic terms of ‘constraint on executive’ indicate 
the presence of nonlinearities. The linear term is positive (5.04, s.e. 2.86) and significant at 
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the 10 percent level and the quadratic term is negative (-0.57, s.e. 0.28) and significant at the 
5 percent level.  
 
Table 2.5. Institutions, Growth and Malaria Index 
N = 174 OLS (I) OLS (II) IV (III) GMM  (IV) 

















Malaria index -1.47  
  (0.60)** 
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R-square 0.2597 0.2737   
Hansen’s J    [0.89] 
Panel B. First Stage Estimates




Log Settler mortality -0.31 
(0.16)* 
R-square 0.299
Notes: The figures in parenthesis are the standard errors. The figure in brackets are p-values.    
 
The results indicate that the presence of a variable controlling for the disease environment 
somewhat weakens the main results. The level of significance of the result fall from 5 
percent level to 10 percent level.  The results indicate a nonlinear relationship between the 
index of private property institutions and growth when controlling for disease environment 
with a lower significance level8. 
                                                     
8 Table A8 in the Appendix A reports estimates from IV and GMM using an alternate set of 






This paper examined the relationship between private property institutions and economic 
growth and found some support for the presence of nonlinearities in the relationship.  First, 
using parametric estimation, I found that there is evidence of nonlinearities in the 
relationship. The results are reinforced using various measures of private property 
institutions. Second, in order to establish the shape of the nonlinear relationship, I resort to 
semi-parametric estimation which allows for consistent estimation of the variable of interest 
without assuming a functional form. The graphical representation of the result indicates a 
nonlinear relationship in the shape of an inverted-U. For lower levels of institutions (below 
2), increases in the level of private property institutions corresponds  positively with growth. 
The quantitative implication of the estimate is that, for example for Zaire (with a level of 
private property institutions of 1 as per Polity IV index), would incur a rise in its average 
growth rate of 0.04 percent per year would be predicted given an increase in its level of 
private property institutions to that enjoyed by Algeria (the value of 2 in the index) over a 
decade. For countries having level of institutions between 2 and 5.5, the relationship is 
positive as broadly documented. For example, for Tunisia (having a value of 3 in the index), 
growth would be predicted to rise on average by 0.06 percent per year if its index rises to 4 
(as enjoyed by Malaysia in the sample) over the decade. For levels of institutions above 5.5, 
the relationship is negative. A possible channel could be that the cost of enforcement 
increases as the level of sophistication and specialization increase at high income levels. In 
terms of the results, for example Brazil (having an index value of 6) would be predicted to 
incur a fall in the growth rate of 0.07 percent per year if it increased its current level of 
institutions to a value of 7 (as enjoyed by United States and Canada in the sample) over a 
decade. Using other measures of private property institutions shows that the results are 
broadly replicated. 
                                                                                                                                                      
based on a gravity model of international trade that only uses a country's population and geographical 
features and log settler mortality.  The first two instruments have been used by Hall and Jones (1999). 
The results indicate that the presence of Malaria Index does not change the baseline results and the 
estimated relationship between private property institutions and growth is nonlinear. 
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3.0  AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CONTINGENT RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A wide body of evidence indicates that financial development can help spur economic 
growth (King and Levine, 1993 and Levine and Zervos, 1998). During the 1990s, a number 
of theoretical studies explored the relationship between financial development and income 
inequality and suggested a wide range of possibilities for why this might be so. However to 
date, the empirical evidence of this relationship is scant. This paper attempts to shed light on 
this empirical relationship. The goal is to evaluate the empirical relevance of alternate 
theoretical predictions, while simultaneously suggesting appropriate policies to address 
issues associated with observed patterns of income inequality. 
 
Among the theoretical studies, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) suggest that the 
relationship between financial development and income inequality should be a nonlinear 
inverted-U, and related to the level of economic development. In initial stages of 
development, as financial development occurs endogenously with economic development, 
only the rich can afford to access and profit from financial markets so that financial 
development intensifies income inequality. At higher levels of economic development, 
financial development helps an increasing proportion of the society, aggregate savings and 
income increase, and the distribution of income becomes more equal. Alternatively, Galor 
and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993) Aghion and Bolton (1997) argue that credit-
market imperfections, coupled with indivisible human capital investment, imply that initial 
distributions of wealth should determine long-term levels of aggregate output and 
investment. The implication is a negative relationship between financial development and 
income inequality, as financial sector development can reduce credit- market imperfections, 
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enable agents to enjoy the benefits of higher returns to education, and thereby lead to a more 
equitable income distribution. In contrast, Galor and Maov (2000) suggest that the 
relationship between financial development and income inequality is U-shaped and cyclical 
at mature stages of development. In their model, in initial stages of development, financial 
development enables agents to acquire skills and earn higher returns to education, which 
reduces income inequality between skilled and unskilled sectors. However, with further 
financial development, technological progress raises the demand for high-skill labor and 
returns to ability, creating wage dispersion between and within skilled and unskilled sectors.  
The predictions of this model can also be combined with insights of Kuznets (1955, 1965) to 
suggest potential links between the sectoral structure of the economy, economic and 
financial development, and income inequality. The main Kuznets hypothesis focused on the 
transition of an economy from being agriculturally based to becoming mature and 
industrialized, and conjectured an inverted-U relationship between income inequality and 
economic development. However, during the process of transition and industrialization, he 
suggested that income inequality may increase with the development of economic 
infrastructure. The implication is that sectoral structure has an impact on the relationship 
between economic and financial development and income inequality.  Thus theoretically, 
there are alternative predictions of the relationship between income inequality and financial 
development. 
 
The first part of the paper revisits the relationship between financial development 
and income inequality. I document this relationship using parametric and non-parametric 
techniques. The empirical results indicate that income inequality tends to decrease as 
countries initially develop their financial infrastructure; however, beyond a certain threshold 
(corresponding to 55% of GDP when the measure private credit to GDP is used as proxy for 
financial development), further financial development has a nonnegative relationship with 
income inequality. The results are consistent with the predictions by Galor and Maov (2000) 
and runs directly counter to the theoretical predictions of an inverted-U relation as suggested 
by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). It is also inconsistent with the linear negative 
relationship predicted by Galor and Zeira (1993) and others.  
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In accordance with the insights of Kuznets (1955) and Galor and Maov (2000), 
financial development not only has a nonlinear relationship with income inequality, but it 
also seems to depend on the level of development. Guided by theory, the second part of the 
paper explores these mechanisms. To test the suggestion by Kuznets (1955) that income 
inequality increase with sectoral development, I add as an explanatory variable an interaction 
term between the ratio of the industrial and service sectors to GDP and financial 
development. This specification reveals a significant interaction effect under which the 
marginal impact of financial development on income inequality is increasing with industrial 
and service sector development. To test the suggestion by Galor and Maov (2000) that 
income inequality increases with the rise in demand for skilled workers at higher levels of 
financial development, I add an interaction term between employment in the service sector 
as a percentage of total employment and financial development. This specification also 
indicates a significant interaction effect under which the marginal impact of financial 
development on inequality is increasing with higher employment in service sectors.  
 
As noted, the empirical literature on the relationship between income equality and 
financial development is scant. Evidence that does exist stems primarily from a paper by 
Clarke, Xu, and Zou (2003), who study this relationship using GMM estimation techniques 
and find evidence of a negative linear relationship. A major motivation to reexamine this 
finding is the availability of a more extensive dataset on income distribution than was 
previously available and used by Clarke et al (2003); and also an interest in examining 
sensitivity to the use of semiparametric estimation techniques. In the late 1990s and early 
2000, empirical studies of income inequality received a substantial boost from the important 
work of Deininger and Squire (1996), Lynn and Squire (2000) and Dollar and Kraay (2002), 
who constructed a large comprehensive cross-country dataset on inequality that was 
previously unavailable.  In the arena of studies in banking and financial infrastructure 
development, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000, 2004) compiled a comprehensive 
cross-country dataset of various indices of financial infrastructure spanning a period of over 
forty years. These datasets have a panel structure, and thus jointly enable an analysis of the 
evolution of the relationship between financial development and income inequality over the 
course of the development process. Thus this study uses the newer and more extensive 
dataset on income distribution (the Dollar and Kraay, 2002 dataset), which incorporates a 
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larger number of countries and a longer time frame relative to the Lynn and Squire (2000) 
dataset used by Clarke, Xu and Zou (2003). Also, this study takes advantage of the larger 
number of observations to employ nonparametric and parametric estimation techniques. The 
results indicate that nonlinearities become apparent only when using the expanded set of 
countries included in the Dollar-Kraay dataset.  
 
Methodologically, the paper uses two econometric techniques: (i) generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimation of a parametric specification; and (ii) sieve 
minimum distance (SMD) estimation of a semi-nonparametric specification. The benchmark 
model is a nonlinear specification that includes control variables common to the cross-
country literature on growth and financial development (for example as pioneered by King 
and Levine, 1993). The semi-nonparametric model is a partially linear model that allows the 
nonlinear components to enter additively. It has an advantage over the more widely used 
semiparametric partially linear model (PLR, Robinson, 1988) in that it allows for explicit 
estimation of the marginal effects of the nonlinear components on the dependent variable, 
whereas the PLR formulation treats the variables that enter the non-linear part of the model 
as nuisance variables. The SMD estimator (developed by Newey and Powell 2003, Ai and 
Chen 2003) provides consistent estimates of the endogenous nonlinear variables of interest. 
The approach focuses on estimating and then graphically presenting evidence on the nature 
of these nonlinearities. The graphical representation, as also seen in recent studies of the 
nonlinearities in growth, initial output and schooling (Liu and Stengos, 1999, Kalaitzidakis 
et al, 2001), provides direct evidence of the presence of nonlinearities in the relationship 
between financial intermediation and income inequality. As a robustness check, I estimate a 
parametric quadratic specification of the model first and obtain results indicating evidence of 
nonlinearities in the relationship. The regression results are robust to a number of diagnostic 
tests for the presence of outliers, specification tests supporting the appropriateness of 
instruments used in GMM estimation, as well as alterations in sample in accordance with 
levels of per capita income and alternations in control variables and instruments. 
 
The relationship between financial development and income inequality is important 
in its policy implications.  The results indicate that making financial markets universally 
accessible will not only have a beneficial effect on growth at initial stages of development, 
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(as has been proposed by a wide empirical literature cited at the introduction) but will also 
reduce income disparity and poverty among various sections of the society. In fact, the 
success of micro-credit institutions across the world shows how effective increased access to 
credit can be in improving living standards of the poorest sectors of the economy. For more 
developed economies, the findings indicate that there are limits to how much financial 
development can decrease income inequality. Further efforts can be directed to the design of 
welfare schemes and scholarship programs that target unskilled workers to facilitate their 
transition to the skilled sector where they can enjoy the benefits of higher income.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a survey of the 
literature on financial development, growth and inequality. In section 3, I give details on the 
data used, and the parametric and semi-nonparametric estimation strategies. In section 4, I 
report the parametric and semi- nonparametric estimates. I also isolate why my results differ 
from those of Clarke et al. (2003). In section 5, I check whether the relationship between 
Gini coefficients and financial development depends on the sectoral structure of the 
economy, and on employment in skill-oriented sectors. In section 6, using other measures of 
financial development, alternative measure of income inequality, and other controls, I 
provide robustness checks of the results. There, I also provide evidence of contingencies 
between inequality and financial intermediation in countries stratified by per capita income. 
Section 7 concludes. 
3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW: THEORETICAL EVIDENCE ON FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND INEQUALITY 
In the early literature on growth and development, the leading view regarding the 
relationship between income distribution and economic development was dominated by 
writings by Kuznets (1955, 1965). The Kuznets hypothesis is the proposition that during the 
course of an economy’s lifetime, income inequality rises during the transition from a more 
egalitarian agricultural sector to a less egalitarian industrial sector. However, as the 
agricultural sector shrinks, and agricultural wages increase, this trend reverses and income 
  45
inequality decreases, resulting in an inverted U-shaped trajectory over the course of 
economic development.  
  
Over the past decade a number of studies have theorized on the expected 
relationship between income inequality and financial intermediation. Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990) formulated a model in which financial intermediaries arise endogenously 
during the process of economic development. In their model, financial trading organizations 
serve as intermediaries and allow investors who join them to earn a higher return on capital 
investment on risky projects, which in turn feeds back on economic growth and income 
levels. At lower levels of development income inequality widens between agents who join 
these coalitions after paying a fixed entry cost and those who remain outside. However, 
since the entry fee is fixed, eventually low-income people can save enough to join these 
intermediaries, resulting in reversal in the upward trend, with income distribution stabilizing 
to a higher growth level. In the final stages of development, the distribution of income across 
agents stabilizes, the saving rate falls, and the economy’s growth rate converges to a higher 
level than that prevailing during its infancy. The distributional effect of financial deepening 
is thus adverse for the poor at early stages, but positive for the poor after a turning point, 
indicating a nonlinear inverted-U relationship.  
 
A number of other theoretical studies gave contrary views of the relationship. For 
example, Galor and Zeira (1993) suggested that in the presence of credit-market 
imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human capital, the initial distribution of 
wealth has persistent effects on aggregate income and investment. They presented a two-
sector model with bequests between generations, where agents who make an indivisible 
investment in human capital can work in the skill-intensive sector. However with the 
assumption of capital-market imperfections, only individuals with bequests larger than the 
investment amount or who can borrow were able to make this investment. In the model, this 
results in income inequality that is perpetuated through bequests to the next generation. An 
implication of their model is that strengthening credit markets can ameliorate credit 
constraints and allow agents to invest in costly human capital, thereby allowing them to 
enjoy the benefits of higher returns in skill-intensive jobs. It is through this mechanism that 
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the model predicts a negative relationship between financial development and income 
inequality. 
 
In a similar spirit, Banerjee and Newman (1993) showed that the presence of credit-
market constraints can affect the pattern of occupational choice, process of development and 
distribution of income. They constructed a three-sector model in which two of the 
technologies require indivisible investment. Due to capital-market imperfections, only rich 
agents can borrow enough to run these indivisible, higher-return technologies. As a result, 
occupations that require a high level of investment are beyond the reach of poor people who 
instead chose wage contracts serving as employees under wealthier agents. Thus the pattern 
of occupational development is determined by the initial distribution of wealth. The ultimate 
distribution of wealth depends on the initial distribution, and this result is compounded as 
access to financial markets is constrained.  Relatedly, Aghion and Bolton (1997) showed that 
informational asymmetries produce credit constraints that are particularly binding on the 
poor because the poor do not have the resources to fund their own projects, nor the collateral 
to access bank credit. These credit constraints thus restrict the poor from exploiting 
investment opportunities. Holding all else equal these models suggested that countries with 
larger capital-market imperfections (that is, higher hurdles to borrow funds to finance 
indivisible investment) should have higher income inequality. 
 
In a third alternative prediction, Galor and Maov (2000) predicted a U-shaped 
relationship that becomes cyclical at higher levels of development. In their model, at initial 
stages of development, a reduction in credit-market imperfections leads to increasing 
investment in human capital. As a result, the supply of skilled workers increases and this 
reduces the returns to ability and hence wage inequality within the skilled workers. Also 
among the unskilled workers inequality falls as the average ability declines due to the 
outflow of the upper tail of the ability distribution. With further reduction in credit-market 
imperfections and larger availability of a pool of skilled labor, there is rapid technological 
progress.  The increase in the rate of technological progress induces a higher demand for 
skilled workers and simultaneously increases returns to ability. The heterogeneity of ability 
between skilled and unskilled workers results in a rise in wage dispersion, and thus higher 
inequality.  
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Only recently has any empirical work been undertaken to study this relationship, 
primarily due to difficulties in assembling credible data across countries on income 
distributions and also measurement of financial development.  The first empirical work on 
the topic is by Clarke, Xu and Zou (2003). Using a cross country framework and sample of 
44 countries they showed that financial development has a strong negative linear impact on 
income inequality, and thus that the inverted-U proposition fails to hold. Beck et al. (2004) 
examined the relationship between financial development and the growth of income 
inequality and poverty using a cross section sample of 55 countries, and reiterated the 
findings of Clarke, Xu and Zou (2003). They showed that financial development has a strong 
negative impact on income inequality, that is, improving the financial infrastructure leads to 
a lessening of inequality. However this analysis was based on a cross country sample 
averaged over 30 years for 55 countries. 
3.3 METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
This section provides a description of the different techniques used to examine the data for 
uncovering the relationship between financial intermediation and income inequality. First, I 
provide a description of the data proxing income inequality and financial intermediary 
development as well as other controls used in the estimation process. Second, I present a 
description of the parametric estimation process. Third, I outline the strategy to deal with 
endogeneity and simultaneity problems in the estimation process. Lastly, I present the 
nonparametric estimation technique and outline why I use this technique instead of available 
alternatives. 
3.3.1 The Data Details 
The study uses a sample of 60 countries over the period 1961 to 2000. The sample 
period is divided in eight non-overlapping 5-year periods9. Data averages are used in 
                                                     
9 Section B1 in the Appendix lists the countries in the sample. 
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measuring stock variables and beginning-of-period values are used in measuring flows. The 
primary measure of income inequality is the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is derived 
from the Lorenz curve, which plots the cumulative percentage of the population on the 
horizontal axis and the cumulative percentage of income on the vertical axis for each 
country. A 45-degree line diagonal line depicts a situation in which there is a perfectly even 
income distribution. To measure income inequality, the Gini coefficient equals the ratio of 
the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line. Since the Lorenz curve equals the 
45-degree line when there is perfect income equality, the Gini coefficient equals zero when 
perfect income equality holds. The data are from the Dollar and Kraay (2002) dataset, which 
is cited to be drawn from four different sources: the UN-WIDER World Inequality Database, 
which is a substantial extension of Deininger and Square (1996); the Deininger and Square 
(1996) measure for data not included in UN-WIDER; Chen and Ravillion (2000) who 
construct measures of income distribution and poverty from 265 household surveys in 83 
countries; and the Lundberg and Squire (2000) database. Dollar and Kraay have restricted 
their sample to income distribution measures based on nationally representative surveys. 
Also since all surveys reported whether the measure is income or consumption, and whether 
they are gross or net of taxes, their data is adjusted for taxes and transfers.  
 
The primary measure of financial intermediary development is ‘Private credit’ 
which is defined as the value of credit by financial intermediaries to the private sector 
divided by GDP. This measure has been used in a number of recent papers (e.g., Levine et 
al. 2000; Beck et al., 1999). The advantage of this measure is that it excludes credit issued by 
the central bank and development banks. Furthermore, it excludes credit to the public sector, 
credit to state owned enterprises, and cross claims of one group of intermediaries on another. 
Private credit is a comprehensive measure capturing the amount of credit channeled from 
savers through financial intermediaries to private firms.  To assess the robustness of the 
results I use two additional measures of financial development. The first measure, ‘liquid 
liabilities’ is traditionally used and equals the liquid liabilities of the financial system 
(currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of financial intermediaries and 
nonblank financial intermediaries) divided by GDP. A second measure is ‘bank assets’ 
which are claims on the non-financial domestic sector by the deposit money banks divided 
by GDP. This measure has been used by Clarke et al (2003) as a secondary measure of 
financial intermediation.  All measures of financial intermediation are from the World Bank 
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Financial Infrastructure database (Beck et al., World Bank 2004). Details of these measures 
are given in Appendix B2.   
 
Since the main focus of the paper is on potentially nonlinear relationships between 
financial development and income inequality, I use the usual controls used in the literature 
on finance and growth and inequality. King and Levine (1993) and Levine et al. (2000) 
include trade openness, inflation, government spending as a share of GDP, and education as 
plausible channels through which financial intermediary development could affect growth. 
Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP and its relationship with 
income inequality has not been clearly established in empirical literature. Average inflation 
rates is assumed to have a positive relationship with income inequality, higher levels of 
inflation tend to increase inequality in an economy.  Government consumption can have a 
negative relationship with income inequality if there are explicit policies to redistribute 
income through taxes and transfers. Education is assumed to have a negative relationship 
with income inequality. With higher education, income levels increase and this reduces 
income inequality within a society. Detailed definitions and sources for the variables used 
and data procured are given in Table B2 in Appendix B. Table B3 in Appendix B provide 
summary statistics for the variables in the analysis. The statistics are reported for the sample 
cleaned of outliers10.  
  
3.3.2 Linear Estimation Techniques  
The basic parametric specification of the relationship is as follows: 
ittititit TZXfY εϕγα +⋅+′++= )(                  (3.1) 
where  is the measure of income inequality of country i in period t,  is the measure of 
financial development,  is the vector of other controls,  is the time dummies,  f(Xit) is 
assumed to be a linear or quadratic functional form, 
itY itX
itZ tT
γ  is a vector capturing effects of 
                                                     
10 Following the method of Belch, Kelsey and Huh (1980), I use DFITS and Influence statistics to 
select data points that may have undue influence on point estimates. Details are provided in section 
3.6. 
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control variables in   and itZ ϕ   are parameters capturing the effect of time dummies.  To 
proxy for measures of financial development I use three measures. The baseline measure is 
private credit. I also use ‘liquid liabilities’ and ‘bank assets’ as other measures for robustness 
checks. The subscripts i and t represents the country and time period respectively. 
 
The simplest strategy is to estimate the model in equation (3.1) using OLS 
regression. There are two distinct problems with this strategy. First, financial development is 
endogenous, so this may capture reverse causality and simultaneity or the effect of some 
omitted characteristics (like geography, institutions, culture or other variables). Second, the 
variable may be measured with error, so there may be a downward attenuation bias.  These 
concerns imply that OLS regressions will generate results that do not correspond to the 
causal effect of financial development on income distribution. To avoid these concerns, the 
strategy is to estimate the linear equation (3.1) using two stage least squares (2SLS) using 
distinct and plausible instruments for measures of financial development. Ideal instruments 
are correlated with the endogenous regressor but orthogonal to any other omitted 
characteristics (i.e., uncorrelated with the outcome of interest through any channels other 
than their effect via the endogenous regressor).  A successful IV strategy  corrects not only 
for differential measurement error in the endogenous variable but also for endogeneity bias, 
and the parameters can be estimated consistently. I lean on literature on financial 
development and growth to identify legal origin of countries (La Porta et al 1998) as a valid 
instrument. A description of the instrument is given in the next section 3.3. The first stage 
for the IV strategy is given by equations (3.2) and (3.3) below. In (3.2), the instrument is the 
legal origin of countries (that is, whether countries have English Common law, Napoleonic 
Civil law, German or Scandinavian law); and in (3.3) I add latitude to the instrument list 
following empirical literature in finance and growth: 
 
ittitiiit uTZGFEX i ⋅⋅= + + +⋅+⋅+⋅μφ τψδ                        (3.2) 
ittitiiiit uTZLGFEX i ⋅⋅= + + +⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅μφ τψλδ ,                (3.3) 
 
where  is the measure of financial development,  is a dummy for English legal origin, 




latitude of a country,  is the vector of other controls and  is the time dummies. The 
exclusion restriction is that in the population ,   
itZ tT
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,,,, ==== Cov iLitiitiitiit CovGCovFECov εεεε ,                 (3.4) 
where itε  is the error term in the second stage (3.1).  
To estimate the parameters of the nonlinear version of (3.1), the generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimation methodology is used.  The 2SLS estimation technique is 
ruled out for the nonlinear version to avoid the trap of the forbidden regression. The 
forbidden regression describes the replacement of a nonlinear function of an endogenous 
regressor with the same nonlinear function of fitted values from the first-stage estimation 
(for details see Wooldridge, 2002, pp 236). The implication is that if the forbidden 
regression is run, the resulting estimates are inconsistent. The GMM estimation technique is 
used to overcome this concern and consistently estimate the parameters of interest. The 
GMM estimator uses the following moment condition: 0][ =⋅ itE itV ε  where Vi is the 
matrix of instruments and εit  is error term in equation (3.1). The standard errors reported are 
clustered by country to avoid serial correlation within observations of the same country.  
To test the validity of the moment conditions, I use the test of over identifying 
restrictions by Hansen (1982) and Newey and West (1987). The null hypothesis of Hansen’s 
test is that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, and thus, the instrumental variables are 
not correlated with the error term. The test statistic is the sample size times the value attained 
by the objective function at the GMM estimate (the J-statistic). Hansen’s test is distributed as 
χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of moment conditions minus the number of 
parameters to be estimated. These statistics are reported in the tables. 
3.3.3 Endogeneity and instrument selection 
In this section I provide a description of the instruments legal origin and latitude, 
and the results of the first stage estimation. La Porta, Lopez, Sheifer and Vishy (1998) show 
that the legal systems with European origins can be classified into four major legal families 
(Reynolds and Flores, 1996): the English Common law, and the French, German, and 
Scandinavian Civil law countries. LLSV (1998) identified that the legal origin of countries 
influenced the legal treatment of shareholders, the laws governing creditor rights, the 
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efficiency of contract enforcement and accounting standards. The logic is that since financial 
systems are based on legal contracts which protect investors and creditors, legal origins play 
a role in the financial development of a country. Legal origin is usually considered as an 
exogenous endowment as the English, German, French, Scandinavian legal systems were 
spread through occupation and colonialism. Hence legal origin can serve as an instrument as 
it is exogenous with respect to income distribution, and correlated with indicators of 
financial development. Originally LLSV (1998) had a 44 country data set. This was 
extended by Levine et al (2000) to a total of 71 countries using Reynolds and Flores (1996). 
The second instrument, latitude, is the absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, 
normalized between zero and one. In recent literature, a number of papers show that natural 
resource endowments as proxied by latitude account for development of national institutions 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001; Engerman and Sokolof, 1997; and Easterly and Levine 2003). In 
accordance, I have used this variable to account for differences in financial development in 
some regressions. 
Table 3.1 presents regressions of the financial intermediary indicators on the control 
variables, including dummy variables for English, French, and German legal origin relative 
to Scandinavian origin (which is captured in the constant). The table also presents 
regressions that include latitude as an instrumental variable along with other controls.  
 
Table 3.1.  Legal Origin and Financial Intermediary Development 





































LATITUDE  0.72 







Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 













N 225 225 225 225 225 225 
 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are robust standard errors. ENGLISH = English legal origin. FRENCH 
= Napoleonic legal origin. GERMAN = German legal origin. Scandinavian legal origin is the omitted 
category. The F-test is for the particular significance of the legal origin and latitude variables and is 
not the overall F test for regression. The standard errors reported are clustered by country.  
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The results show that the countries with German legal origin have better-developed 
financial intermediary systems in comparison to countries having the Common Law or 
French legal systems. This result holds for the range of specifications that I estimate as a part 
of robustness checks and is in accordance with studies by Levine et al (2000). When latitude 
is added to the regression specification, it has a large positive impact, implying countries at 
higher latitudes have deeper levels of financial development. The F-test reported in the table 
provides a diagnostic statistic for the presence of weak instruments. The results indicate that 
there is little evidence that the legal origin and latitude variables are weak instruments; 
rather, they explain a significant portion of cross-country differences in financial 
intermediary development. 
3.3.4 Semi nonparametric estimation techniques 
With the availability of large datasets, semi-nonparametric estimation is increasingly used in 
the growth literature to investigate nonlinearities in the relationships studied11.  In this 
framework a part of the regression specification assumes a functional form and part of it is 
estimated without any assumptions beyond some degree of smoothness. The semi-
nonparametric partially linear specification of the model specified can be written as 
( ) iititit uZhXY ++= β' ,                 (3.5) 
where Xit is a matrix of control variables of dimension q, β is a q × 1 vector of unknown 
parameters, Zit  is a continuous variable of dimension p, h(.) is an unknown function and   
E(uit | Xit, Zit) = 0.  
Equation (3.5) can be written in terms of the conditional moment restriction  
                      ( )[ 0|,, 00 ] =XhVE i θρ ,                                           (3.6) 
where V′ = (Y′, Xz′), Xz is a subset of X, ρ(.) is a vector of known (residual) functions, and  
( )[ XhVE i |,, 00 ]θρ   is the conditional expectation of ( )00 ,, hVi θρ  given X. The 
parameters of interest α0 = (θ0, h0) contain a vector of finite-dimensional unknown 
parameters of interest θ0 and a infinite-dimensional unknown functions 
                                                     
11 A model is called semi-nonparametric if it contains both finite-dimensional and infinite-
dimensional unknown parameters of interest. 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ).,........... 0010 qhhh = . The model is semiparametric in the sense it contains unknown 
functions h0.  
When the nonparametric regression component is endogenous, Ai and Chen (2003) 
provided a method for obtaining a  n1/2 consistent estimator of β0 and h(.) using the sieve 
minimum distance estimator. The method of sieves has certain advantages over other 
nonparametric methods. Semi-nonparametric models usually involve unknown parameters 
that lie in infinite-dimensional parameter spaces; hence their estimation is problematic given 
finite samples. The method of sieves overcomes this problem by optimizing a criterion 
function over a sequence of less complex and finite-dimensional parameter spaces. The 
sieves or approximating spaces are usually constructed using linear spans of power series, 
Fourier series, splines or other basis functions. Since these approximating spaces can be 
characterized by a finite number of parameters, a nonparametric estimation technique is 
often reduced to a parametric one when the method of sieves is used (more details are 
provided in Chen 2005). The consistency of the method is ensured as the method requires 
that the complexity of sieves increases with sample size so that in the limit the sieves are 
dense in the original parameter space. Ai and Chen (2003) and Newey and Powell (2003) 
have shown that under a set of sufficient conditions, ( )nnn hˆ,ˆˆ θα =  converges to α0 and h0  is 
both n1/2 consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. Table B14 provides a 
description of the sieve minimum distance estimator.  
3.4 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
In this section, first I present the OLS, Instrumental Variable and GMM estimates and 
provide evidence of the presence of nonlinearities in the relationship. Next, I provide the 
corresponding semi-nonparametric estimates and examine whether they corroborate the 
findings of the parametric section. Lastly, I conduct a series of estimations to isolate the 
difference in results obtained in this study relative to those obtained by Clarke et al. (2003). 
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3.4.1 Parametric estimates 
In Table 3.2, the parametric coefficient estimates of equation (1) are presented using 
simple OLS estimations as well as instrumental and GMM estimation to explore for 
nonlinearities when using private credit. The Table reports estimates obtained after the 
elimination of potential outliers and other observations having high values of residual and 
leverage statistics. The details are in section 3.6.1. In Column 1 and 2, I first report OLS 
estimates of (3.1). In column (1) private credit enters linearly in the regression, and the OLS 
results indicate a strong negative relationship between financial development and income 
inequality. The coefficient estimate is -0.067 with a standard error of 0.029. The negative 
relationship between financial development and income inequality is presented in Figure B1 
in Appendix B. Figure B1 reports a partial regression plot showing the estimated effect of 
private credit on income inequality when all other explanatory variables are held constant12. 
The graph suggests that the estimated relationship is not driven by outlier observations and 
has a strong negative relationship with income inequality.  
 
In terms of the control variables, the OLS regression shows that higher levels of 
income inequality is associated with lower government consumption, higher international 
integration with trade, lower levels of schooling and higher inflation rates.  The government 
consumption ratio is the average of real government consumption to real GDP. The 
estimated coefficient is negative - 0.007 (0.006) and insignificant. The estimate implies that 
a one-standard-deviation increase in the ratio (5.8 in the 1990s) would reduce inequality by 
0.041. The estimated coefficient on trade openness is positive but not statistically significant, 
0.05 (0.06). Hence there is only weak statistical evidence that greater international openness 
increases inequality from the OLS estimates. The point estimate implies that a one-standard-
deviation increase in openness ratio (0.415 in the 1990s) would raise the inequality on 
impact by 0.021.  The estimated coefficient for secondary schooling is negative -0.65 (0.16) 
and significant at the 1 percent level; the point estimate implies that a one-standard-deviation 
increase in schooling (0.154 in the 1990s) in the sample period would reduce income 
                                                     
12 In partial regression plots, I regress inequality against the full conditioning information set and 
collect the inequality residuals. Then, I regress financial development measures against the full 
conditioning set and collect these residuals. Figure 1 plots the inequality residuals against the private 
credit residuals along with the regression line. 
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inequality by 0.102. The inflation variable is the average rate of retail price inflation over 
each of the five year periods. The estimated coefficient, 0.028 (0.021) is positive and 
insignificant. This coefficient implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in inflation rate 
(0.11 in the 1990s) increases the inequality on impact by 0.003. Also to account for the 
Kuznets’ inverted-U hypothesis on income inequality and initial income level, I add a 
squared log GDP term in all our specifications. The estimate for the linear term from the 
OLS in column 2 is positive and highly significant, 1.38 (0.44) while for the squared term is 
negative, -0.079 (0.028) and also significant. The regressions include an overall constant 
term and separate time dummies for the later periods. The coefficient estimate of the time 
period dummies are negative in value till the early 1980s and then become positive in the 
mid 1980s and 1990s. Hence the sample’s level of inequality seems to have declined from 
1960 to early 1980s but there is some marginal evidence that inequality increased from mid-
1980s onwards (estimates are positive though not significant). 
 
To control for the possibility that this negative impact of private credit on income 
inequality is due to simultaneity bias, I conduct 2SLS estimation and report the results in 
column three and four. In column 3, legal origin is used as the instrument, and in column 4 
both legal origin and latitude are used as instruments. The results in column 3 indicate that 
the exogenous component of financial development has a significant negative impact on 
income inequality, -0.09 (0.04). The estimated coefficient on private credit implies that a 1 
percent increase in private credit results approximately in about 0.09 percent decrease in 
income inequality (since both variables are in logs). The coefficient on private credit in the 
IV estimation is larger than the corresponding OLS estimation (0.09 versus 0.06), suggesting 
that the attenuation bias from measurement error in the instrumental variables swamps the 
reverse causality bias that would tend to make the OLS estimates greater than IV estimate. 
The IV results indicate that if Brazil (with an average private credit value of 28.8% of GDP 
over 1995-2000) had the same level of financial intermediary development as Australia 
(average value of 74% of GDP over 1995-2000), their level of inequality would have been 
lower by 0.85 percent over this period13.  
 
                                                     
13 To see this, recall the regressors are in logs and note that ln(74) – ln(28.8) = 0.94. The estimated 
parameter on private credit equals -0.09, thus -0.09(0.94) = - 0.0846. 
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Table 3.2.  The Parametric Estimates : Financial Development and Income Inequality 
Variable OLS  1 OLS 2 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM
Private credit 

































































































     -0.21 
(0.06)*** 
































































































Instruments Used   Legal O Legal O & 
latitude 
Legal O Legal O & 
latitude 
R-Squared 0.56 0.57     
Hansen’s J       [0.55] [0.569] 
N 225 225 225 225 225 225 
Notes:  The dependent variable is log of Gini coefficient. The figures in parenthesis are standard 
errors. ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The F-test for 
the significance level of both set of instruments is presented in Table 1. The standard errors reported 
are clustered by country.  
 
To test the presence of nonlinearities, I add a squared term for the measure of 
financial sector development and estimate the model using GMM methodology. The results 
are presented in column 5 when using only legal origin as an instrument, and column 6 when 
using both legal origin and latitude as instruments. The results in column 5 indicate that the 
linear and squared terms in private credit are each statistically significant at the 10 percent 
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level: - 1.84 (1.18) and 0.24 (0.15), respectively. The results in column 6 indicate that the 
linear and squared terms are -3.05 (1.25) and 0.41 (0.17) respectively, and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. The results indicate a nonlinear relationship in which 
inequality falls initially as economies develop their financial infrastructure; beyond a 
threshold the relationship becomes nonnegative. This result is consistent with theoretical 
predictions by Galor and Maov (2000). Thus in accordance, at initial stages of development, 
reductions in credit-market imperfections tend to reduce income inequality. However the 
negative influence attenuates as private credit rises and reaches zero when the indicator takes 
on the midrange value of 4 (i.e. when private credit takes a value of 55 percent of GDP), 
beyond which there is a reversal in the trend. For countries having higher levels of financial 
development there is no evidence of the negative relationship and some indication that 
income inequality rises with further financial development. Therefore, increases in financial 
development appear to coincide with reduced inequality for countries that have less-mature 
financial systems but tend to have a marginally positive relationship with inequality for 
countries that have achieved financial depth. This nonlinear relationship is shown in Figure 
3.1: the solid line indicates the fitted values implied by linear and squared terms for private 
credit; the dotted lines are 95 percent point-wise confidence intervals. The figure serves to 
provide a comparison to the graphical presentation of the semi nonparametric estimates.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Income inequality and financial intermediation 
Notes: The above figures are from the GMM estimation presented in column 5. The solid line shows 
fitted values of linear and square values of private credit, the dotted values are 95 percent confidence 
intervals.  
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 Regarding the observations in the figure, I find that economies having low levels of 
private credit and levels of development are at the extreme left tail of the figure; these 
observations are for example, Ghana (1991-95), Nepal (1976-80), and Bolivia (1965-70) 
among others. Again at the extreme right tail of the figure, I find observations are of 
economies having high levels of financial and economic development, for example, Japan 
(1991-95), Germany (1991-95), and the Netherlands (1991-95) among others. 
 
For robustness checks, two other measures of financial development are used 
separately in a similar parametric framework. Table 3.3 presents the results of estimating  (1) 
using these measures; bank assets is presented in panel A and liquid liabilities in panel B. 
Bank assets measures claims on the non-financial domestic sector by deposit money banks 
divided by GDP. In comparison to private credit, this measure excludes credit issued by non-
bank financial intermediaries and includes credit issued to government and state-owned 
enterprises. In panel A, the OLS results show that higher income inequalities are associated 
with lower levels of bank credit, government consumption, secondary schooling, and are 
positively correlated with the level of international integration and inflation, consistent with 
results using private credit. The benchmark OLS estimate of bank asset is negative -0.09 
(0.02) and significant at the 1 percent level. Figure B3 in Appendix B reports the partial 
relationship between bank assets and income inequality.  The figure shows that when 
controlling for other covariates, the relationship is negative and highly significant and not 
driven by outliers.   
 
In column 3, the instrumental variable estimates obtained using legal origin as the 
lone instrument show that the exogenous component of the measure bank asset has a 
negative and significant relationship with income inequality -0.11 (0.054). The remaining 
explanatory variables enter the regressions as expected. Initial income enters the regression 
with a significantly positive coefficient and its square is negative and significant, as in the 
previous table. Secondary school enrollment has a strong negative correlation with income 
inequality, while trade openness enters positively. Government consumption enters the 
regression with a negative coefficient, and is statistically insignificant. Also, the inflation 
  60
coefficient is positive and insignificant.  The 2SLS estimates are similar when using legal 
origin and latitude in the instrument list as reported in column 4.  
 
Table 3.3. The Parametric Estimates: Bank assets and Income Inequality 
Variable  (N = 225) OLS  1 OLS 2 2SLS 2SLS  GMM GMM
A. Using Bank Assets 
Bank Assets 













Bank Assets  Square  
(in natural logs) 
 .018 
(0.02) 


















































































Instruments Used   Legal O Legal O & 
latitude 
Legal O Legal O & 
latitude 
R-Squared 0.575 0.577     
Hansen’s J      [0.67] [0.19] 
B. Using liquid liabilities 















square  (in logs) 
 0.071 
(0.037)* 


















































































Instruments Used   Legal O Legal O & 
latitude 
Legal O Legal O & 
latitude 
R-squared 0.56 0.57     
Hansen’s J statistic      [0.72] [0.023] 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of Gini coefficient. The figures in parenthesis are 
robust standard errors. ***, **, * indicates significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The standard errors reported are clustered by country.  
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In column 5, I add a linear and square term for bank assets and estimate this 
specification via GMM, using legal origin as the lone instrument. The results indicate the 
presence of nonlinearity: the estimates for the linear and quadratic terms are -1.39 (0.85) and 
0.17 (0.11) respectively; both estimates are significant at the 10 percent level. Again when 
using latitude and legal origin as instruments, the results are stronger. The estimates for the 
linear and quadratic terms are -2.62 (0.93) and 0.33(0.12) respectively; both estimates are 
significant at the 1 percent level. Thus the pattern follows the results derived using private 
credit, and clearly indicates the presence of a nonlinear relationship. 
 
Figure 3.2a shows the nature of nonlinearities by plotting the fitted relationship 
between inequality and bank assets implied by the GMM estimates of bank assets. As seen 
in the figure, improvements in the level of financial intermediary correspond with reductions 
in income inequality over the lower ranges of financial development. When the index 
reaches a mid-range value of 60.34 percent of GDP, the impact on inequality attenuates and 
becomes nonnegative. Hansen J results show that the null hypothesis is not rejected, 
implying the instruments are appropriate. 
 
3.2a. Bank assets and Income inequality 
 
3.2b. Liquid liability and Income inequality 
 
Figure 3.2. Bank Assets, Liquid Liabilities And Income Inequality: Evidence From GMM 
 
In panel B, Table 3.3, the parametric estimates obtained using ‘liquid liabilities’ are 
presented. This measure equals the ratio of currency, demand and interest bearing liabilities 
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of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries to GDP. This is a typical measure of 
‘financial depth’ and of the overall size of the financial intermediary sector and has been 
used in studies by Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), King and Levine (1993), Levine et 
al. (2000), Beck et al. (1999). The measure is useful if one makes the assumption that the 
size of the financial intermediary sector is positively correlated with the provision and 
quality of services. However the measure has some shortcomings, as reported in Levine et al 
(2000). In particular, it may not accurately gauge the effectiveness of the financial sector in 
ameliorating informational asymmetries and easing transaction costs. Also, the measure 
includes deposits by one financial intermediary in another, which may involve ‘double 
counting’. 
 
In panel B, the OLS results indicate a strong negative relationship between financial 
development and income inequality. The estimate for liquid liability is negative and 
significant, -0.098 (0.036). Figure B2  in Appendix B provides a graphical description of the 
partial relation between the log Gini coefficient and liquid liability. The graph suggests that 
the estimated relationship is not driven by outlier observations and has a strong negative 
relationship with income inequality. The benchmark OLS estimates of control variables 
yields results similar to those obtained using private credit and bank assets. In column 3, IV 
results indicate that the exogenous component of financial development has a significant 
negative relationship with income inequality, -0.17 (0.06). The estimated coefficient implies 
that a 1 percent increase in liquid liabilities results in an approximate 0.17 percent decrease 
in income inequality. In column 5, I add a squared term of the measure and estimate the 
system using GMM. The results indicate that the linear and squared term in liquid liability 
are each statistically significant at the 10 percent level: -1.15 (0.71) and 0.12 (0.07), 
respectively. When using legal origin and latitude in the instrument list, the estimates are 
stronger and significant at the 5 percent level. These estimates have implications similar to 
those obtained using private credit, and again provide evidence of the presence of 
nonlinearities. The fitted relationship is shown in Figure 3.2b. The figure indicates that in 
comparison to private credit, the negative effect of higher financial depth on income 
inequality attenuates and reaches zero when the indicator takes a midrange value of 74% of 
GDP. From this range further increases in financial intermediary seem to have a nonnegative 
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impact on income inequality. In the next section, the estimates from the semi-nonparametric 
method are presented. 
3.4.2 Semi-nonparametric estimates 
Here, the measures of financial intermediation form the nonparametric component of the 
model specification, while the controls enter the model linearly. Table B5 in the Appendix B 
gives the results of the semi-nonparametric estimation. The first column gives results using 
obtained using private credit as a measure of financial intermediation, the second and third 
column give results obtained using bank assets and liquid liabilities, respectively. The 
coefficients a0, a1 and a2 provide estimates of the nonlinear h(Zi) component of equation 
(3.4). Figure 3.3 illustrates a representative semiparametric fit for the h(Zi) component in 
equation (3.4) along with 95 percent confidence intervals. The horizontal axis depicts 
logarithms of private credit while the vertical axis depicts estimates of the nonlinear 
component h(Zi). The figure shows that the function is nonlinear and similar to the fitted 
values of GMM presented in the previous section. The results suggest that the linear 
hypothesis is true only for countries having low and middle levels of financial infrastructure. 




Figure 3.3. Private Credit And Income Inequality: Semiparametric Estimates 
Notes: The figure in circles are fitted values of linear and quadratic terms of private 
credit, the figures in dots are 95 percent confidence levels of the fitted values. 
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 This result is reinforced when using the alternate measures of financial intermediary 
development. Figures 3.4a and 3.4b illustrate estimates obtained using ‘bank assets’ and 
‘liquid liability’ respectively.  Figure 3.4a indicates that increases in the level of bank assets 
correspond with reductions in income inequality; however after the mean value of 55 
percent, the relationship becomes nonnegative. In case of Figure 3.4b, the turning point is at 
the level of 66.7 percent in liquid liability. 
 
Figure 3.4a: Bank Assets and Income Inequality: 
Semiparametric Estimates 
 
Figure 3.4b: Liquid Liabilities and Income 
Inequality: Semiparametric Estimates 
 
  
Figure 3.4. Bank Assets and Liquid Liability: Semiparametric Estimates 
Notes: The figure in circles are fitted values of nonlinear terms of bank and liquid liabilities, 
the figures in dots are 95 percent confidence levels of the fitted values. 
 
The semi-nonparametric estimates of the control variables are similar to those 
obtained using GMM estimation. For example, in column 2 the estimate for secondary 
schooling rate is negative – 0.71 (0.16) and significant at the 1 percent level.  The coefficient 
estimate for inflation is negative -0.095 (0.18) and insignificant, whereas that for trade 
openness is positive 0.067 (0.05) and insignificant. The estimated impact of government 
consumption is negative -0.086 (0.11) but insignificant. The coefficient estimates obtained 
using the other measures are similar, and to conserve space not discussed. In sum, the 
graphical analysis constructed using parametric and nonparametric methods provide 
evidence of a nonlinear relationship between financial intermediary development and 
income inequality.  
  65
3.4.3 Comparison with Clarke et al. (2003) 
Here I investigate why my results differ with those obtained by Clarke et al. (2003). Towards 
this aim, I report a series of estimates. First I replicate the sample, time period and models 
used by Clarke et al. and compare these results with the original sample of 60 countries used 
in this study for the same time period. Next using the same sample of 44 countries in Clarke 
et al., I extend the period to 2000 with the additional data that I have access to and compare 
these results with the original sample of 60 countries for the period extended to 2000. The 
analysis is carried out using the measure ‘private credit’ as used by Clarke et al. 
 
Clarke et al. used the same estimation strategy as followed in this paper; however 
they used a slightly different set of control variables. Specifically, they used the linear and 
squared terms of the log of real per capita GDP, inflation rate, government consumption as 
used in this study, but they differed in their inclusion of the variable ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization and a measure of protection of property rights. They also excluded the 
measure of human capital and trade openness which are incorporated in the baseline model 
used in this paper. In the exercise in this section, I use the same control and source of data as 
in their paper to isolate the difference in estimation results. In Table B13  in the Appendix B, 
I report results obtained using the smaller sample of 44 countries for the period 1960-1995 in 
panel A; and the original sample ( as in this study) restricted to the time period 1960-1995 in 
panel B using the measure of private credit. In panels C and D, I report results obtained by 
extending the sample period to 2000 for both sets of samples. For all variables except per 
capita income, the same source was used 14. For the latter variable, Clarke et al.  used an 
unconventional source which could not be found. In panel A, the replication result for the 
OLS estimate of private credit is 0.044 (0.029); in comparison, the original estimate in the 
previous paper is 0.05 (0.027)15. The GMM estimate of the linear specification for the 
replication set is -0.22 (0.072); in comparison, the previous paper reported -0.23 (0.074). I 
                                                     
14 The following countries are included in addition to that in the sample of countries of Clarke et al. 
(2003): Bangladesh, Bolivia, Switzerland, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Honduras, Israel, Jamaica, Mauritius, Niger, Nepal, Panama, Paraguay, Senegal, Sierra Leone, El 
Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. 
15 A possible reason why there is a slight difference here is that the number of observations was 
slightly bigger at 178 from 170 as reported in the previous paper. But since the sample is an 
unbalanced panel, this problem couldn’t be avoided. 
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was not able to replicate the GMM quadratic specification results. The coefficients of the 
other regressors are similar. In panel D, the GMM estimate of the linear term is -2.19 (1.31); 
and of the squared term is 0.28 (0.16), the estimates are significant at the 10 percent level. 
The results indicate that ignoring the effects of using an unconventional source for per capita 
income, the addition of new observations brings about a significant nonlinear relationship 
between income inequality and financial development. 
 
As a further robustness check, I explore whether the experience of financial crisis in 
late 1990s of some economies had any impact on the relationship. To investigate this I 
excluded observations of economies facing the financial crisis. However the exclusion of 
these observations did not change the main results, the nonlinearities in relationship was 
evident16. 
3.5 UNDERSTANDING THESE RESULTS 
In this section, guided by theoretical suggestions by Kuznets (1955, 1965) and Galor and 
Maov (2000) I report a series of estimates in order to explain the result of the nonnegative 
relationship at higher levels of financial development derived previously. To test whether 
income inequality is higher in economies having a higher level of industrial and service 
sector, I introduce a variable, termed as ‘modern sector’ which measure the share of 
economy accounted by industrial and service sector as a percentage of GDP. Also, to test 
whether financial sector development may have a positive relationship with income 
inequality in countries with larger modern sectors, I include an interaction term between the 
value added in industrial and service sector as a percentage of GDP and the measure of 
financial sector development. This channel of causation of higher inequality has been 
explored by Clarke et al. where it is termed as the augmented Kuznets hypothesis. The results 
are presented in Table B6  in the Appendix B for two measures of financial intermediary 
development, private credit and bank assets. The results obtained using liquid liabilities are 
similar and are not reported to conserve space. In the first column, the OLS estimates show 
                                                     
16 The GMM estimate of the linear term is -1.61 (0.09) and the squared term is 0.21 (0.12), the 
estimates are significant at 10 percent level. This table is not presented but is available on request. 
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that after controlling for other factors that may affect income inequality including per capita 
income and other controls, the share of economy accounted for by service and industrial 
sector as a percentage of GDP is positive 0.004 (0.002) and significant at the 10 percent 
level. The results are similar when using bank assets and is reported in column 5. The result 
on the interaction term is presented in column 4 for private credit and column 8 for bank 
assets. The coefficient estimate on the interaction term is positive at 0.023 (0.014) and 
significant at the 10 percent level for private credit. When using bank assets the estimate of 
the interaction term is similarly positive and significant. These results indicate that financial 
sector development reduces inequality in countries having smaller service and industrial 
sectors, while increases in the size of these sectors are associated with higher inequality in 
countries having a mature financial infrastructure. 
 
Next, I explore whether the rise in income inequality is a result of higher demand for 
skilled labor in response to higher returns to ability and report a series of estimates. 
Specifically, I explore whether inequality is increasing with financial sector development 
because of increasing employment in the service sector (which serves to proxy high skill 
labor).  Table B7 in the Appendix B shows the result when I add a variable denoting the 
percent of employment in service sector to total employment. The data is derived from the 
World Development Indicators (2007). The OLS estimates show that income inequality is 
positively correlated with the percent of employment in service sector; the coefficient 
estimate is 0.004 (0.001)  and significant at the 1 percent level. The GMM estimate of the 
interaction term in column 4 is positive 0.98 (0.72) and insignificant. These results indicate 
that financial sector development tend to increase inequality in countries having higher 
employment in skill oriented sectors. 
 
Again, in order to proxy for high-skill content production, I use available cross 
country data on high technology exports as a percentage of the manufacturing sector 
(Source: WDI, 2007).  The goal here is to explore whether income inequality is higher in 
countries having a high level of high technology exports, which serves to indicate a high-
skill biased manufacturing sector. In Table B8 in the Appendix B, I use private credit and 
bank assets to proxy financial development. The controls apart from the usual include the 
share of industrial and service sector to GDP and high technology exports as a percentage of 
the manufacturing sector. The OLS results show that having a high technology export sector 
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tend to increase the level of income inequality in the economy. For example, in column 1 
and 2, the coefficient estimate for high technology exports is positive and range between 
0.27 (0.16) and 0.25 (0.15); in both cases it is significant at the 10 percent level. Using bank 
assets, the coefficient estimates are similar and range between 0.29 (0.17) and 0.24 (0.15), 
and both are significant at the 10 percent level. These results confirm that inequality is 
positively correlated with high-skill oriented sectors. The coefficient estimate on modern 
sector is positive and significant at the 1 percent level for this sample and it ranges between 
0.011 (0.004) to 0.013 (0.004). Since data was available for most countries in the sample 
only from the mid 1980s, the sample size is significantly smaller.  
 
Thus in sum, the findings indicate that in countries having a large industrial and 
service sector, income inequality is greater than in agrarian economies. Further, the findings 
indicate that inequality is higher in economies having more people employed in the service 
sector, where the average skill content of work is generally higher, and it increases with 
further financial development. Again the results indicate that when economies have a large 
high technology sector, income inequality is seen to be higher. Together, these results aim to 
explain why inequality is seen to have a nonnegative relationship with financial development 
at higher levels of financial development. 
3.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section I provide a wide array of sensitivity analyses to gauge the robustness of these 
findings. In the first section, I provide details of tests conducted to clean data of the potential 
influence of outliers. Secondly, I split the data according to income levels as specified by the 
World Bank and explore the relationship between financial infrastructure and income 
distribution of samples stratified by income. Next, I use the ratio of 90 to 10 income 
percentile as an alternate measure of income inequality and explore whether the results 
withstand the test of an alternate measure. Lastly, I change control variables to test whether 
the results withstand this robustness check.  
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3.6.1 Tests for Outliers, Influence Statistics and Leverage 
As a first robustness check, I explore for the potential influence of outliers. A total of 11 
observations were singled out using a combination of two test statistics to flag observations 
which act as outliers. The first test statistics is advocated by Belsley, Kuh and Welch (1980) 
which use the DFITS statistic to flag observations associated with a high combination of 
residual and leverage statistics17. The second test statistic, the Cook’s D statistic, is used as a 
measure of the aggregate impact of each observation on a group of regression coefficients 
and their covariance. As a standard rule, values larger than n4  are considered highly 
influential. I also use the leverage test for checking observations which have a large 
influence. The leverage values measure how far an observation is from others in terms of the 
levels of the independent variable. Observations with values larger than ( ) nk 12 +  are 
considered to be highly influential, where k is the number of predictors and n is the sample 
size. The results in all tables represent samples without outliers and other observations 
having high leverage and influence18. 
3.6.2 Income – Financial Development Contingencies 
To examine the income financial development contingencies, I split the sample of 
countries to sub-samples, including low income, lower middle income countries, upper-
middle income countries and high income countries, and estimate separate linear 
specifications for each.  The criteria for the four income levels are as follows; sample of poor 
countries are those with per capita income less than $2,650, middle income countries with 
income between $2,650 and $5,499, upper-middle countries are those with incomes between 
$5,500 and $11,499 and high income are those with incomes above $11,500.  These 
thresholds are as defined in the World Bank’s income measures and correspond to measures 
                                                     
17 Following Belsley, Kuh and Welch (1988), I identified as potential outliers countries with 
associated DFITS statistics greater than 2(k/n)^0.5 where k is the number of explanatory variables and 
n is the number of countries in the  sample.  
18 The presence of outliers in the gini (Y), the measure of financial development (X) or controls (Z) 
are not affecting the main results in the sample. The magnitude of the GMM estimates varies 
depending on whether X or Y/Z is included, the magnitude is smaller when X is included and is larger 
when Y/Z is  included. These results are presented in Table B12 in the Appendix using private credit. 
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from the Penn World Tables. Table B9 in the Appendix B provides the estimates of the 
relationship between financial development and income inequality in a linear specification 
for these income split samples using private credit and liquid liability. 
 
For the poor-income sample, the relationship between financial development and 
inequality is large and negative -0.36 (0.08) and significant at the 1 percent level. The 
estimates progressively decrease in their magnitude in any sample having higher income. For 
example, the estimates are negative -0.17 (0.10) and significant at the 5 percent level for the 
lower middle group, but for the upper middle group the estimates are negative -0.08 (0.07) 
and significant at the 5 percent level. For the richer income level, estimates indicate a 
positive relationship 0.036 (0.05) though insignificant. Regarding the quantitative 
significance, the impact on income inequality of a 10 percent point increase in financial 
development is estimated as -0.72 percent for low income economies, -0.34 percent for 
lower-middle economies, -0.16 percent for upper middle economies and 0.07 percent 
increase in income inequality for rich economies19. The results from using liquid liabilities 
and bank assets are reported in panel B and C respectively in Table B9 (Appendix B). In 
sum, these results show that increasing the level of financial infrastructure has a large 
negative relationship with income inequality for poor economies, but its relationship is 
positive and small in richer economies. 
 
I will briefly discuss the coefficient estimates obtained for the additional explanatory 
variables when using private credit. The ratio of government consumption to GDP is 
negative and insignificant for rich-income samples, but positive and insignificant for low and 
upper-middle income countries.  A possible reason for the former could be that more 
spending in social welfare programs in these societies on non-aged population may be 
beneficial for an equal income distribution. Estimated coefficients for secondary school 
enrollment is negative and significant, but have larger impact on lower income societies at    
-2.72 (0.46) and then lower-middle, -0.91 (0.40) and upper-middle income, -0.63 (0.18) in 
that order respectively. For rich-income countries, the estimates are small -0.06 (0.20) and 
insignificant.   The estimates for trade openness are positive for low, lower-middle and 
                                                     
19 These measures are obtained by multiplying the coefficient estimate by the percentage point change 
of 10, and dividing by the time span between inequality observations (5 years).  
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upper-middle economies implying increasing openness and international trade leads to 
higher inequalities, an issue which is sometimes attributed to skill-biased technological 
change (Acemoglu, 2002 etc.). The coefficient estimate is positive 0.42 (0.10) and 
significant at the 1 percent level for low income countries, but negative -0.09 (0.04) and 
significant at the 5 percent level for high income countries. The estimates for initial income 
for all samples indicate higher levels of initial income leads to higher inequality, a finding 
which has been also reported by Edwards (1997). Finally, inflation has a negative 
relationship with inequality for low income and lower-middle income countries and a 
positive relationship for the high income countries. 
3.6.3 Using 90th to 10th percentile as a measure of inequality 
In Table B10 in the Appendix B4, I report results using 90th to 10th percentile as an 
alternative measure of income inequality. The objective of using this measure is to capture 
the ratio of the extreme tails of the distribution of income inequality in the particular time 
period for each country. The correlation between this measure and the adjusted Gini is 0.71. 
In panel A, I report the estimates of OLS, IV and GMM regression using the measure private 
credit, while in panel B, I report the same using bank assets as a measure of financial 
intermediation. In column 1, the OLS estimates of private credit is negative -0.26 (0.10) and 
significant at the 1 percent level. When controlling for endogeneity, the estimate of private 
credit increases to -0.54 (0.22) and is significant at the 5 percent level. The results obtained 
when adding a quadratic term and estimation by GMM are reported in column 4. The results 
indicate that the linear term is negative -12.07 (6.8), and significant at the 10 percent level, 
while the quadratic term is positive 1.57 (0.95) and significant at the 10 percent level.  The 
results imply a nonlinear relationship between private credit and ratio of 90th percentile to 
10th percentile and confirm previous results obtained using the gini coefficient.  From the p-
value of the Hansen’s J test, I find that the over-identifying restrictions are valid and the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. 
 
In panel B, I report the estimates obtained using bank credit. As above, the OLS 
estimate obtained when bank credit enters the estimating equation linearly is negative -0.33 
(0.11) and significant at the 1 percent level.  With a quadratic specification, the estimates 
  72
indicate a nonlinear relationship. The linear term negative and significant at the 5 percent 
level, and the squared term positive and significant at the 10 percent level. The alternative 
measure of income inequality reinforces the previous results. 
3.6.4 Income Inequality, Current Account and other Controls 
In Table B11 in the Appendix B4, I present results obtained using the current account as an 
additional control variable which may have an impact on the degree of income inequality in 
the economy. The current account typically reveals the net capital inflows in a society and 
hence can be an indirect measure of external capital inflows in a country. Table B11, 
columns 1 and 2 present OLS and GMM estimates obtained when using private credit. In 
columns 3 and 4, I present estimates obtained using bank assets as a measure of financial 
intermediation. All columns include the current account along with the usual control 
variables. However for the sample of countries in this paper, I find that the current account 
does not have a significant relationship with income inequality. The results in all four 
columns show that the estimate is negative, small and insignificant.  
 
Incorporating this variable, however, does not change the basic results of the 
relationship between domestic financial intermediation indices and income inequality. In 
column 1, the instrumental variable estimate of  private credit is negative, -0.21 (0.07) and 
significant at the 1 percent level. In column 2, the coefficient estimates of private credit from 
the GMM estimation show evidence of a nonlinear relationship; the linear term is negative    
-3.20 (1.55) and significant at the 5 percent level and the squared term is positive 0.41 (0.19) 
and significant at the 1 percent level.  In columns 3 and 4, estimation results obtained when 
using bank assets as a measure of financial depth are similar.  Also in Table B13 (panel D), 
the controls include a variable proxying property institutions and ethnological background of 
the population. Here the estimates of the linear and squared terms of private credit indicate 
that the nonlinear relationship survives changes in control variables. One implication of this 
analysis is that the basic nonlinear relationship withstands alternations in control variables, 
and this serves as a further robustness check of the results derived. 
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
This paper studies the empirical relationship between various measures of financial 
intermediary development and income inequality. Using a linear specification and 
controlling for endogeneity, I find that higher levels of financial intermediary development 
lead to a reduction in income inequality. When a suitable model specification is made that 
allows for nonlinearities in the model specification, I find evidence of a nonlinear 
relationship in accordance with the theoretical predictions by Galor and Maov (2000). The 
results indicate a possible U-shaped relationship in which at lower levels of economic 
development income inequality falls with financial development. At higher levels of 
development, the relationship is nonnegative with further financial intermediary 
development. This result is confirmed when using different indicators of financial 
development. When using the indicator ‘private credit’, I find that the inflexion point is 
approximately at the level of 55 percent of GDP. In the second part of the paper, I find that 
the empirical root of the results lies in the close relationship between the level of economic 
development and the level of financial development. When introducing a variable measuring 
the depth of the industrial and service sector in the economy, I find that the marginal impact 
of financial development on inequality is increasing with the development of industrial and 
service sectors. When the sample is altered based on the income specification as defined by 
the World Bank, I find that income inequality is significantly reduced when low income 
economies improve their level of financial infrastructure; however the same result cannot be 
extended for richer economies. For these countries, the estimates are small and insignificant, 
implying that the impact of this variable is marginal. Overall, using alternate measures of 
financial development, I find support for the theoretical predictions by Galor and Maov 
(2000) and no indication of an inverted-U relationship as suggested by Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990), or a negative relationship as suggested by Banerjee and Newman (1993) 
and Galor and Zeira (1993). 
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4.0  EXTERNAL SHOCKS, DEPTH OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: ACCOUNTING FOR WHAT DETERMINES VARYING 
RESPONSES TO MAJOR FINANCIAL SHOCKS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 had a significant negative impact on the real economy of 
most countries in East Asia and Latin America. In this paper, I explore why some emerging 
markets were hit particularly hard by the financial crises during 1997, while others were not. 
To this end, I present a simple model that highlights three factors that influence the 
vulnerability of countries to financial crisis: external terms of trade shocks, fragile financial 
infrastructures, and weaknesses in institutions that provide protection to investors. I find that 
for the sample of emerging and developed economies, significant differences in these factors 
help account for the output and investment collapse witnessed in the Asian crisis in 1997.  
 
The literature focuses on the importance of certain factors in determining the 
financial crises, such as, changes in current accounts, foreign exchange reserves, short-term 
debt, capital inflows, and the appreciation of the real exchange rates prior to a crisis. In this 
paper, I find that after controlling for external terms of trade shocks, fragile financial 
infrastructures, and weak investor protection, many alternative hypotheses that have been 
used previously to explain financial crises have low marginal explanatory power in my 
sample. Hence in comparison to prior studies, this paper attempts to extend the literature by 
showing a robust and strong relationship between these three factors and growth and 
investment declines for the period of the Asian financial crisis.  
 
 The importance of external shocks in determining the low persistence observed for 
growth rates has been explored previously in empirical growth literature. For example, 
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Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett and Summers (1993) explored this factor when addressing the 
puzzle that whereas economic growth varies considerably decade by decade, country 
characteristics such as educational levels, political stability, and policy configurations carry 
persistent implications for growth. They tested the extent to which the variation in growth 
rates between countries can be explained in terms of differences in policies, and the extent 
due to differences in shock variables such as terms of trade, external transfers, changes in 
war-related casualties per capita, and the realization of a debt crisis. Their results showed 
that much of the variance in growth rates observed for the decades of 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s can be directly attributed to shocks to terms of trade.  In a related paper, Rodrik 
(1999) gave evidence that external shocks, in combination with domestic institutions of 
conflict management (such as rule of law and democratic rights) are important in 
determining the low persistence of growth rates. Rodrik’s paper focused on the growth 
collapse of Latin America and Middle East countries in the second half of 1970s, particularly 
when they had satisfactory growth rates in 1960s and 1970s.  
 
In East Asia, negative shocks manifested in many forms and are briefly described as 
follows. For example, the Asian economies of Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong experienced a collapse of export growth in 1996 after many 
years of growth in excess of 20 percent. A plausible reason could be that after 1994, the US 
dollar experienced a period of sharp real appreciation relative to the European currencies and 
the Japanese yen. This had an adverse affect on export competitiveness in the Asian region, 
as most currencies were pegged to the US dollar. Moreover, the period prior to the crisis 
experienced a global glut of labor-intensive manufactured exports. This resulted in declining 
terms of trade for these products and a fall in export earnings, as they constituted an 
important share of exports in most East Asian economies. Sector-specific shocks such as the 
fall in the demand for semi-conductors in 1996 added to the declining exports in the region. 
Also the concurrent rising economic growth in China may have shifted export-oriented 
production away from East Asia, particularly after the official devaluation of the Chinese 
Yuan in 1994.  
 
A second key factor for triggering the crisis advanced in this paper is that the 
economies most affected suffered from excessive bank lending and financial fragility. The 
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concept of ‘financial fragility’ or instability is borrowed from Bernanke and Gertler (1990). 
The concept is as follows. When borrowers (entrepreneurs or managers with access to 
productive investment projects) have lower contributions to the total investment of a project, 
their interests are likely to diverge from those of the lenders. Since borrowers have the 
ability to take unobserved actions that affect the distribution of project returns, a greater 
incompatibility of interests can increase agency costs associated with the investment process. 
A financially fragile situation is one in which potential borrowers have low wealth relative to 
the size of their projects. Using a two-period general equilibrium model, Bernanke and 
Gertler showed that financial fragility is more acute when potential borrowers have low 
wealth relative to the size of the project. In extreme cases this can lead to a decrease in 
investment.  
 
A third key factor for triggering the crisis and the subsequent negative impact on the 
real economy as advanced in this study was the poor level of regulatory institutions that 
governed the corporate sector. A number of studies point to weak levels of corporate 
governance as a major reason for the loss of confidence of foreign and domestic investors in 
these economies. For example, Fisher (1999) mentions ‘lax prudential rules and financial 
oversight’ as a factor that can lead to a deterioration in the quality of banks’ loan portfolios. 
In particular for the most affected economies, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea, he writes that, 
“weak financial systems, excessive unhedged foreign borrowing by the domestic private 
sector, and a lack of transparency about the ties between government, business and banks 
have both contributed to the crisis and complicated efforts to defuse it.” In a similar vein 
Temple (2000), in describing Indonesia’s spectacular fall in growth rates after averaging 
over 8 percent growth rate per annum prior to the onset of the crisis, attributes as a major 
cause  “unusually pervasive corruption, associated with state involvement in the economy 
and the centralization of political power.” La Porta et al. (1998) suggest that relatively weak 
accounting standards in East Asian countries may have allowed firms in crisis-affected 
countries to shelter their actual financial positions and continue in business even after they 
were no longer financially viable.  
 
To this end I present a simple model to determine how these factors may have had 
an impact on aggregate output and investment. The model is a version of models presented 
  77
by Bernanke and Gertler (1990) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) in which I incorporate 
external shocks and weak institutions as additional factors determining outcome variables. In 
the model, individual entrepreneurs perform costly evaluations of potential investment 
projects and then undertake those projects that seem sufficiently worthwhile. The evaluation 
process gives entrepreneurs better information about the quality of the project than is 
available to potential lenders. This information asymmetry creates an agency problem 
between lenders and borrowers. The model shows that the quantity of investment spending is 
sensitive to the share of borrowers’ net worth in the project, the quality of institutions 
protecting investors, and the probability of a negative shock. Based on comparative statics 
exercises, I find that large external shocks, coupled with relatively low levels of corporate 
governance, have detrimental effects on aggregate output and investment. Moreover, rapid 
increases in external lending in prior years increases the risk of an output/ investment 
collapse.  
 
The empirical analysis focuses on differences in rates of economic growth and 
investment observed between five years before and after the occurrence of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997. In the empirical part, I test the importance of financial fragility, 
weak institutions of corporate governance and negative external shocks in influencing 
growth and investment collapses in East Asia. I find that for a set of countries including and 
excluding crisis countries, these three factors were important in explaining the growth and 
investment collapse during five years immediately after the crisis in 1997. I then test the 
leading contenders using additional control variables and in multiple regressions.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. The section 2 gives a review of literature in this 
area. Section 3 sketches a simple two period model to derive testable implications in terms 
of our main hypothesis. The section 4 gives details on the data used, results from OLS 
estimation and results on instrumental variable estimation. The section 5 reports the results 
of robustness tests where the main factors are tested against the leading contenders of the 
crisis from literature. The section 6 concludes. 
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4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on the East Asian crisis in 1997 has focused mainly on macroeconomic and 
banking issues. A number of authors, such as Corsetti et al. (1998) and Greenspan (1998), 
observed that many Asian countries had inappropriate macroeconomic policies during the 
1990s, and the crisis in a way reflected the structural and policy distortions in the countries 
most affected. In their view, the root of the Asian crisis was the existence of close links 
between governments and private institutions that created a moral hazard problem. 
Specifically, due to these facts, markets operated under the impression that investment 
returns were ‘insured’ against adverse shocks. Hence even when facing negative returns, 
risky investments were undertaken with the anticipation of future bailouts from the 
government. Such beliefs resulted in a sustained process of capital accumulation, resulting in 
persistent and sizeable current account deficits, increases in foreign indebtedness, and short-
term inflows. In their view these factors were an important indication of the vulnerability of 
these economies in face of a sudden crisis.  
 
In contrast, others such as Radelet et al. (1998) argued that the Asian crisis displayed 
elements of a self-fulfilling crisis, in which capital withdrawals by creditors cascaded into a 
financial panic and resulted in unnecessarily deep contractions. In their view, the countries 
most affected had relatively strong fundamentals, but due to a series of international 
financial market shocks, individual investors panicked, which led to collective herd 
behavior. Thus the crisis was triggered by dramatic swings in creditors’ expectations, 
thereby creating self-fulfilling financial panic. In the process, domestic financial institutions 
that borrowed heavily defaulted on their loans. Hence even though these economies were 
essentially solvent, strong real economies, the temporary illiquidity problem resulted in large 
capital outflows and subsequent exchange rate and growth collapses. The rapid increase in 
short-term external debt prior to the crisis was in their view a key signal of the vulnerability 
of the economies to international financial market instability. It signaled to foreign creditors 
that there was insufficient foreign exchange to pay off all creditors in the case of a panic.  
 
Further still, a number of authors have argued that the crisis resulted primarily from 
the existence of weak regulatory institutions.  Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) 
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explored this issue when examining the collapse of stock markets and nominal exchange 
rates of the East Asian economies. They showed that weak legal institutions (that is, legal 
institutions that do not effectively support the claims of outside investors), help account for 
cross-country differences in stock market declines and exchange rate depreciations during 
the Asian crisis. The importance of legal protection afforded to creditors and minority 
shareholders as a determinant of corporate valuation was also examined by La Porta et al. 
(1997, 2002). They provided evidence from a sample of 49 countries that weak shareholder 
rights and poor enforcement lead to underdeveloped stock markets. They showed that the 
extent to which creditors and minority shareholders are protected explains a great deal of the 
variation in how firms are funded and owned across countries. In a similar vein, Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy (1998) emphasized the underinvestment in appropriate collateral that 
occurred due to incentive problems. Rajan and Zingales (1998) explained problems that can 
occur when a relationship-based financial system is opened to capital inflows.  
 
Some of the literature in this area has emphasized the role of appreciating real 
exchange rates in triggering financial crises. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) explored this 
issue while studying determinants of the growth collapse in the aftermath of the Mexican 
peso crisis in 1994-95. These authors argued that the peso crisis resulted primarily from a 
large appreciation of the real exchange rate, compounded by excessive bank lending and low 
levels of foreign reserves. In their view, financial investors tried to avoid short-term capital 
losses by fleeing from countries in which there was an expectation of impending large 
nominal exchange rate depreciation. Nominal currency depreciation was the most common 
policy undertaken by economies to counter the possibility of defaulting on external loans, 
and the extent of depreciation was usually larger in economies that experienced a large 
appreciation of real exchange rate during a period of rapid capital inflows relative to past 
average values. They found that for a sample of twenty emerging market economies, 
differences in these factors were able to better explain the eventuality of the occurrence of a 
crisis relative to other factors, such as increasing current account deficits and high foreign 
capital inflows. However, their paper related to the experience of the Peso crisis in 1994, and 
hence the strength of these factors was not evaluated for the Asian crisis economies. 
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Most of the empirical literature in this area seeks to identify a set of determinants 
that can account for the occurrence of a crisis. However, there is a void in identifying factors 
important for accounting for declines in growth and investment that occurred after the crisis 
in 1997. This paper attempts to establish factors associated with differential growth declines 
across countries. The focus is on rapid increases in domestic lending, rather than 
international lending, in economies with weak regulatory institutions and experiencing 
negative external shocks. The next section illustrates a simple model designed to explain 
how these factors can influence a growth collapse. 
4.3 THE MODEL 
The following two-period model is based on models developed by Bernanke and Gertler 
(1990) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). These papers depict a conflict of interest between 
managers and outside financiers (banks, equity holders); in addition, I have incorporated 
institutional strength and the possible realization of external shocks as factors that can 
determine output, in order to evaluate their empirical implications. In the model, investment 
is a lengthy (more than one-stage) process. The success of investment projects depends on 
actions taken along the way by the firm's "insiders" (entrepreneurs, managers, and directors). 
The actions cannot be perfectly observed by people outside the firm. In addition, as the 
process evolves, insiders obtain superior information about the quality of the investment. To 
the extent that external finance is required for the project, informational asymmetries 
introduce an agency problem: insiders have the incentive to invest the funds of the outside 
lenders in negative-present-value projects. The specific assumptions of the model are as 
follows.  
 
There is a countable infinity of people. An individual drawn at random is an 
entrepreneur with probability µ and is a non-entrepreneur with probability (1 - µ). At the 
beginning of the first period, an endowment of a non-consumable input good is distributed 
continuously over the population; each individual i receives the quantity wi. During this 
period, the endowment may be either stored or invested. The output of either storage or 
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investment is a consumption good, available in the second period. The gross rate of return on 
any amount stored is r units of output per unit of input. 
 
All projects are identical ex-ante. There are two stages in the investment process, 
which takes place in the first period. In the first stage the project is “evaluated” which costs 
the entrepreneur e units of effort and yields a probability  that the project if undertaken 
will succeed. Only entrepreneurs can evaluate projects.  Undertaking the project requires one 
unit of endowment. The entrepreneur must obtain external finance if his endowment is less 
than unity.  
pˆ
 
The investment technology is indivisible, involves informational asymmetries, and 
yields a random payoff. If the project succeeds it pays a gross rate of return R > r units of 
consumption. R is a random variable having a value r0 when the economy experiences a 
negative shock with probability q and r1 when the economy experiences a positive shock 
with probability (1 – q).  If the entrepreneur decides not to proceed, he may simply store his 
endowment or lend it to others; however, the effort expended in the evaluation stage is sunk 
and cannot be recouped if the project is abandoned. A non-entrepreneur could undertake a 
project, but since non-entrepreneurs cannot evaluate, the project would fail with certainty. 
 
All individuals are risk neutral. Entrepreneurs maximize expected second period 
consumption less any effort expended on project evaluation. Non-entrepreneurs maximize 
expected second-period consumption; their only decision is whether to store or lend their 
endowment. Let w  be per capita endowment, let m be the fraction of individuals who 
evaluate projects. Formally, with no external financing by entrepreneurs, the output is given 
by the following equation. 
Q = [ ] ( )( )[ ]eqrqrpmpmwr −−++− 1ˆˆ 10α               (4.1) 
 
In equation 4.1, the first term is the expected per capita return from storage and the 
second is the per capita return (net of evaluation costs) from investment. 
 
Now suppose that for most of the individuals i,  wi  < 1 so that individual 
endowments are less than the unit required to operate the project. Then entrepreneurs who 
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decide to proceed with their projects must borrow endowments from lenders like financial 
intermediaries (i.e. non- entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who do not proceed with 
investment). The entrepreneur owns share α ( )( )wf=α  of the firm and the lenders/ 
intermediaries own share (1 – α). The intermediaries lend the entrepreneurs the amount       
(1 – w) of the input good and suppose in return the entrepreneur is to pay the intermediary an 
amount of consumption good, Zs. 
 
When wi  < 1, an agency problem emerges as has been suggested by Jensen (1988). 
Because the financial intermediary cannot directly verify project quality, there maybe cases 
in which entrepreneurs channels the borrowed funds in negative present value projects, or 
simply expropriate the funds. Suppose that some entrepreneurs steal  of the borrowed 
capital and obtains a utility S from them. Stealing is equivalent to all forms of expropriation. 
Stealing is costly, and the entrepreneur expects to lose 
0≥S
( ) ( )k2SS 2=C  when he steals, for 
example because there is some punishment associated if caught. The parameter k denotes a 
weak legal system or weaker levels of corporate governance. If k is high, it is less costly to 
steal. Thus, the value of stealing, S – C(S), is concave in S. The marginal value of stealing 
falls as the amount stolen increases because it becomes harder to steal as the absolute 
amount of theft increases; the stealing becomes more obvious and easier for the court to 
stop20. With borrowing capital and expropriation, output is given by: 
  
Q = [ ] ( )( )( ) ( )[ ]eZpkSSqrqrpmpmSwr smp −−−−−−++−+ αα 1ˆ211ˆˆmax 210,ˆ ,    (4.2) 
The first term in (4.2) is the expected per capita return from storage which includes 
per capita endowment net of that invested in project plus the amount expropriated by 
managers; and the second is the expected per capita return (net of costs of expropriation, 
payments to investors and evaluation costs) from investment. 
To examine the impact of negative shocks, costs of expropriation in terms of 
institutions protecting investors, and share of net worth of entrepreneurs on output and 
investment, I undertake the following comparative statics exercise. Differentiating equation 
(4.2) with respect to k gives: 
                                                     
20 The variables S, C(S) = S2/2k, q, α, ro, and  r1 are added in this paper in comparison to the model 










                 (4.3) 
This implies that weaker level of corporate governance (high k) leads to a fall in 
investment and output. As k rises, the amount of expropriation in equilibrium rises and this 
results in siphoning funds from productive investment which ultimately leads to a fall in 
output and investment. 
Differentiating equation (4.2) with respect to α gives: 
( )[ ]sZpSRpmd
dQ ˆ1ˆ +−=α  > 0                (4.4) 
This implies that having greater share in ownership by the entrepreneurs leads to a 
rise in output and investment. Because the manager owns share α of the firm, he has an 
incentive to invest at least some of the firm’s cash rather than to steal it all. The net result is 
increase in output and investment. 
Differentiating equation (4.2) with respect to q gives : 
( )( ) 01ˆ 10 <−−= Srrpmdq
dQ α  since ;1,001 <>> Srr             (4.5) 
This implies that a higher incidence of negative shocks leads to a fall in output and 
investment. 
 
Next, I examine the implications of the model in terms of aggregate output. Let wl  
be the threshold level of personal endowment required by any entrepreneur to evaluate his 
project. If     w < wl , it is not profitable for the entrepreneur to evaluate his project.  Let F(w) 
and f(w) be the cdf and pdf of initial endowments for the entrepreneurs. Let w  be per capita 
mean endowment. Then total output is given by  









−−−−−−++= ∫ αα   
                    (4.6) 
In equation (4.6), the first term is the per capita return from storage; the second term 
is the per capita surplus from projects owned by “middle class” entrepreneurs (those with 
endowments between wl and unity); the third term is the per capita surplus from “rich” 
entrepreneurs (those with endowments exceeding unity). 
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As shown by Bernanke and Gertler (1990), a situation in which many entrepreneurs 
have low wealth (between wl and unity) is financially fragile. In this situation, many 
potential borrowers need funds but are not “credit worthy”: that is, agency costs of lending 
to them are too high. In such situations, even though the fundamentals of investment may be 
good, the average realized return of investments undertaken may be low. In this situation 
there is a possibility of investment and output collapse if entrepreneurs have low 
endowments; this is compounded if the probability of a negative shock is high and if 
institutions protecting investors are weak.  In the next section, we test these implications for 
the output and investment collapse witnessed in East Asia after 1997. 
4.4 DATA DETAILS AND RESULTS 
4.4.1 Data Details 
The sample includes 48 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt , Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordon, Kenya, Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, South Africa, USA, 
UK, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. The list includes 19 emerging economies, − the 
rest are OECD and other developing economies. This sample of countries is chosen in 
accordance to the availability of data for indices of corporate governance21. The key 
dependent variable is the change in the per capita growth rate (chain weighted) from 1997 to 
2001. The year 1997 is taken as the breakpoint as the crisis erupted in the summer of 1997 
with the initial devaluation of Thailand’s baht. The second dependent variable is the change 
in investment levels from 1997 to 2001. The data for growth and investment are from the 
Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston, Summers, Allen 2006). Table A in the appendix provides 
                                                     
21 The sample size is restricted to countries in which there were at least five domestic non-financial 
publicly traded firms since an important focus is on protecting investor rights (see La Porta et al. 
(1998) for details). 
  85
summary statistics of the key variables. All the regressions contain the following 
independent variables (in addition to variables representing external shocks, indicators of 
corporate governance, and indicators of financial fragility): regional dummies for East Asia, 
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, and log per capita GDP in 1993. Per capita GDP and 
regional dummies are included to control for structural characteristics that are correlated 
with income levels and geographical location.  
 
The measure of external shocks is calculated by multiplying the standard deviation 
of the first log-differences of the terms of trade with the average share of total trade in GDP 
during 1993-1997. It is meant to capture the unexpected component of the volatility of the 
streams of income associated with foreign trade. Assuming that the terms of trade follow a 
random walk (possibly with a drift), this is the theoretically appropriate indicator of external 
volatility (Rodrik, 1998b). The data are derived from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2006). 
 
The measure of financial fragility is proxied by two variables. The first is the ratio of 
the increase in ‘Private Credit’ to the increase in the aggregate capital stock over the same 
period 1993 to 1996. The measure intends to capture whether increases in external 
borrowing by the private sector is matched by increases in the capital stock, and serves as a 
rough proxy of the concept of financial fragility portrayed by Bernanke and Gertler (1990)22. 
‘Private Credit’ is defined as the value of credit by banking and other financial 
intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. The second proxy is the increase in 
‘Private Credit’ over the period 1993 to 1997. The presumption is that when bank lending 
increases sharply during a short period of time, banks' ability to screen marginal projects 
declines; thus they are more likely to end up with a large share of weak borrowers in their 
portfolios. The measure ‘Private Credit’ is popular, as witnessed in a number of recent 
papers (e.g., Levine et al. 2000, Beck et al (1999)). The measure isolates credit issued to the 
private sector as opposed to credit issued to governments and public enterprises. It also 
                                                     
22 The measures of capital stock are constructed using the Perpetual Inventory Method (see Barro and 
Salai-Martin, 2004 for details). The data for investment are derived from the Penn World Tables 6.2 
(Summer and Heston, 2006). The initial capital is proxied by using twice the real per capita income in 
1960.This is under the assumption that per capita income follows a Cobb-Douglas production 
function and the share of capital is ½. A constant value of depreciation of capital stock at 10 percent is 
used for all countries. 
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excludes credit issued by the central bank and development banks. It captures the amount of 
credit channeled from savers, through financial intermediaries, to private firms. The data are 
from the World Bank Financial Infrastructure Database (Beck et al. , World Bank 2004). 
 
As a proxy for measuring the quality of corporate governance, I use the ‘Investor 
Protection’ index (World Bank, Doing Business 2006) and also the index of ‘Average 
Protection against Expropriation Risk’ (International Country Rating) as measures of overall 
quality of governance institutions. The indices are described as follows. The Investor 
Protection index measures the strength of minority shareholder protections against directors’ 
misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. The indicator is a composite of three indicators 
which distinguish alternate dimensions of investor protection: transparency of related-party 
transactions (extent of disclosure index), liability for self-dealing (extent of director liability 
index) and shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct (ease of 
shareholder suits index). The data come from a survey of corporate lawyers and are based on 
securities regulations, company laws and court rules of evidence. The index ranges from 0 to 
10, with higher values indicating more investor protection. The second institutional measure 
is the Average Protection against Expropriation Risk 1985-95, from Political Risk Services. 
The index measures the risk of outright confiscation by governments or forced 
nationalization. It scales from 0 to 10, where a higher score means less risk. For ease of 
interpretation, both the indices are adjusted so higher levels indicate weaker level of 
institutions. 
 
4.4.2 Results from OLS Estimation 
Table C.1 in the Appendix C provides summary statistics for the key variables in the 
analysis. There is considerable variation across countries in changes in growth rates and 
investment shares during the period 1997 to 2001. For example, emerging market economies 
like Malaysia, Hong Kong and Brazil suffered growth-rate declines of -4.9 percent, -3.65 
percent, and -2.32 percent from its 1997 value. In contrast, the sample mean is -0.73 percent 
(s.d of 2.18 percent). In terms of investment share differentials, whereas Sweden and Italy 
experienced increases of 1.04 and 1.25 percent, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia 
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experienced declines of -14.02, -12.01, and -15.56 percent. The sample mean is -2.22 
percent (s.d. of 4.16). Further, there is considerable variation in the extent of increases in 
private credit prior to the crisis. For example, allocations increased by 56.4 percent, 42.1 
percent, and 25 percent in Thailand, Malaysia and Hong Kong from 1993 to 1997; in 
comparison, Canada, Austria and Germany experienced modest increases of 6 percent, 5.3 
percent, and 14.5 percent over the period. The sample mean is 21 percent (s.d. of 43 
percent). Again in terms of variation in investor protection, OECD members Canada and 
USA scored a high level of 9.3 and 8.3 in the index whereas Philippines, Indonesia and 
Mexico scored lower values of 3.3, 5.3 and 4.  
 
Table 4.1 display OLS estimates of the relationship between growth rate 
differentials between 1997 and 2001 and external shocks, weak institutions, and measures of 
financial fragility, excess bank lending and controls. Table 4.2 display OLS estimates of the 
relationship between the level of investment differentials between 1997 and 2001 and the 
variables listed above. The sample is restricted to countries for which data for corporate 
governance indicators are available. Also, each leading variable of interest (external shocks, 
the proxies for financial fragility, and the proxies for weak institution) are added separately 
in column 1 to 3 to assess their individual explanatory power. In column 4, both external 
shocks and proxies for financial fragility are included. Finally in column 5, all variables are 
included in the regression specification. 
  
Column 1 (Table 4.1) reports results obtained by regressing growth rate differentials 
between 1997 and 2001 on external shocks and the additional control variables. The 
estimated coefficients on the regional dummies indicate that East Asia and Latin America 
suffered a growth decline during this period: the coefficients on both dummies are large, 
negative and significant at the 1 percent level. The estimated coefficient for initial per capita 
GDP in 1993 is positive but insignificant. Finally, I estimate a statistically significant 
relationship between the external shock and the growth differential, indicating greater 
exposure to external turbulence during this period is associated with larger reductions in 
growth. The estimated coefficient on the external shock is negative  (-0.13, s.e. 0.06) and 
significant at the 5 percent level. This coefficient estimate implies that a country like 
Thailand (with an external shock value of 13.88) is predicted to have a growth rate decline of 
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1.8 percent per annum over this period. This estimate is similar to that found by Rodrik 
(1999) (-0.17, s.e. 0.06) in his analysis of the impact of shocks on growth differentials 
between the period 1960-75 and 1975-89. 
 
Table 4.1. Impact of External Shocks, Financial Fragility and Weak Institutions on Growth: 
OLS Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: Per capita growth rate between  2001 minus per capita growth rate in 1997
External shocks -0.13 
(0.06)** 




Increase in ratio of 




































































R2 0.4822 0.5748 0.5850 0.6251 0.6797 
N 46 46 46 46 46 
 
Notes: The figures in brackets are standard errors. Levels of significance are indicated by asterisks:  
*** 99 percent, **95 percent , * 90 percent 
 
Column 2 reports results obtained by regressing growth rate differentials on proxies 
for financial fragility and excessive bank lending and the additional control variables. The 
estimated coefficient of the ratio of increase in private credit to capital stock is negative       
(-0.024, s.e. 0.009) and significant at the 1 percent level. The estimate implies that large 
lending which is not followed by increases in the capital stock is associated with a fall in 
output. The coefficient implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in the variable private 
credit to capital stock (26.3 during the period 1993-97) is associated with a growth rate 
decline of 0.63. Again, the estimate of increase in private credit to GDP is negative (-1.64, 
s.e. 0.57) and significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient implies that a one-standard-
deviation increase in the private credit (0.43 during the period 1993-97) is associated with a 
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growth rate decline of 0.71. The results are in accordance with the implications of the model 
presented:  when bank lending expands very sharply over a short period of time, banks’ 
ability to screen marginal projects declines, so that they are more likely to end up with a 
larger share of weak borrowers in their portfolios.  
 
Column 3 reports results obtained by regressing growth differentials on the proxies 
for weak institutions and the additional control variables. The indicator ‘Investor Protection 
Index’ proxies weakness in institutions protecting minority shareholders from expropriation 
by management and serves as an indicator for strength of corporate governance. The proxy 
‘Risk of Expropriaton’ captures expropriation by government officials and serves as an 
indicator for the overall quality of institutions in these economies. Improvement in law and 
order as gauged by this subjective index implies enhanced property rights. The results 
indicate a statistically significant relationship; the estimate for ‘investor protection’ is 
negative (-0.50, s.e. 0.14) and significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficient implies that a 
one-standard-deviation reduction in the index (1.74 during the period 1993-97) is associated 
with a growth rate decline of 0.87. Hence when institutions do not adequately safeguard the 
interests of investors, higher expropriation and investment in negative net present projects 
result ultimately in having an adverse impact on the real economy. The estimate for the 
indicator ‘Risk of Expropriation’ is  negative (-0.66, s.e. 0.33) and significant at the 5 
percent level, indicating that weak institutions are associated with the growth collapse 
witnessed in this region. The coefficient implies that a one-standard-deviation fall in the 
index (1.59 during the period 1993-97) is associated with a growth rate decline of 1.05. 
 
Column 4 reports results obtained by regressing growth rate differentials on external 
shocks, financial variables and the additional controls. The results indicate a statistically 
significant relationship indicating that both external shocks and financial fragility is 
associated with the growth decline. The estimate for external shock is negative (-0.12, s.e 
0.05) and is significant at the 5 percent level. The estimate for increase in ratio of private 
credit to capital stock is negative (-0.022, s.e. 0.006) and is significant at the 1 percent level. 
The estimate for increase in private credit is negative (-1.64, s.e. 0.49) and is significant at 
the 1 percent level.  
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In column 5, all variables are added to the regression specification. The results 
indicate that external shocks, financial variables and weak investor protection have a 
negative and significant relationship with growth differential over the period. However, the 
estimate of the variable, ‘average risk of expropriation’ is -0.44 (s.e. 0.28) and is not 
significant at conventional levels.  To conclude, the OLS estimates from Table 4.1 indicate 
that East Asia and Latin America suffered a growth decline during the period 1997 to 2001. 
The decline is strongly correlated to external shocks in terms of trade, proxies of financial 
fragility, and weak investor protection.  
 
Table 4.2 reports results of the relationship of external shocks, weak institutions and 
excessive lending on the levels of investment differentials between 1997 and 2001. Column 
1 reports results obtained by regressing investment differentials between 1997 and 2001 on 
external shocks and the additional control variables. The coefficient on regional dummies 
implies East Asia suffered a large decline in investment. The coefficient estimate is negative 
and statistically significant (-5.29, s.e. 1.26). The coefficient on Latin America is negative 
but insignificant (-0.8, s.e. 1.02). The coefficient on the external shock is negative (-0.33, s.e. 
0.09) and significant at the 1 percent level. The estimate implies greater exposure to external 
turbulence during the 1990s is associated with larger reduction in investment after 1997.  
The point estimate implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in external shocks (5.17 
during the period 1993-97) is associated with an investment decline of 1.71. 
 
In column 2, the proxies for excessive bank lending and financial fragility are added. 
The estimated coefficient of the ratio of increase in private credit to capital stock is negative 
(-0.04, s.e. 0.02) and significant at the 5 percent level. Thus paralleling its impact on growth 
collapse, financial fragility did have some contribution in the investment collapse during this 
period. The coefficient implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in the private credit to 
capital stock (26.3 during the period 1993-97) is associated with an investment decline of 
1.05. Finally, the coefficient on increase in bank lending to private sector is negative (-1.26, 
s.e. 1.04) but insignificant, indicating excessive bank lending and the resulting high 
probability of bad loans was not a significant factor in the investment decline during this 
period. 
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Table 4.2. Impact of External Shocks, Financial fragility and Weak institutions on 
Investment: OLS Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: investment between  2001 Minus investment rate in 1997 
External shocks -0.33 
(0.09)*** 




Increase in ratio of 






































































R2 0.6563 0.6161 0.6375 0.7098 0.7327 
Adjusted R2 0.6133 0.5570 0.5818 0.656 0.6659 
N 46 46 46 46 46 
 
Notes: The figures in brackets are standard errors. Levels of significance are indicated by asterisks:  
*** 99 percent, **95 percent , * 90 percent. 
 
Column 3 reports results obtained by regressing investment differentials between 
1997 and 2001 on proxies for weak institutions and additional control variables. The 
coefficient estimate on investor protection is negative (-0.73, s.e. 0.25) and significant at the 
1 percent level. Hence weak corporate governance is associated with slowing investment in 
this period. The estimate implies a one-standard-deviation increase in the index (1.74 during 
the period 1993-97) is associated with an investment rate decline of 1.27. The estimate for 
risk of expropriation is negative (-0.56, s.e. 0.6) but insignificant, indicating existence of 
weak private property institutions was not a significant factor for the investment decline. The 
coefficient implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in the index risk of expropriation 
(1.59 during the period 1993-97) is associated with an investment decline of 1.03. 
 
Column 4 reports results obtained by regressing investment differentials between 
1997 and 2001 on external shocks, proxies for excessive bank lending and financial fragility, 
  92
and the additional controls. The results indicate that external shocks remain negative (-0.32, 
s.e. 0.09) and significant at the 1 percent level. The estimate for the increase in ratio of 
private credit to capital stock is negative and remains statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. In column 5, all variables are added.  These results are similar to their contribution in 
the growth decline. The estimates of external shocks, ratio of increase in credit to capital 
stock and investor protection are significant, indicating a first-order effect of these variables 
on growth and investment decline. To conclude, the OLS results indicate that external 
shocks witnessed in this region is strongly correlated with the decline in investment together 
with poor investor protection and evidence of financial fragility when bank lending out-
surpassed increase in capital stock. In the next section, these results are examined when 
controlling for potential endogeneity of some of the variables of interest. 
4.5 ON ENDOGENEITY AND INSTRUMENTS 
One problem in the inference associated with the OLS is the likely endogeneity of 
the regressors. To counter this issue, I report two-stage least squares estimates after 
identifying suitable instruments for institutions and banking variables. The instruments are 
chosen such that they are correlated with the endogenous regressors but remain orthogonal to 
any omitted characteristics and are not correlated with the outcome variables through any 
other channel other than their effect via endogenous variables. For the institutional variables 
measured at a particular point in time, the instruments are identified from literature. La Porta 
et al. (1998, 2002) showed that differences in legal origin and rules of investors help explain 
how firms are financed and owned differently in various countries. Legal scholars place 
countries into four major legal families: English, French, German and Scandinavian systems. 
Company and bankruptcy/ reorganization laws pertaining to investor protection are part of 
the commercial codes in Civil law countries and exist as separate laws mainly in the form of 
Acts, in Common law countries. La Porta et al. (1998) identified that Common law countries 
have the strongest investor protection and in accordance English legal origin is identified to 
be a good instrument for the investor protection. In this section, I use English legal origin as 
instruments for the Investor Protection. Again, several authors as Hall and Jones (1999), and 
Rodrik, Subramanium and Trebbi (2002) identified latitude to be a good instrument for 
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institutions. They showed that countries having higher latitude tend to be highly correlated 
with those with good institutions. Accordingly Latitude and German legal origin is used as 
an instrument for the measure Average Risk of Expropriation. The endogeneity problems in 
the banking variable may be marginal as they are measured as changes from 1993 to 1997 
and hence are before the period of growth and investment collapse after 1997. However to 
counter the possibility that anticipation of a growth decline resulted in excessive bank 
lending and financial fragility, I take into account possible endogeneity before drawing 
empirical conclusions of the theoretical model. For the banking variables, the likely 
endogeneity of the explanatory variable is taken into account by using lagged values as 
instruments. Thus the strategy aims to isolate the effect of excessive bank lending on growth 
rather than the opposite by using lagged instruments. The variable external shock is 
exogenous by definition.  
 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 report results obtained when controlling for endogeneity for the 
institutions of corporate governance and banking variables. First-stage estimates are reported 
in Tables C2, C3, and C4 in the Appendix C corresponding to the three instrumental variable 
regressions reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. The results indicate that when regressing investor 
protection on English legal origin and other controls, the former have a strong negative 
relationship with weak investor protection in all cases: the coefficient estimate of English 
legal origin as reported in column 3, Table C4  is negative (-2.84, s.e. 0.44) and is significant 
at the 1 percent level. In column 4, Table C3, latitude has a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with the index of risk of expropriation: the coefficient estimate is      
-6.03 (s.e. 1.45), indicating that bad institutions are associated with economies nearer to the 
equator in accordance to the empirical literature. Also when regressing changes in private 
credit on lagged values and other controls, the estimate of lagged private credit is positive 
and significant (0.88, s.e. 0.04). Similarly, when regressing changes in the ratio of private 
credit to capital stock on lagged values and other controls, the coefficient estimate of the 
lagged value is positive and significant (4.04, s.e. 0.98) as reported in column 2, Table C3. 
      
 In column 1, Table 4.3, the estimating equation includes all variables: the dummies 
for geographical location, initial income, external shocks, the measures of excessive bank 
lending and financial fragility, and two measures of weak institutions. The IV estimates 
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obtained when including all variables indicates that external shocks and increases in the 
credit /capital stock ratio are associated with the observed growth collapse. However, both 
the institutions variables are found to have insignificant though negative correlation with 
growth. A potential problem with applying instrumental variable estimation is that the IV 
standard errors have a tendency to be large in comparison to the OLS estimates, particularly 
because of the quality of the endogenous and exogenous instruments. Hence, the associated 
control variables add to the noise. In order to reduce the noise in the standard error of the 
variables of interest, the next strategy is to drop any variables that are not of any 
consequence for the inference of the model. Towards this aim, I drop two variables, the 
dummy for sub-Saharan Africa and initial per capita income and report the subsequent IV 
estimates in column 223. The coefficient estimate on external shocks is negative (-0.12, s.e. 
0.06) and significant at the 5 percent level. Again the estimate on increase in credit /capital 
stock ratio is negative (-0.016, s.e. 0.009) and significant at the 10 percent level. The results 
indicate that increases in bank lending have a large negative relationship (-1.79, s.e. 0.64) 
and is significant at the 5 percent level. Also, the estimate on weak investor protection is 
negative (-0.25, s.e. 0.14) and significant at the 10 percent level. The estimate on risk of 
expropriation is large, negative (-0.34, s.e. 0.32) but insignificant.  
 
As a further check, I drop the measure ‘risk of expropriation’ to assess the impact of 
the main variables of interest; the results are reported in column 3. The estimates indicate 
that after controlling for endogeneity, external shocks, excessive banking lending and weak 
level of institutions of corporate governance have a significant negative relationship with 
growth, and are associated with the growth collapse in accordance to the model presented. 
The corresponding first stage results are presented in Table C4 in the Appendix C. 
 
 
                                                     
23 The OLS estimates corresponding to this table are reported in Table C5 in the Appendix C. 
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Table 4.3. Impact of External Shocks, Financial Fragility and Weak Institutions on Growth: 
IV Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Dependent variable Growth rate 2001 Minus Growth rate 1997 






Increase in ratio of private 








































Initial GDP (in logs) 1993 -1.96 
(2.43) 
  
N 46 46 46 
 
Notes: The variable increase in private credit between 1993 to 1997 is instrumented using lagged 
value of increase in private credit. The variable increase in ratio of private credit to capital stock is 
instrumented using lagged values. The variable investor protection is instrumented using English legal 
origin.. The variable Average Risk of Expropriation is instrumented using latitude and German legal 
origin. 
 
Table 4.4 reports instrumental variable estimates of external shocks, excessive bank 
lending and weak institutions on investment differentials24. In the first column, the estimates 
when taking into account the likely endogeneity of the institutions and banking variables 
indicate that external shocks are negatively correlated with the investment collapse during 
this period. The point estimate is negative (-0.34, s.e. 0.1) and is significant at the 1 percent 
level. The estimate for financial fragility and increase in bank lending are negative but 
insignificant: the estimate for increase in ratio of private credit to capital stock is negative (-
0.03, s.e. 0.02), the estimate for increase in private credit is negative (-0.57, s.e.1.52), both 
estimates being statistically insignificant. Also the estimates of the variables indicating weak 
institutions are negative but again insignificant. 
 
                                                     
24 The OLS estimates corresponding to this table are reported in Table C6 in the Appendix C. 
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In column 2, after dropping the variables initial income and dummy for sub-Saharan 
Africa, the coefficient estimates indicate that external shocks are negatively correlated with 
investment during this period: the estimate is negative (-0.34, s.e. 0.10) and is significant at 
the 1 percent level. The estimate for increases in credit /capital stock ratio remain negative  
(-0.022, s.e. 0.016) and insignificant; similarly the estimate for increase in private credit to 
GDP is negative (-1.62, s.e. 1.1) and insignificant. The estimate for the investor protection 
index is negative (-0.41, s.e. 0.24) and significant at the 10 percent level. Similar to the OLS 
results, the estimate for risk of expropriation is negative (-0.21, s.e. 0.47) and insignificant.  
 
Table 4.4. External Shocks, Financial fragility and Weak institutions on Investment: IV 
Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Dependent variable is investment rate between  2001 Minus 1997 
External shocks -0.34 
(0.10)*** 
-0.34 
        (0.10)*** 
-0.32 
      (0.09)*** 
Increase in ratio of private credit 












(0.85)*     




-0.43    
(0.24)* 





East Asia -4.93 
    (1.55)*** 
-4.88 
     (1.29)*** 
-5.01 










Initial income 1993 
(in logs) 
  -1.0 
(3.7) 
  
N 46 46 46 
 
Notes: The Investor protection index is instrumented by English legal origin, expropriation risk is 
instrumented by German legal origin and latitude of countries. The increase in private credit and 
private credit to capital stock are instrumented by their lagged values. 
 
 
In column 3, the IV estimates indicate that the variables external shocks, increase in 
credit /capital stock ratio and investor protection are negative and become statistically 
significant. The estimate for increase in private credit to GDP is negative (-1.37, s.e. 0.85) 
and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. These results are similar to the OLS 
results presented in the previous section: external shocks, investor protection and excess 
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banking are associated with the investment collapse, and the results survive after controlling 
for endogeneity bias. In conclusion, when taking into consideration the potential endogeneity 
of the variables of interest, the resulting estimates indicate that external shocks, weak 
institutions of corporate governance and excessive bank lending are associated with the 
growth and investment collapse realized in East Asia during this period.  
4.6 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The debate on the Asian crisis has focused on the relative importance of some 
macroeconomic variables such as large current account deficits, large foreign investment 
inflows, sudden changes in foreign exchange reserves, appreciation of the real exchange rate 
prior to the crisis, and increases in short-term debt to total debt. In this section, some of these 
factors are considered and their explanatory power is evaluated. Using instrumental variable 
regression, I check whether any of them help to explain the growth and investment collapse, 
after controlling for external shocks, financial fragility and weak institutions. In Table 4.5, I 
report a series of estimates to explore for factors determining the growth collapse. Similarly, 
in Table 4.6, I report the results for determining investment collapse. Tables C7 and C8 in 
Appendix C gives the corresponding OLS estimates. The estimating equation includes the 
dummies for East Asia and Latin America, external shocks, proxies for financial fragility 
and investor protection index. In addition, each leading contender is added separately to test 
their explanatory power. The variable risk of expropriation is not included in these 
regressions as its explanatory power was found to be statistically insignificant. 
 
Economists including Corsetti et al. (1998) and Greenspan (1998) attributed the 
emergence of the crisis to large current account deficits prior to the crisis. In their view, a 
high current account deficit can lead to two sets of problems. Firstly, large deficits lead to 
high external debt until the country either becomes insolvent (the present value of 
conceivable trade balance surpluses does not suffice to cover external obligations) or they 
face a borrowing constraint (lenders understand that the country will have no incentive to 
repay any additional debt). In either case, if lending ceases, the country can be facing a 
crisis. In the second case, large external deficits expose a country to the instabilities of 
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international capital markets. Column 1 reports results obtained by regressing growth 
differentials on the current account balance to GDP ratio from 1993 to 1996, the main 
variables and the additional control variables, dummies for East Asia and Latin America. 
The data are from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2007)25. I control for 
endogeneity using lagged values as an instrument for current account balance to GDP. The 
results indicate the coefficient estimate for change in the current account balance to GDP 
ratio is negative (-0.15, s.e. 0.33) but insignificant. The point estimate implies that a one-
standard-deviation increase in the current account balance to GDP (4.18 during 1993-97) is 
associated with a growth rate decline of 0.63. Table C4 in the Appendix C gives the results 
of the OLS estimation. The coefficient estimate on current account is negative, and 
statistically insignificant (-0.08, s.e. 0.07). The coefficient estimates of external shocks, 
increases in private credit and increase in private credit to capital stock remain significant 
and are similar to the baseline in Table 4.3. The estimates of weak investor protection is 
negative (-0.10, s.e. 0.24) but insignificant in the IV estimation. The corresponding OLS 
value is negative (-0.30, s.e. 0.14) and significant at the 5 percent.  The evidence suggests 
that the growth decline was not associated with trade and current account deficits since most 
of these economies were strong growing economies.  
 
A number of papers, including Corsetti et al. (1998) and Radelet et al. (1998), 
indicated that rapid increase in foreign capital inflows played an important role in the 
exchange rate and subsequent growth collapse in Asia. Foreign capital inflows are prone to 
become rapid outflows in the face of investor panic, as was witnessed in Mexico in 1994.  I 
test the explanatory power of the change in foreign direct investment as a percent of GDP 
from 1993 to 1996. The data is from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).  The 
results as reported in column 2, Table 4.5 indicate that this variable has little effect on the 
main results: the estimate for change in FDI is positive (0.18, s.e. 0.61) and insignificant. 
The implication is an increase in foreign direct investment inflows is weakly correlated with 
higher growth in the subsequent period. The OLS estimates are reported in Table C7 in the 
Appendix C. The coefficient estimate for change in FDI is positive (0.027, s.e. 0.11) and 
insignificant. A plausible reason could be that foreign direct investments are considered as 
                                                     
25 The current account data was not available for the following countries, Belgium, Hong Kong and 
Zimbabwe. The sample size is reduced to 43. 
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longer-term inflows and lead to increases in the productive capacity of economies. These 
results are similar to those found by Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) when examining the 
explanatory power of this variable in the Mexican Peso crisis. The coefficient estimates of 
the main variables remain negative and significant. 
 
Table 4.5. Financial Crisis, Economic Growth Collapse and its Causes: IV Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Dependent variable is change in  growth rate between  2001 Minus 1997 



















































    





   
Change in Real 
Exchange Rate 1993-
96 
  -3.84 
(2.88) 
  
Change in short term 
debt 1993-96 
   -0.11 
(0.07) 
 
Changes in total 
reserves 1993-96 
    0.06 
(1.80) 


















N 42 45 44 21 42 
 
Notes: This table leaves out the variables sub-Saharan Africa, initial GDP and Average risk of 
Expropriation. The figures in brackets are standard errors. Levels of significance are indicated by 
asterisks:  *** 99 percent, **95 percent , * 90 percent. 
 
 
In column 3, I check the robustness of the results by adding the change in real 
exchange rate between 1993 and 1996. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) attributed the 
emerging market crisis in 1994 to real exchange rate appreciation in the period prior to the 
crisis. The data are from the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2007). The results 
indicate the real exchange rate appreciation prior to the period had a large negative effect on 
the growth collapse, but the estimates are insignificant (-3.84, s.e. 2.88). The coefficient 
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estimate implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in real exchange rate (0.11 during 
1993-97) is associated with a growth rate decline by 0.42. The corresponding OLS estimate 
also indicates weak correlation, -2. 62 (s.e. 1.86) and is reported in column 3 in Table C7. 
Moreover when including this variable, external shocks and financial variables or weak 
investor protection do not lose their explanatory power and remain negative and significant. 
A possible explanation could be that the real appreciation in East Asia during the 1990s was 
relatively modest compared with those seen in Latin American countries as for example 
Brazil and Argentina. In these countries, the real exchange rate appreciated more than 40 
percent since 1990. Real exchange rate appreciated by 8 percent in Korea and Indonesia and 
14 percent, 35 percent and 12 percent in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand from 1990-
96.  
Radelet et al. (1998) attributed the crisis to the sharp increase in short-term debt, 
which can contribute to financial market instability in face of panic by creditors. A high ratio 
of short-term debt to total debt make economies vulnerable in the face of a crisis, as this 
signals foreign creditors that there may not be enough foreign exchange to payoff all 
creditors in the case of a sudden exodus of capital. The variable used is short-term debt as a 
percent of total external debt, the source is the World Development Indicators (WDI, 
2007)26. Column 4 reports results obtained by regressing growth differentials on the main 
variables, the change in short term debt to total external debt 1993-96 and the additional 
controls. The coefficient estimate from the instrumental regression indicates that when 
controlling for the main variables of interest, this variable is negative but statistically 
insignificant (-0.11, s.e. 0.07). The evidence suggests that solvency was not an important 
issue for the growth decline. 
Lastly, I also examine whether low foreign exchange reserves were a potential 
reason for the growth collapse after the 1997 crisis. The level of reserves is an important 
determinant of whether a country is able to meet its external obligations in face of a self-
fulfilling panic without nominal depreciation of the currency or other structural adjustments. 
The variable added is the change in total reserves in months of imports from 1993 to 1996. 
                                                     
26 The sample size is reduced to 22 countries. The following countries did not have short-term debt: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Turkey, USA, 
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The data is from the World Development Indicators (2007)27. I use lagged values of the 
variable as an instrument to control for endogeneity. The results indicate that when 
controlling for the main factors, the estimate for the change in total reserves is positive (0.06, 
s.e. 1.8) and insignificant. An implication is that the reduction in total reserves is weakly 
correlated with growth reversals. The OLS results as presented in Table C7 in the Appendix 
C indicate that the coefficient estimate is negative (-0.21, s.e. 0.66) and insignificant. The 
other main factors remain negative and significant. 
Next, these factors are also examined for their impact on the investment collapse 
during 1997 to 2001. The instrumental variable estimation results are reported in Table 4.6 
and the corresponding OLS estimates are reported in Table C8 in the Appendix C. In column 
1, the instrumental estimate for change in current account during 1993 to 1996 is positive, of 
small magnitude (0.04, s.e. 0.52) and insignificant. In comparison, the estimates for external 
shock and weak institutions are negative and significant. The corresponding OLS estimates 
are presented in Table C5 in the Appendix. The coefficient estimate for change in current 
account is negative (-0.14, s.e. 0.12) and insignificant. In the OLS estimates, the main 
variables have negative value and are statistically significant indicating the importance of 
these variables in accounting for the investment collapse in comparison.  
In column 2, the instrumental variable estimate for change in foreign direct 
investment between 1993 and 1996 is positive (0.06, s.e. 1.04), but insignificant. The 
corresponding OLS estimate is negative (-0.19, s.e. 0.18). Foreign capital inflows do not 
appear to be related to growth rate changes, while the coefficient on external shocks and 
weak institutions are negative and remain statistically significant as in the baseline Table 4.4. 
The proxies for excessive bank lending and financial fragility though negative in value, lose 
their significance level in comparison to the corresponding OLS estimates.  
Column 3 reports results obtained by instrumental regression of investment 
differentials on the changes in real exchange rate between 1993 and 1996, the main variables 
and the additional controls. The estimate on change in real exchange rate is negative             
(-0.31, s.e. 5.09) and insignificant. The corresponding OLS estimates are reported in Table 
C8 in the Appendix C, the estimate is negative (-0.44, s.e. 3.28). The instrumental variable 
                                                     
27 The following countries were excluded due to lack of data: Belgium, Hong Kong and Zimbabwe. 
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estimates for external shocks and investor protection remain negative and statistically 
significant. Hence sudden appreciation of the real exchange rate is not significantly 
contributing to the investment collapse when including factors as external shocks and weak 
investor protection.  
 
Table 4.6.  Financial Crisis, Investment Collapse and its Causes: IV Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Dependent variable is change in investment  between  2001 Minus 1997 














































    




   
Change in Real Exchange 
Rate 1993-96 
  -0.31 
(5.09) 
  
Change in short term debt 
1993-96 
   -0.14 
( 0.08) 
 
Changes in total reserves 
1993-96 
    2.31 
(3.28) 




















N 42 45 44 21 43 
 
Notes: This table leaves out the variables sub-Saharan Africa, initial GDP, and Average risk of 
expropriation. The figures in brackets are standard errors. Levels of significance are indicated by 
asterisks: ***99 percent, **95 percent, *90 percent. 
Column 4 adds changes in ratio of short term debt to total external debt. The 
instrumental variable estimate is negative (-0.14, s.e. 0.08) and marginally significant at the 
11 percent level. The corresponding OLS estimate is -0.15 (s.e. 0.07) and significant at the 5 
percent level. Thus there is some support that changes in short-term external financing had 
some impact on the investment decline in the region. In comparison, the instrumental 




Lastly, column 5 reports results obtained by instrumental variable regression of 
investment differentials on changes in total reserves from 1993 to 1996, main variables and 
the additional controls. The estimate on changes in total reserves is positive (2.31, s.e. 3.28) 
and insignificant. Thus there is a weak correlation between larger reductions in reserves and 
greater investment declines. The corresponding OLS estimate as reported in Table C8 is 
positive (0.53, s.e. 1.12). The OLS estimates of the main variables are negative and 
statistically significant.  
 
The results of these robustness exercises indicate that after controlling for 
endogeneity, the data suggest a significant relationship between external shocks, excessive 
bank lending and weak investor protection and growth decline from 1997 to 2001. In 
comparison, the other factors as discussed in literature have a marginal contribution on the 
growth collapse as witnessed during this period. When examining the impact of the variables 
on investment collapse, apart from increase in short-term debt, the other factors had marginal 
contribution when incorporating the main variables of interest. 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
The Asian financial crisis raised some questions on the growth strategies employed 
by some of the fastest growing economies of the world. The magnitude and severity of the 
crisis in some of the most affected economies suggested important gaps in the growth 
strategy adapted by these economies. In this paper, I present a simple model to illustrate why 
poor corporate governance institutions and excessive bank lending can lead to a fall in 
aggregate output and investment when economies experience negative terms of trade shocks. 
When tested empirically, the results indicate that these factors mattered significantly in the 
growth and investment declines witnessed during this period. The results are robust to 
controlling for endogeneity bias. The paper also finds that some common explanations for 
the occurrence of the crisis are not supported by the data from the sample. Changes in the 
current account, capital inflows, short term debt, reserves, and also real exchange rate 
appreciation prior to the crisis during the period 1993 to 1996, do not explain why some 
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countries experienced greater financial crises rather than others after 1997, conditional on 
the additional explanatory variables I employ.  
 
The results indicate that strong corporate governance and investor protection are 
important components of any strategy to enhance resilience to volatility in the external 
environment. With greater integration of global financial markets, these elements are 
increasingly important to stabilize emerging economies who are recipients of large 
investments. Further, the results suggest that banks and financial intermediaries should 
follow capital adequacy rules in lending and investments so that there are lower non-
performing loans to account for. The reform of institutions governing corporate sector, 
vigilant supervision, and greater degree of screening before the financing of investment 
projects by banks and other financial intermediaries during economic boom periods are some 




APPENDIX A:  
PRIVATE PROPERTY INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:  CHAP 2 
Table A1. List of Countries and theirs level of Constraint on executive  in 1970-90 
No. Country 1970 1990 No. Country 1970 1990 
1 Algeria 1 3 30 Jamaica 7 7 
2 Angola 3 3 31 Kenya 3 3 
3 Argentina 1 5 32 Madagascar 3 3 
4 Australia 7 7 33 Malaysia 3 5 
1 Bolivia 1 7 34 Mali 1 1 
6 Brazil 1 6 35 Mexico 3 4 
7 Burkina 2 2 36 Morocco 1 2 
8 Cameroon 3 2 37 New Zealand 7 7 
9 Canada 7 7 38 Nicaragua 1 5 
10 Chile 5 7 39 Niger 3 3 
11 Colombia 6 6 40 Nigeria 1 1 
12 Congo(Brazzaville) 3 2 41 Pakistan 3* 7 
13 Costa Rica 7 7 42 Panama 1 6 
14 Cote I'voire 1 2 43 Paraguay 1 3 
15 Dominican Republic 3 5 44 Peru 1 7 
16 Ecuador 1 7 45 Senegal 3 3 
17 Egypt 3 3 46 Sierra Leone 4 3 
18 El Salvador 4 5 47 Singapore 3 3 
19 Ethiopia 1 2 48 South Africa 7 7 
20 Gabon 1 2# 49 Sri Lanka 7 7 
21 Gambia 1 2 50 Tanzania 3 3 
22 Ghana 5 1 51 Togo 1 1 
23 Guatemala 3 3 52 Trinidad &Tobago 7 7 
24 Guinea 1 1 53 Tunisia 2 3 
25 Guyana 6 1 54 Uganda 3 1 
26 Haiti 1 6 55 Uruguay 5 7 
27 Honduras 3 5 56 USA 7 7 
28 India 7 7 57 Venezuela 6 6 
29 Indonesia 2 2 58 Zaire 1 1 
 




Table A2.  Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Description Source 




Average of annual GDP growth rate Penn World Table 6.1 
Government consumption average of the ratio of real government 
‘consumption’ expenditure to real GDP from 
1970-80, 1980-90 and 1990-2000 
Barro and Lee data set 
Log average inflation Log of the average annual inflation in the 
Consumer Price Index from the period 1970-
80, 1980-90, 1990-2000. 




real exchange rate 
overvaluation 
An index of real overvaluation of the official 




the methodology of 
Dollar (1992) 
Constraint on the Executive 
in 1970, 1980 and 1990 
A seven category scale, from 1 to 7, with a 
higher score indicating more constraints. 
Score of 1 indicates unlimited authority; score 
of 3 indicates moderate limitations; score of 5 
indicates substantial limitations, score of 7 
indicates executive parity or subordination. 
Polity IV data set, 
downloaded from the 
Inter-University 
Consortium for 
Political and Social 
Research.  
Log settler mortality Log of estimated mortality for European 
settlers during the early period of European 
colonization (before 1850). Settler mortality is 
calculated from the mortality rates of 
European-born soldiers and bishops when 
stationed in colonies. 
Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2001). 
Log GDP per capita Logarithm of real GDP per capita (1980 
international  prices) 
Penn World Table 6.1 
Secondary school 
enrolment rate 
Total gross enrollment ratio for secondary 
education 
Barro and Lee dataset 
Average Protection Against 
Expropriation Risk, 1985-
95 
Risk of expropriation of private foreign 
investment by government, from 0 to 10, 
where a higher score means less risk. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) 
report an average value for all years from 
1985-95. 
As used in Acemoglu, 
Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) 
Economic Freedom A five category scale, from 1 to 10 with a 
higher score indicating higher economic 
freedom. 
Gwartney et al. 
(1997) 
Democracy This measure is a seven point index, with 
higher values of this variable indicating feIr 
freedoms or greater political violence and thus 
bad conditions for investment. 
Gastil, Freedom 
house 
Rule of law Indicator of a number of elements that capture 
the protection afforded to property rights as Ill 
as the strength of the rule of law. Is a 
standardized measure that varies between – 







Table A3.  Summary Of Data Statistics 
    Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max        
Growth rate 1.07  2.33 -4.61        8.34 
Secondary school Enrolment .32     0.23 .01 1 
Log(average inflation)  2.69   1.22 -.22        7.23 
Log (exchange rate overvaluation) 4.68     .38 3.46        5.47 
Government consumption    16.68   6.38 7.1        35.2 
Log(Initial income)   7.96  .89 6.2 10.18 
Initial Constraint on executive 3.65  2.24 1 7 
Rule of Law -0.206 0.82 - 1.44 1.94 
Political Rights 4.17 1.85 1 7 
          Log settler mortality    4.73    1.24       2.15       7.99 
 
Notes: these data represent the sample with observations which fall under outliers, violate 

















 Table A4. Private property institutions, macroeconomic policies and Growth: Parametric and 
Semiparametric Estimates with no outliers  
Explanatory variable OLS (I) 2SLS  (II) GMM  (III) GMM  (IV) 
 

















































(  1.27)* 
























Initial Constraint on executive index 
square 




Initial Constraint on executive index 
cubed 
   -0.38 
(0.18)** 
R2 0.32 0.335   
Hansen’s J              [0.91]       [0.88] 
N 164 164 164 164 
First Stage estimates for measure of Private property institutions 
 




Notes: The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Those in brackets are p-values. These figures are produced given the 
exclusion of outlier observations, Congo in the decade 1970s, Nigeria, Congo, Uruguay and Zaire in the decade of 1980s and 
Australia, New Zealand, and Zaire in the decade 1990s. The identification of these countries as outliers was made on the basis of 
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Table A5. Linear Specification, Income Sample Splits 
Table A5.1. Poor Income Sample 
Regressor Coefficient Robust S.E. T-ratio Pvalue 
Constraint on executive 0.51 0.29 1.73 0.09 
Government 
consumption 
-0.06 0.04 -1.39 0.17 
Log(inflation) -0.12 0.26 -0.44 0.66 
Log (exchange rate 
overvaluation) 
-1.52 0.59 -2.59 0.01 
Log(Initial income) -0.09 0.71 -0.13 0.90 
Enrolment 4.50 2.26 1.99 0.05 
D80 -1.33 0.60 -2.20 0.03 
D90 -2.66 .598 -4.45 0.00 




Table A5.2.  Middle Income Sample 
Regressor Coefficient Robust S.E. T-ratio Pvalue 
Constraint on executive 2.21 .813 2.72 0.010 
Government 
consumption 
-0.12 0.06 -1.99 0.054 
Log(inflation) -0.87 0.14 -6.21 0.000 
Log (exchange rate 
overvaluation) 
0.91 .81 1.12 0.269 
Log(Initial income) -1.99 1.60 -1.25 0.22 
Enrolment 5.75 2.34 2.46 0.018 
D80 -2.57 .675 -3.80 0.000 
D90 -3.68 1.07 -3.44 0.001 




Table A5.3. Rich Income Sample 
Regressor Coefficient Robust S.E. T-ratio Pvalue 
Constraint on executive 0.86 0.72 1.2 0.24 
Government 
consumption 
-0.13 0.14 -0.94 0.36 
Log(inflation) -0.53 0.22 -2.34 0.03 
Log (exchange rate 
overvaluation) 
1.39 1.36 1.02 0.31 
Log(Initial income) -2.54 1.3 -1.96 0.06 
Enrolment 3.32 2.12 1.56 0.13 




Notes: The above estimates are of a sample without the presence of outliers. Lower income economies are countries 
with per capita GDP less than $2650. Middle income economies are countries with per capita GDP between $2650 
and $5499. Rich income economies are countries with per capita GDP greater than $5499. The dependent variable is 
the growth rate over the decades 1970-80, 1980-90 and 1990-00 
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Table A6. Rule of Law, Macroeconomic Policies and Growth: Parametric and Semiparametric Estimates with no 
Outliers 
Explanatory variable 2SLS Estimates  GMM Coefficient Estimates 


































Rule of law index cubed  -7.348 
(3.01) 
R2 0.48  
N 55 55 
Panel B: First stage estimation for Rule of Law 
 





Notes: The figures in parentheses are t – ratios and that in brackets is p-value. The sample excludes three 
observations which were singled out for violating the tests for outlier and influence statistics. Detailed 
sources and definitions of data are in Appendix A2. The dependent variable in Panel A is the average 
growth rate for GDP per capita over the period 1990-2000. In panel A, the measure of Rule of Law is 
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Table A7. Political Rights, Macroeconomic Policies  and GDP growth 





































Political rights index squared  -0.13 
(0.54) 
Political rights index cubed  -0.02 
(0.04) 
R2 0.266  
N 174 164 
Panel B: First stage estimates 




Note: The figures in brackets are standard errors. Detailed sources and definitions of data are in 
Appendix A2. The dependent variable in Panel A is the average growth rate for GDP per 
ca112pita over the period 1970-80, 1980-90 and 1990-2000. In panel A, the measure of Political 
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Hansen’s J   0.55 0.58 
First Stage Estimates 


















R2 0.3318 0.35 
 
Notes:   (1) The following instruments are used for the IV and GMM estimation: Latitude, log settler 
mortality and log of Frankel and Romer instrument. Latitude is the absolute distance from the equator 
scaled to 0 to 1.  The Frankel and Romer instrument is a variable constructed by Frankel and Romer (1996). 
It is defined as the (log) predicted trade share of an economy, based on a gravity model of international 
trade that only uses a country's population and geographical features. Both latitude and Frankel and Romer 
instrument has been used by Hall and Jones (1996). 
(2) Columns 2, and 4 include Malaria Index in the regression equation. The malaria Index is 
derived from Gallup and Sachs (1998) is the proportion of each country’s population that live with risk of 
malaria transmission. 
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APPENDIX B 
APPENDIX TO INCOME INEQUALITY AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: CHAP. 3 
Table B1. Countries in the sample 
Australia Malaysia 
Austria Mauritius 
 Bangladesh Mexico 
Belgium Nepal 
Brazil Netherlands 
Canada New Zealand 
Chile Niger 
Colombia Norway 
Costa Rica Pakistan 
Denmark Panama 





Germany Salvatore, El 
Ghana Senegal 
Greece Sierra Leone 
Guatamala South Africa 
Guyana Spain 









Korea, South Zimbabwe 
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Table B2: Variable Description and Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Gini Coefficient The Gini Coefficient is the ratio of the area between 
the Lorenz curve, which plots share of population 
against the income share received, to the area below 
the diagonal. It lies between 0 and 1, where 0 is 
perfect equality and 1 is perfect inequality. 
 
Dollar and Kraay, 2002 
 
Private Credit [(0.5)*{F(t)/Pe(t)+F(t-1)/ Pe(t-1)}] / [GDP(t)/ Pa(t)],  
where F is credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to the private sector(lines 
22d+42d), GDP is the line99b, Pe is the end of period 
CPI and Pa is the average CPI for the year. 
 
Levine et al (2006) , original 
source is IFS 
Liquid liabilities [(0.5)*{F(t)/Pe(t)+F(t-1)/ Pe(t-1)}] / [GDP(t)/ Pa(t)],  
where F is liquid liabilities (line 55I), GDP is the 
line99b, Pe is the end of period CPI and Pa is the 
average CPI for the year. 
 
Levine et al (2006) , original 
source is IFS 
Bank Asset [(0.5)*{F(t)/Pe(t)+F(t-1)/ Pe(t-1)}] / [GDP(t)/ Pa(t)],  
where F is deposit assets of deposit money banks 
(lines 22d), GDP is the line 99b, Pe is the end of 
period CPI (line 64) and Pa is the average CPI for the 
year. 
Levine et al (2006) , original 
source is IFS 
Schooling Average years of secondary schooling in the 
population over 25 
Barro and Lee (1996) 
Government 
consumption 
Government Expenditure as a share of GDP. World Development 
Indicators 




Inflation rate Log difference of Consumer Price Index International Financial 
Statistics 
Log GDP per capita Log of real per capital GDP (chain weighted series). 
 
Penn World tables. 
Legal Origin Dummy variable for British, French, German and 
Scandinavian legal origin 
LLSV (1998), Levine et al 
(2000)  using Reynolds and 
Flores (1996)  
Latitude The distance of the country from the equator scaled 
between 0 and 1. 
LLSV (1996) using CIA 
Factbook 
Modern sector The modern sector is the value added of service and 





Average value of five indices of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization, with values ranging from 0 to 1, 
with higher values indicating greater 
fractionalization. 
Levine, Loayza and Beck 
(2000) 
Employment in Modern 
Sector 
Employment in industrial and service sector 
industries as percent of total employment. 
World Development 
Indicators, 2007 
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Table B3.  Summary Of Data 

























GDP per capita (in natural 
logs) 
































































N 225 225 42 63             50 70 
 
Notes: This table reports the mean and standard deviation for the main variables for the full sample of observations 
(N = 225) and also that when the sample is stratified in accordance to income levels as analyzed in section 6.2. The 
data is cleaned of outliers using the methods outlined in section 6.1. 
 
Table B4. Correlation Statistics 
 GINI GDP GOVT. PRIV LIAB BANK TRADE INF SCHOL 
GINI 1.00         
GDP -0.446 1.00        







-0.364 0.587 0.37 1.00      
LIAB -0.38 0.566 0.37 0.824 1.00     
BANK -0.414 0.616 0.443 0.938 0.833 1.00    
TRADE 0.083 0.0724 0.169 0.12 0.118 0.145 1.00   
INF 0.22 -0.062 -0.137 -0.151 -0.182 -0.144 -0.112 1.00  
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-2 -1 0 1
e( priv | X )
coef = -.06762061, (robust) se = .02920311, t = -2.32
 














-1 -.5 0 .5 1
e( liab | X )
coef = -.09849508, (robust) se = .03609677, t = -2.73
 














-1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
e( bank | X )
coef = -.09106118, (robust) se = .03375568, t = -2.7
 
Figure B3. Bank Assets and Log Gini Interaction 
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Table B5.  Financial Intermediation and Income Inequality: Semiparametric estimates 



























GDP per capita square 











































































N 225 225 225 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is log Gini coefficient. The figures in parenthesis are standard errors. The financial 
development measures has been instrumented using dummy variables for English, German and French legal origin.  
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Table B6. Income Inequality, Financial Intermediation and Modern sector 
 Private Credit Bank Assets 






-0.25   
 (0 .14)* 
























































































 Schooling rate -0.66 
(0.16)*** 
-.66    
(.16)*** 



































-0.089   
(.029)*** 












Modern sector 0.004 
(0.0025)* 
-0.005   
(.005) 






















-1.58   
(1.68) 




R-Squared 0.52 0.5688   0.538 0.5769   
Hansen’s J      [0.38]     [0.8448] 
N 225 225 225 225 225  225 225 





18.93 [0.00] 17.55 [0.00] 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of Gini coefficient. The figures in brackets are robust standard 
errors. The modern sector is the value added of service and industrial sectors as share of GDP. The instruments for 
GMM specification are dummies indicating legal origin. The null hypothesis of the Hansen test is that instruments 
are not correlated with error terms. The ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance. The F-test is for 
the particular significance of the legal variables and is not the overall F test for regression. The standard errors 
reported are clustered by country. 
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Table B7. Income inequality and employment in service sector 
 OLS OLS IV GMM 
Private credit 









Private credit*Employment in 








































































R-Squared 0.55 0.56   
Hansen’s J      [0.10] 
N 135 135 135 135 





Notes: The dependent variable is log gini coefficient. The figures in parenthesis are standard errors. The financial 
development measures have been instrumented using dummy variables for English, German and French legal origin 
and latitude. The estimates of controls and dummy variables controlling for time are not reported for brevity. The 
sample size is reduced due to unavailability of data for employment in service sector for the period of 1960s and 
1970s. The standard errors reported are clustered by country. 
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Table B8. High technology exports, Financial intermediation and Income inequality 
  Private Credit Bank Assets 
Dependent variable is natural log of Gini coefficient 
 
Variable OLS  GMM OLS  GMM 
Private credit 







(in natural logs) 






























































































R-Squared 0.637  0.642  
Hansen’s J [sig. level]  [0.494]  [0.492] 
N 78  78 78 78 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is log gini coefficient. The figures in parenthesis are standard errors. The financial 
development measures have been instrumented using dummy variables for English, German and French legal origin. 
The standard errors reported are clustered by country. 
 
   121
Table B9. Results from Income splits: IV Results 
Variable Low income  Lower middle Upper middle  High Income 
Panel A. Estimates using Private Credit
Private credit 











































GDP per capita 



















R-Squared 0.47 0.3494 0.5478 0.371 
Panel B. Estimates using Liquid Liabilities 
Liquid liabilities 











































GDP per capita 



















R-Squared 0.658   0.4057 0.5398 0.3575 
Panel C. Estimates using Bank Assets
Bank Assets 











































GDP per capita 



















R-Squared 0.43 0.3252 0.52 0.3707 
N 42 63 50 70 
Notes: The country classifications are as defined by World Bank’s income measures; high-income countries are 
those with real per capita GDP above $11,500; upper- middle income countries those between $5,500 and $11,499; 
lower - middle income countries are between $2,650 and $5,499; and low income countries those with less than 
$2,650. The standard errors reported are clustered by country. Legal origin is used as an instrument. 
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Table B10. Using ratio of 90th percentile to 10th percentile of Gini as dependent variable 
N = 205 OLS Coefficient OLS 2 IV GMM 
Using Private credit 
Private credit 











































Real GDP square 







-0.83   
(0.41)** 








Trade openness 0.026 
(0.22) 














R-Squared 0.5738 0.576 0.5436  
Hansen’s J      [0.98] 
 F-test for first stage legal origin variables [prob] 26.83 [0.0] 
Using Bank Assets 
Bank Assets 

























Inflation (rate) 0.54 
(0.43) 
















Real GDP square 

































R-Squared 0.583 0.583 0.57  
Hansen’s J      [0.28] 
F-test for first stage legal origin variables [prob] 24.82 [0.0] 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of ratio of 90th percentile to 10th percentile of gini. The data is 
drawn from the World Income Inequality database, version 2a. The estimates for the time dummies are not presented 
for want of space but can be available on request. The sample size is slightly reduced due to unavailability of data on 
percentiles for the whole period 1960-2000 for many of the countries in the sample. The standard errors reported are 
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 Using Private Credit Using Bank assets 
Private credit 















Bank assets square    0.33 
(0.18)* 




































Real GDP square 

































R-Squared 0.44  0.54  
Hansen’s J    [0.4632]   [0.6186] 
N 185 185 185 185 








Note: Dependent variable is log of Gini. The data for current account is from the International Financial Statistics. 
The figures in brackets are robust standard errors. The ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.  
The F-test is for the particular significance of the legal origin and latitude variables and is not the overall F test for 
regression. The estimates for the time dummies are not presented for want of space but can be available on request. 
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Table B12. Income Inequality and Private Credit: Estimates when Including Outliers 
 OLS OLS IV IV GMM GMM 
Panel A (N = 227) Outliers in Y included 






















Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instruments 
used 
  Legal origin Legal origin 
and latitude 
Legal origin Legal origin 
and latitude 
     0.54  
Panel B (N = 231) Outliers in Z included 






















Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instruments 
used 
  Legal origin Legal origin 
and latitude 
Legal origin Legal origin 
and latitude 
Hansen’s J     0.59 0.544 
Panel C (N = 228) Outliers in X included 






















Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instruments 
used 
  Legal origin Legal origin 
and latitude 
Legal origin Legal origin 
and latitude 
Hansen’s J       
Panel D (N = 236) All Outliers (Y, X, Z) included 






















Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instruments 
used 
  Legal origin Legal origin 
and latitude 
Legal origin Legal origin 
and latitude 
Hansen’s J     0.49 0.0.08 
 
Notes: These estimates show the relationship between income inequality and financial development in the sample of 
countries when the observations identified as outliers are included. The outliers are identified as that in Y (the 
adjusted Gini) variable and those in X (private credit) and Z (the controls). The following observations are identified 
as outliers in the sample: the outliers for Yare South Africa (1991-1995), Spain (1996-2000); the outliers for X are 
Chile (1971-75), Niger (1996-2000), Peru (1986-1990); the outliers for Z are Brazil (1991-95, 1986-1990), India 
(1961-65), Pakistan (1961-65), Spain (1966-1970), Greece (1971-75). In panel A, I only included the outliers in Y to 
gauge the impact of these outliers on the results. Similarly, I included the outliers in Z and X separately in panel B 
and C respectively. In panel D, I included all the outliers.  
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 Table B13. Comparison with previous literature 
 Replication results (N = 178) All sample till 1995 (N = 209)
 OLS OLS GMM GMM OLS OLS GMM GMM 
Private 
Credit 
.044   
(0.029) 
-0.17   
(0.14) 














 0.015   
(0.02) 










1.19   
(0.3)*** 
1.29   
(0.34) 














-0.069    
(0.02)*** 
-0.074   
(0.02) 
-0.076   
(0.02) 












-0.081   
(0.013)** 
















0.069   
(0.074) 
















-0.10    
(0.039) 
-0.09   
(0.04) 
-0.16   
(0.05) 




























.002  .002 0.002    
(0.002) 
0.005   
(0.003) 










Constant   -0.87   
(1.32) 
-1.06   
(1.34) 












R2 0.5705 0.5718   0.599 0.6079   
Hansen J-test    0.35 0.42   0.56 0.87 









































































































































































R2 0.56 0.56   0.59 0.587   
Hansen J-test    0.29 0.23   0.35 0.46 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of Gini. The figures in brackets are robust standard errors. The ***, **, * indicate 
1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance.  The financial development measures are instrumented using legal origin. 
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Table B14. The Mechanism of the SMD Estimator (Ai and Chen, 2003) 
The semiparametric model applicable to our problem is the partially linear regression model studied by 
Robinson (1988) having the conditional moment restriction is as follows:   ( ) ( )iiii ZhXYV 00110, −′−= θαρ             
  (7)  
With ( )[ 0,|, 210 =iii XXVE ]αρ , where α0 = (θ0, h0), , and ( ) ( 211 ,,, XXXXYV ′′=′′= )
( ′′′= ZYY ,1 ) .  The following paragraph describes the SMD estimator28. 
Suppose that the observations {(Y, X) : i = 1, 2, …n} are drawn independently from the distribution of (Y, 
X) with support   where  is a subset of and ℵ×Υ Υ dyℜ ℵ is a compact subset of . Suppose that the dxℜ
unknown distribution of (Y, X) satisfies the conditional moment restriction given by (7), where  ρdℜ→Α×Ω:ρ
is a known mapping, up to an unknown vector of parameters ( ) Θ Η×≡Α∈≡ 000 ,hθα . We assume that 
θdℜ⊆Θ is compact with nonempty interior and that  is a space of continuous functions. qΗ×......×1Η≡Η
We further assume that  and ( )zX ′′ zY ℵ×Υ≡Ω∈′≡ ,V ℵ⊆ℵz . If FY|X (functional form of the conditional 
distribution of Y given X) were known, then the functional form of the conditional mean function 
( ),xm =α ( ,,, xy z θ ) )((.) ydFh | xXY =∫ ρ  would be known. The minimum distance estimator of αo would then 
minimize: 
                             ( ) ( )[ ] ( ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ )′ −×Θ∈= ∑ ααθα ,,inf 1),( XmXXmEHh               (8) 
where   is a positive definite matrix for any given X. The true value of α0 could then be estimated ( )∑ X
by minimizing the sample analog of (7). Following the sieve literature, Ai and Chen replace the H with the sieve 
space  which is computable and often finite-dimensional compact parameter space that qnn Η×≡Η n ×Η ......1
becomes dense in H as n increases. Then the SMD estimator of α0 minimizes the sample analog of a nonparametric 
version of (9) with h restricted to the sieve space Hn: 
( )nnn hˆ,ˆˆ θα = : ( ) [ ] ( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ Σ′ −×Θ∈= ααθα ,ˆ)(ˆ,ˆmin 1),( iiHh XmXXmE    (9) 
To compute the consistent estimator of m(X), the linear sieve estimator is used. Let {p0j(X). j = 1,2, ….} 
denote a sequence of known basis functions (as in splines, Fourier series, power series etc.), the linear sieve 
estimator is given by : 
                                                     
28 This portion is heavily derived from Ai and Chen (2003). More details on the derivation of the variance 
covariance is available in this paper. 
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where P  =  ( ) ( )( )′nknkn XpXp ,.......,1 . 
The integer kn is the smoothing parameter which is required to grow with n so that the approximation error 
decreases to zero. The above sieve estimator can be interpreted as GMM. With = I, the SMD estimator   is )(ˆ XΣ
the solution to  


























,,min αραρθα        (10) 
where   denotes the Kronekar product and I the dρ  × dρ identity matrix. ⊗
Following the procedure as specified in Ai and Chen (2003), we assume that the nonparametric part of the 
estimating equation ,   for j = 1, …q. For identification we assume that Z [ ] 2/1,1,1 10 11 >−Λ=∈ γγcjj Hh
contains a constant with dim(Z) > 1, and hoj (0) = 0 for j = 1, …, q. We consider the Fourier series sieves for j = 
1, …, q: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]








































               (11) 
here ( 1,21 )γ∈p   is a constant arbitrary close to 1γ . We apply the SMD procedure described above 
with    given in (7) and  k1n = q(2Jn + 1). The SMD procedure with identity ,........1 qnnn HHH ××≡ jnH
weighing is just a 2SLS estimation applied to ( ) iiii uhXY 1011 Z0 ++′= θ   , with pkn(Xi) as instruments. 
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APPENDIX C 
APPENDIX ON EXTERNAL SHOCKS, INSTITUTIONS : CHAP 4 
Table C1. Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Change in growth 46 -0.73 2.18 -5.77 2.524 
Change in 
investment 
46 -2.22 4.16 -15.56 3.9 
EEA 46 0.17 0.38 0 1 
SSA 46 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Latin 46 0.19 0.40 0 1 
External Shock 46 5.00 5.17 0.72 28.56 
Per capita GDP 
1993 (in logs) 
46 9.12 0.89 6.98 10.23 
Change in private 
credit to GDP 
46 0.21 0.43 -0.50 2.12 
Change in ratio of 
private credit to 
capital stock 
46 -1.46 26.34 -95.34 122.11 
Investor 
Protection Index 
46 5.77 1.74 2.7 9.7 
Average Risk of 
Expropriation 
46 7.94 1.59 5.22 9.98 
Latitude 46 0.34 0.20 0.011 0.711 
Change in current 
account 
43 -1.08 4.18 -19.35 3.58 
Change in FDI 45 0.96 2.03 -1.37 12.16 
Change in REER 45 0.135 0.34 -0.26 2.25 
Change in Short 
term debt 
21 0.027 6.02 -13.86 11.53 
Change in total 
reserves 
43 -0.044 0.27 -0.49 0.72 
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Table C2. First stage for growth and investment collapse: Including all variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 For private 
credit 
























































































R-square 0.967 0.4444 0.7013 0.8423 
N 46 46 46 46 
Notes: This table serves as first stage estimates for column 1 in Table 3 and 4. The variable investor protection is 
instructed using English legal origin. The variable Average Risk of Expropriation is instrumented using latitude and 
German legal origin.  
 
Table C3. First stage for growth and investment collapse : Excluding SSA and GDP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 For private 
credit 








































































R-square 0.96 0.4321 0.6558 0.5654 
N 46 46 46 46
Notes: This table serves as first stage estimates for column 2 in Table 3 and 4.  
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Table C4. First stage for growth and investment collapse: Excluding variables SSA, Log GDP and 
Average Risk of Expropriation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 For private credit For credit to capital 
stock 
Investor protection 
East Asia 0.024 
(0.047) 




Latin America -0.11 
(0.05)** 






































R-square 0.96 0.357 0.63 
N 46 46 46 
 
Notes: This table serves as first stage estimates for column 3 in Table 3 and 4.  
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Table C5. Impact on Growth: OLS estimates corresponding to the IV estimates in Table 3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Dependent variable Growth rate 2001 Minus Growth rate 1997 






Increase in ratio of private 








































Initial GDP (in logs) 1993 -0.47 
(0.47) 
  
R-square 0.6797 0.672 0.6585 
N 46 46 46 
 
Notes: The figures in brackets are standard errors. Levels of significance are indicated by asterisks:  *** 99 
percent, **95 percent , * 90 percent. 
 
Table C6. Impact on Investment: OLS corresponding to the IV estimates  in Table 3 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Dependent variable is investment rate between  2001 Minus 1997 






Increase in ratio of private 



















Risk of Expropriation -0.40 
(0.56) 
-0.36 
   (0.28) 
 















Initial GDP (in logs) 1993 -0.02 
(0.92) 
  
R-square 0.7341 0.7326 0.7211 
N 46 46 46 
 
Notes: The figures in brackets are standard errors. Levels of significance are indicated by asterisks:  *** 99 percent, 
**95 percent , * 90 percent. 
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Table C7. Financial Crisis, Growth Collapse and its Causes: OLS Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Dependent variable is change in growth rate between  2001 Minus 1997 












































Change in current 
account balance 1993-97 
-0.08   
(0.07) 
    





   
Change in Real 
Exchange Rate 1993-96 
  -2.62 
(1.86) 
  
Change in short term 
debt 1993-96 
   -0.10 
(0.07) 
 
Total reserves 1996     -0.21 
(0 .66) 




















R-square 0.6569 0.6548 0.6721 0.6698 0.6518 
N 42 45 44 22 43 
 
Notes: The figures in brackets are standard errors. Levels of significance are indicated by asterisks:  *** 99 percent, 
**95 percent , * 90 percent. 
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Table C8. Financial Crisis, Investment Collapse and its Causes: OLS Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Dependent variable is change in  investment between  2001 Minus 1997 




















-0.028   
(0.016)* 





























    





   
Change in Real 
Exchange Rate 1993-
96 
  -0.44 
(3.28) 
  
Change in short term 
debt 1993-96 
   -0.15 
(0.07)** 
 
Changes in total 
reserves 1993-96 
    0.53 
(1.12) 








-5.67   
(1.33)*** 










R-square 0.7363 0.7285 0.7205 0.9091 0.7292 
N 43 45 44 22 43 
 
Notes: The figures in brackets are standard errors. Levels of significance are indicated by asterisks:  *** 99 percent, 
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